SHARIAsource

Plaintiff William Welch claimed the Saginaw Correctional Facility violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion by providing meals that provided insufficient nutrition and calories. The appellate court agreed that Welch had demonstrated a potential violation of his constitutional rights, and affirmed the district court's earlier denial of qualified immunity to the defendants. 

A baby produced through medical intervention by the sperm and egg of duly wedded couples (without involving a third party) is permissible under Islamic law. However, surrogacy is not allowed because marriage is the only means through which children should be produced under Islamic law. Surrogacy is likely to give rise to innumerable legal problems regarding paternity and maternity of the surrogate children, the relationship between actual children and surrogate children, and inheritance rights.

On March 6, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued a revised Executive Order which barred, with certain exceptions, entry to the United States of nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries, suspended the entry of refugees for 120 days, and reduced the number of refugees who can be admitted to the United States by more than half. The Plaintiffs (political activist Linda Sarsour, as well as 26 additional Muslim individuals) filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. While other litigation opposing the revised Executive Order were filed to enjoin only Sections 2 and 6 of the revised Executive Order, in this case the Plaintiffs asked the Court to enjoin the enforcement of the revised Executive Order in its entirety. In order for the Plaintiffs to succeed, they had to prove that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits of their case; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) the balance of the equities tips in their favor; and (4) an injunction would be in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S. Ct. 365, 172 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2008).

In this opinion, addressed to the Official Gazette, the Secretary of the Guardian Council invalidated Article 26 –Note 1 of the Law on the Formation, Duties, and Election of National Islamic Councils 1996. He argued that because Guardian Council does not have any supervisory authority over the decisions of the City Councils (unlike legislative acts), religious minorities could not represent Muslims where majority of residents are Muslims.

In 1986, the Aga Khan IV promulgated a global Ismaili Constitution, which brought the social governance of the Ismaili community under one umbrella. It was envisioned as a document which could harness the best in individual creativity while creating an ethos of group responsibility. The global Constitution, amended in 1998, covers a range of topics including authority over the community, family and personal law, dispute resolution mechanisms, and the formation of institutions relevant to the community. 

This document shows the ruling made by Judge Datuk Hanipah Farikullah of Malaysia’s Federal High Court that only the Syariah Court has the power to decide on the validity of the Selangor fatwā that labelled the activist organization Sisters In Islam (SIS Forum) as a “deviant group” for promoting “liberalism” and “religious pluralism.” This ruling shows the grounds on which the decision was made that the [civil] High Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the Sister in Islam’s application for judicial review to challenge the validity of the fatwā issued by the Selangor Fatwa Committee.

To fund construction for a new building without violating Islamic law's prohibition against interest, the Islamic Center of Nashville (ICN) entered into an ijāra agreement with Devon Bank; the bank created a subsidiary for the purpose of the ijāra agreement. Under the agreement, Devon Bank had legal ownership of the building's title until ICN could fully purchase the building. After ICN paid for the building, ownership was transferred to ICN from Devon Bank. ICN applied for a property tax exemption, including for the time period in which Devon Bank held the title for the building. The state of Tennessee denied ICN the exemption for the period in which Devon owned the building, but granted it for the time after. ICN appealed that decision. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment on the basis of the Tax Injunction Act, which prohibits federal courts from hearing challenges to tax obligations if the taxpayer has adequate access to judicial review in state courts.  

To fund construction for a new building without violating Islamic law's prohibition against interest, the Islamic Center of Nashville (ICN) entered into an ijāra agreement with Devon Bank; the bank created a subsidiary for the purpose of the ijāraagreement. Under the agreement, Devon Bank had legal ownership of the building's title until ICN could fully purchase the building. After ICN paid the amount for the building's construction, ownership was transferred to ICN from Devon Bank. ICN applied for a property tax exemption, including for the time period in which Devon Bank held the title for the building. The state of Tennessee denied ICN the exemption for the period in which Devon owned the building, but granted it for the time after. ICN appealed that decision. 

This suit filed before the High Court of Borno State, Nigeria, centered on the question of whether the Borno State legislature can constitutionally extend the jurisdiction of the Sharīʿa Court of Appeal beyond questions of Islamic personal law to other civil and criminal matters. The Court answered in the negative. Because the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Sharia Courts of Appeal is regulated by the Constitution, the Court determined that varying its jurisdiction would require an amendment of the Constitution rather than mere legislation.

The Sharia Court, Mariga, Nigeria convicted the Appellant for the offense of house trespass and theft under the Penal Code of Nigeria. The Appellant brought this appeal before the High Court of Niger State, challenging his conviction on the basis that the Sharia Court’s jurisdiction was limited to Islamic law and did not extend to the Penal Code, which is based on Common Law. The High Court allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction.

These materials include (i) a compendium of the Sharia Courts Laws enacted by the sharīʿa states, in the form of the Zamfara State Sharia Courts Law annotated section by section to show variations between it and all the rest; (ii) tables correlating the sections of the Zamfara State Sharia Courts Law with the Area Courts laws of 1967-68, from which the Zamfara law was derived; (iii) other statutory materials; (iv) materials on civil procedure in the Sharia Courts; (v) selected decisions by state High Courts and the federal Court of Appeal on matters related to the Sharia Courts, including their jurisdiction and the law applicable in them; (vi) information on the judges of the Sharia Courts, including their numbers, qualifications, and remuneration; (vii) data on caseloads of courts in the sharīʿa states, including the High Courts and Sharia Courts of Appeal, 2011-2015; and (viii) data on numbers of judgments of amputation and stoning to death imposed by Sharia Courts, 2011-2015, and numbers of appeals from such judgments going to High Courts and Sharia Courts of Appeal.

These materials are a part of The Nigeria Papers – a SHARIAsource Special Collection, compiled and edited by Independent Scholar Philip Ostien and others. 

These materials include the results relating to gender of a perceptions survey carried out in three sharīʿa states in early 2016, which included questions on hisbah and women, zakat and gender issues, practices harmful to women, and education of girls and women. Also included is documentation of a number of public enlightenment and sensitization programs on women’s rights carried out in the sharīʿa states, and of the effect of sharīʿa implementation on the education of girls and women.

These materials are a part of The Nigeria Papers – a SHARIAsource Special Collection, compiled and edited by Independent Scholar Philip Ostien and others. 

Petitioner Muneer Awad sued defendant members of the Oklahoma Election Board seeking to prevent certification of election results of a proposed state constitutional amendment that would have prevented Oklahoma state courts from considering or using "Sharia Law." The Petitioner claimed this state constitutional amendment would have violated his federal constitutional First Amendment rights and sought a preliminary injunction. The Appellate Court determined that the Petitioner asserted the kind of direct injury-in-fact necessary to create First Amendment Establishment Clause standing. Specifically, the Appellate Court determined that because the amendment would have been certified a week after it was passed, the injury was imminent and not conjectural or hypothetical. The Appellate Court also found that the proposed amendment violated the Establishment Clause because it discriminated among religions, and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny. The Appellate Court ruled that the proposed amendment could not pass the strict scrutiny standard because the Oklahoma Election Board could not prove that the amendment was enacted to provide a compelling state interest, and therefore could not prove that the amendment was not “closely fitted” to that interest.

The constitution of the State of Brunei was composed at the end of the British Residency (1906-1959) and recorded in Brunei Constitutional Documents, a collection of all of the constitutional documents that came into force between September 29, 1959, and July 1, 1960. It was enacted by proclamation of the Sultan of Brunei, Omar Ali Saifuddin Sa'adul Khairi Waddin Ibni Almarhum Mohamed Jamal-ul Alam. It has twelve parts: Part I, Preliminary; Part II, Religion; Part III, Executive Authority; Part IV, Privy Council; Part V, The Executive Council; Part VI, The Legislative Council; Part VII, Legislation and Procedure in the Legislative Council; Part VIII, Finance; Part IX, The Public Services; Part X, The State Seal; Part XI, Miscellaneous; Part XII, Amendment and Interpretation of the Constitution.

The plaintiff brought a case before the General Court of Roudehen seeking the Court’s authorization for remarriage. The Court rejected his claimed and stated that Article 16 of the Family Protection Law 1974 was unconstitutional.

Religion appears in the constitutions of the Arab world, almost all with Muslim majorities, in a variety of ways. But aside from ensuring a public role for religion, these states are far from theocratic and show considerable though subtle diversity within them. 

In 2014, a Malaysian federal court invalidated an Islamic state law criminalizing the public behavior and appearance of transwomen (people identifying as women and identified as men at birth). The Court ruled that the Malaysian Constitution’s fundamental rights trumped state-legislated Islamic law. It relied heavily on the notion that the Muslims being prosecuted suffered from Gender Identity Disorder (GID), over which they had no control. Evidence of the plaintiff’s GID and information about GID was provided to the Court by two psychiatrists, a psychology, and a sociologist.

The Plaintiff, Marcus Leeotis Watts, sued the Respondents, various prison officials at the Perry Correctional Institution in South Carolina, for allegedly violating his rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment when the prison failed to provide Muslim prisoners with ḥalāl meat. The Respondents contended that the vegetarian meal option that complied with Islamic law was adequate, and sought summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment for the Respondents, citing earlier case law providing that the failure to provide a ḥalāl diet containing meat did not substantially burden prisoners' exercise of religion because a Muslim prisoner is not religiously-obligated to eat meat.