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Petitioner Fedwa Khalik, an Arab-American who was born in Kuwait and practiced Islam, sued her former employee, alleging discrimination because of race, religion, national origin, and ethnic heritage under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Petitioner alleged she was grabbed in the office and subjected to false investigation and discrimination. The Appellate Court held for the Respondent after determining that the Petitioner’s allegations were not plausible under the Twombly/Iqbal standard [two cases which announced a new federal pleading standard, allowing district court judges to dismiss a complaint if it does not set out a “plausible” claim: Bell Alt. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)] because (1) several of her allegations were not entitled to the assumption of truth because they were entirely conclusory, and (2) the remaining facts did not sufficiently allege discrimination or retaliation since her claims were based solely on the fact that she was Muslim and Arab-American.

Plaintiff Jeffrey Coleman filed an action against the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) alleging violations of his constitutional rights under the First Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and RLUIPA. The Plaintiff claimed that these rights had been violated in over 12 policies, including the policy that limited his purchase of prayer oil to once a week, a grooming policy that prevented him from growing a beard, and a CD policy limiting inmates’ purchase of spoken religious word CDs to a single vendor. The District Court dismissed all claims against the Respondent except for claims related to the CD policy, which the District Court determined was not related to any legitimate penological interest.

Plaintiff Mitchell Theophilus Garraway filed an action against the Respondent, a Lewisburg penitentiary, for a claimed violation of RLIUPA. The Plaintiff alleged that various Federal Bureau of Prisons rules and policies severely and unnecessarily burden his right to private religious exercise of his Islamic faith. The Plaintiff cited, among other reasons, that the prison did not make the chapel available to all Muslims to congregate for Friday prayer, and also placed other restrictions on Muslims’ ability to perform all their prayers together as one group. The District Court decided that the penitentiary had a legitimate governmental interest—the need to maintain order and security—that was rationally connected to the policy regarding congregation for prayer. 

Plaintiff Jim Davis challenged a prison policy that imposed a temporary, total ban on the purchase and receipt of prayer oil as a violation of both his First Amendment and RLUIPA rights. The Respondents, the prison administration and various officers individually named in the complaint, counterclaimed that a ban on prayer oils furthered a legitimate government interest, as prayer oils posed a fire, health, and safety hazard. The Plaintiff alleged in a second claim against the Respondents that they retaliated against him for filing a grievance regarding this prison policy by restricting the purchase of religious items to the quarterly packages he could receive while incarcerated. The Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court determined that the Plaintiff stated a cognizable First Amendment and RLUIPA violation with respect to the prayer oil ban, because the Plaintiff sufficiently showed that the prayer oils were not flammable and therefore did not pose a risk. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss with regard to the second claim because the District Court determined that restricting religious items to the quarterly packages did not sufficiently burden his practice of religion, as he was not denied all access to prayer oil and was still allowed to order oil in quarterly packages.

The Plaintiff, Muslim prisoner Davis Totten, brought this civil rights claim against employees of Ryan Correctional Facilities alleging religious discrimination. The Plaintiff claimed that the Respondents violated his First Amendment right to religious freedom because they 1) threatened the Plaintiff with disciplinary action if he attended the Friday (jumuʿa) prayer service, the Islamic study class (taʿlīm) or any Islamic seminar while on a work or school assignment; 2) tried to control how Muslims appoint their spiritual leader for the Friday prayer services; and 3) failed to make preparations for the Eid al-Aḍḥā prayer service, among other alleged offenses. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, on the claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Respondents’ motion be granted in part and denied in part. On the first issue, the Magistrate Judge determined that the Respondents were entitled to qualified immunity, because the Plaintiff did not meet his burden of convincing the Court that it was clearly established law that an official’s failure to allow prisoners to attend the Friday prayer service, the Islamic study class, or any Islamic seminar violate the First Amendment right to practice religion. The Magistrate Judge found the Respondents entitled to summary judgment on the second issue, because the Magistrate Judge found that the plaintiff did not indicate that any prison officials actually appointed an inadequate spiritual leader who interfered with his right to practice his religion. On the third issue, the Magistrate Judge determined that the Respondents were not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds on this claim, because the Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his ability to attend the Eid al-Aḍḥā prayer service—which is mandated by his religion and is a “sincerely held” practice—had been infringed upon, and was not related to a legitimate penological interest.

The Plaintiffs, Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) prisoners Eric Dowdy, Averis X Wilson, Roger Hunt, Amira Salem, Tom Traini, Patricia L. Caruso, Dave Burnett, and Michael Martin, alleged that the Defendants, various MDOC employees, violated their rights under federal and state constitutional provisions and RLUIPA by unlawfully restricting their religious practices. Specifically, the Plaintiffs challenged the Respondents’ alleged failure to accommodate certain religious practices which they claimed must be observed during particular days and times each week. The Muslim Plaintiffs specifically challenged that the inability to attend Friday (jumuʿa) prayer services without obtaining permission to exercise a “call-out”—permission which is often denied—violated their federal and state constitutional rights. The Muslim Plaintiffs also challenged the Respondents’ alleged failure to accommodate their religious dietary restrictions and their observance of the Eid al-Fīṭr and Eid al-Aḍḥā feasts. In response to the first allegation, the Respondents claim that there is a legitimate governmental interest in prison security that would be compromised if inmates were allowed to attend prayer services. The District Court determined, however, that while a legitimate governmental interest existed, the restriction of prayer services was not the least restrictive means of protecting this compelling interest in prison security. Accordingly, the District Court did not grant summary judgment in response to the Plaintiffs’ Friday prayer claim. In response to the second allegation, the Court determined that failure to provide Muslim inmates with a ḥalāl diet substantially burdens a religious exercise, but found that a question of fact exists as to whether the Plaintiffs received such a diet.

Plaintiff Sha-Heed Rahman, a Shīʿī Muslim prisoner in the New York Department of Corrections (“DOCS”), brought this lawsuit against the respondents, various DOCS prison officials, alleging that the respondents violated a settlement agreement, retaliated against him, and conspired to punish him for pursuing his First Amendment rights to exercise his religion and access the courts. The plaintiff originally brought a civil rights lawsuit in 2004, claiming that the respondents violated his First Amendment rights by only employing Sunnī chaplains at DOCS facilities and not allowing inmates to observe Shīʿī holy days. The plaintiff and the respondents entered into a settlement agreement which included the plaintiff’s right to an alternative Shīʿī Friday prayer (jumuʿa) service. In this current suit, the plaintiff claimed that the respondents had failed to provide a separate Shīʿī service and failed to provide Shīʿī study classes. The plaintiff also claimed that when he filed grievances in an attempt to enforce the settlement agreement terms, he was sent to the Special Housing Unit as punishment. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the claim. The District Court granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss, determining that the plaintiff failed to state a claim. However, the District Court granted the plaintiff leave to amend the claim regarding his First Amendment and retaliation concerns with respect to the provision of Shīʿī study classes.

Plaintiff Joey Kenneth Priddy, a Virginia inmate, filed this civil rights action alleging that the Respondents, various prison officials at Bland Correctional Center, violated his constitutional rights by allowing Muslim inmates to conduct prayer groups in common areas of the prison facility. The Plaintiff sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The District Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s complaint, determining that the challenged prison practices did not deprive the Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. The District Court found that there was no violation of the Establishment Clause, because the prison officials allowed Muslim inmates to conduct informal prayer groups in common areas, but that this opportunity is equally open to any inmate of any other religious persuasion. Therefore, the accommodation of Muslim inmates’ beliefs did not constitute an improper endorsement of Islam over other religions.

Plaintiff William C. McKinnedy, a South Carolina inmate, brought this suit against the Respondents, over 30 South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) staff members and state government officials, alleging that the Respondents violated his religious beliefs by 1) refusing to provide a food tray prior to sun-up during Ramadan; and 2) not allowing the Plaintiff to attend the Eid feast at the conclusion of Ramadan. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, stating that on multiple occasions the Plaintiff informed the Chaplain that he did not consider himself part of the Muslim community. The Magistrate Court granted summary judgment for the Defendants, determining that the Defendants’ refusal to allow the Plaintiff to participate in Ramadan was related to a legitimate penological interest, such as security concerns.

Amendment 219(C) to the Policing and Crime Bill would require all religious marriages to comply with English and Welsh marriage laws. Baroness Cox of the House of Lords proposed and defended the amendment in her statements to the House of Lords on November 16, 2016.

Plaintiff Kareem Hassan Milhouse, an inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania (“USP-Lewisburg”), filed aBivens-styled complaint against several Federal Bureau of Prisons and USP-Lewisburg officials. The Plaintiff asserted that he had been denied access to the courts on three occasions and denied the practice of his religious requirements in violations of his right to free exercise, on the bases that: (1) there was no Islamic chaplain for Muslim inmates nor services for Special Management Unit inmates to attend services physically, nor were services provided through the radio as were other institutional programs, and (2) there was no Islamic celebration after the Ramadan fast, nor special meal of the types given for holidays of other faiths, and no Muslim chaplain with whom to discuss articles of faith. [He believed both of these types of services to be requirements stipulated by Islamic ritual law.] The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. The District Court granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court found that the alleged conduct did not fall within the scope of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), which applies to free exercise of religion claims under the First Amendment raised by prisoners, because the Plaintiff did not establish that a “substantial burden” had been placed on his ability to exercise his religion. The Court further determined that the Plaintiff had alternative means of worship available to him and that the Defendants’ conduct of providing the meal to non-Muslim inmates did not inhibit or curtail his ability to express adherence to his Islamic faith and beliefs. Because the Plaintiff failed to meet the substantial burden test with respect to both of these freedom of religion claims, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

Plaintiff Jesse Copeland, an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, brought suit after he refused to leave a Muslim religious meeting after prison officials ordered the meeting’s conclusion and was disciplined for causing a disturbance and placed on disciplinary restrictions, including a six-month ban on attending other religious meetings. The Plaintiff filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, challenging the ban and other prison policies impacting Muslim inmates. The District Court dismissed the complaint and granted summary judgment for the Respondents, prison officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit determined that there was no First Amendment free exercise violation under § 1983 nor a  violation of the Plaintiff’s rights under RLUIPA based on the Plaintiff’s six-month ban from attending religious meetings due to procedural bars to the Plaintiff’s recovery, including sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and mootness.

Petitioner Kofi Easterling, an inmate at Green Bay Correctional Institution (GBCI), filed suit against the Respondents, various prison officials, alleging that they ignored the Petitioner's instructions as to when Ramadan began. The Petitioner claimed that the Respondents’ Ramadan date violated his religious beliefs under the First Amendment and RLUIPA. In the District Court, the Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, to which the Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in response. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Respondents, finding that the Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim failed because he had produced no evidence of a substantial burden on his religious exercise. Because the Plaintiff failed to meet his burden under RLUIPA, he similarly failed to establish that the Respondents burdened a “central religious belief or practice” in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Therefore, the Respondents were entitled to summary judgment on the First Amendment and RLUIPA claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Plaintiff Charles Glenn, an inmate at the New Hampshire Department of Corrections (DOC) filed suit against the Respondents, various DOC prison officials, for alleged violations of his rights to free exercise [of his ability to exercise Islamic ritual law] under the First Amendment and RLUIPA. Specifically, the Plaintiff – a practicing Muslim – argued that there had been no Friday prayer (jumuʿa) services at the New Hampshire State Prison for the past three years and that he had no access to an Imam (a Muslim prayer leader), a Qur’an, or other Islamic literature, which placed constraints on his ability to practice Islam [specifically, it's ritual law aspects]. In conducting a Preliminary Review, the Court applied the four-part test for examining the constitutionality of a regulation that restricts an inmate’s First Amendment free exercise of religion found in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987). The Court assessed the four Turner factors -- (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate government interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether alternative means to exercise the right exist; (3) what impact accommodating the right will have on prison resources; and (4) whether there was an absence of alternatives to the prison regulation. The Court found that the prison’s policy of denying Friday Prayer (jumuʿa) services, which are a central and essential element of religious practice, impinged on the Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to exercise his religion.

Plaintiff Jack Robinson, a formerly incarcerated inmate at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn (“MDC”), brought an action against Respondent, Officer Jimminez, a correctional officer at MDC, for allegedly depriving the Plaintiff of his right to religious worship under the First Amendment. The Plaintiff claimed that, although he reserved the prison’s religious room for Friday prayer (jumuʿa) services, the Respondent allowed Jewish prisoners to also use the room. The Respondent argued that the Plaintiff’s religious service was “stopped due to a scheduling conflict with another group of inmates who had also reserved the religious room for the same time as plaintiff.” The Respondent moved for summary judgment, and the district court judge referred the Respondent’s motion to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation. The magistrate judge determined that the Respondent’s decision to stop one religious service was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests because the action was undertaken to maintain order and prevent an altercation between Muslim and Jewish prisoners, and therefore recommended that the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment be granted.

Plaintiff Derrick Lafurr Brown, a Muslim inmate confined in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, filed a suit against the Respondents, who were various prison officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, for interrupting the Islamic services [Friday services specified in Islamic ritual law] out of an alleged general bias against Islam. The magistrate judge determined that the prison officials were acting in response to the Plaintiff’s repeated disobedience, and that their measure of standing in the doorway to block entry to the services was related to a legitimate penological interest and therefore did not interfere with the inmate's free exercise of religion. The magistrate judge recommended that the plaintiff's civil rights claims be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff Tariq A. Vaughn, Sr., an inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics alleging that he told prison officials that he did not want to be housed with a Muslim inmate, and after he was placed in a cell with a Muslim inmate, that the Muslim inmate stabbed him in the head and back. The magistrate judge recommended that the Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint be dismissed with prejudice because it was frivolous, and alternatively for failing to state a claim for which relief can be granted. [There seemed to be no stated religious or Islamic law basis for the claim.]

Plaintiff Leila Diab, an observant Muslim teacher who was hired to teach social studies and English as a second language, filed a suit against the Respondents, the Chicago Board of Education and John F. Kennedy High School Principal George Szkapiak, alleging that the Respondents discriminated and retaliated against her, and further subjected her to a hostile work environment, on the basis of her Islamic faith. The Plaintiff alleged that she was forced to resign from her teaching position following anti-Islamic comments made by the principal and various teachers at the Kennedy high school. The Plaintiff further claimed that she received a hate mail note (which read: “Israel is doing OK) and that her Qur'an was desecrated on school property [in violation of norms taken to be governed by Islamic ritual law, of treating the Qur'an with respect]. In response, the Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the complaint. The District Court determined that in order to prevail on her discrimination claims, the Plaintiff had to show that the Respondents subjected her to an adverse employment action, such as: "(1) termination or reduction in compensation, fringe benefits, or other financial terms of employment; (2) transfers or changes in job duties that cause an employee's skills to atrophy and reduce future career prospects; and (3) unbearable changes in job conditions, such as a hostile work environment or conditions amounting to constructive discharge." Barton v. Zimmer, Inc., 662 F.3d 448, 2011 WL 4921603, at *4 (7th Cir. 2011). The Court granted the Respondent’s motion as to the Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims, finding that it could not conclude that a reasonable jury would find the note, taken together with the Qur'an incident nine months later, to create a hostile work environment. While the Court acknowledge that the incidents may have proved upsetting to her, it observed that the two incidents were not repeated and did not involve any physical contact or verbal abuse.

Plaintiff John Knapp, a state prisoner and observant Muslim [following the general requirements of Islamic ritual law], filed suit against the Respondents, prison officials in their individual and official capacities, for an alleged violation of his rights under RLUIPA on the claim that the prison facility lacked weekly Friday prayer (jumuʿa) services. The prison employed a volunteer policy, which allowed Muslims in the prison community to volunteer to lead the Friday prayer service in order to enable group worship. But because there were no volunteers or future prospect of volunteers, the Friday prayer service was not conducted. The magistrate judge determined that the volunteer policy challenged by the Plaintiff could violate the prisoner’s rights under RLUIPA if such a policy was not the least restrictive means by which the government could achieve a compelling state interest, and that the Plaintiff’s allegations sufficed to assert a claim. The magistrate judge therefore recommended that the Plaintiff’s claim under RLUIPA be allowed to proceed.

A Uzbek alien named Yusopov, who had previously been labeled a danger to the security of the nation by the Board of Immigration Appeals, petitioned the court for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The plaintiff argued that he would likely be tortured if returned to his home country of Uzbekistan on religious and political grounds, because he was a practicing Muslim. The Court granted asylum, concluding that the government had not presented evidence to prove that the petitioner posed a national security risk. NB: The Convention Against Torture provisions on withholding removal are codified into U.S. Law at 8 C.F.R. §1206.16 (c). Further obligations noted by the Court are described in the INA at 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(A), which “prohibits removal of an individual unlawfully in this country if the Attorney General believes that the individual's life or freedom would be threatened in the country of removal on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”

The plaintiffs were survivors, family members, and representatives of the estates of the American victims of the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. The plaintiffs sued Iran, utilizing an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) that allows the prosecution of foreign states that sponsor terrorism for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful death. The plaintiffs pointed to the financial ties between Hezbollah (who allegedly orchestrated the attack) and Iran when arguing that Iran should be held liable. Iran did not file an answer to this claim. The court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding $1 billion in punitive damages.

The plaintiff , an American citizen whose wife was killed in a suicide bombing in Israel, sued Iran under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (allowing suit against sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism), for intentional infliction of emotional distress and economic loss due to wrongful death of his wife in a suicide bomber’s attack in Israel. The plaintiff argued that Iran and its Ministry of Information and Security should be held financially liable, as there were financial ties between the group that claimed responsibility for the attack, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Iran. Iran failed to make an appearance or file an answer. The Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him $10,380,568 for emotional and economic loss.

Additional commentary. The FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A. §1605(a) is the terrorism exception to FSIA and what plaintiffs depend on to get jurisdiction over Iran. §1605(a)(1) stays that “A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case not otherwise covered by this chapter in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act if such act or provision of material support or resources is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.” While there is no direct connection to Islamic law, there is a dispute that centers around whether Iran -- an Islamic constitutional state -- sponsors military operations conceived of as jihad under the guise of Islamic law.

Plaintiffs, a group of individuals harmed in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, brought tort claims for damages incurred during that attack against thirty-two distinct defendants. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the charges against seven of the thirty-two defendants, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a Saudi government charity, and several Saudi princes, concluding that none of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) exceptions (which would allow suit to proceed against sovereigns or diplomats) were applicable in those cases. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and further dismissed the case against a Saudi banker for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The defendant, an American Muslim man accused of attending a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, appealed a conviction for making false declarations to a grand jury, obstructing justice, and for making false material statements to the FBI. Specifically, the defendant was convicted for traveling to Pakistan in 1999 and attending a “jihadist training camp” in Afghanistan. While attending these camps were not a crime in 1999, the defendant subsequently lied about his travels and experiences. He argued that his conviction should be overturned because the lower court admitted irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence, and misapplied the sentencing guidelines for terrorism-related convictions. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, concluding that neither the admitted evidence nor the application for the terrorism sentencing guidelines was inappropriate. While the case did not relate to Islamic law directly, the rules governing jihad, and petitioners' views of them, are often based on false definitions of Islamic law.

Two Uzbek “independent Muslim” men, Bekhzod Bakhtiyarovich Yusupov and Ismoil Samadov, applied for asylum and withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(A). Both men had entered the country on student visas and subsequently remained in the United States illegally. The Board of Immigration Appeals found that, while the men would be eligible for asylum under CAT, the national security exception to withholding removal, 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(B)(iv), applicable according to the Attorney General when “there is evidence that would permit a reasonable person to believe that the alien may pose a danger to national security,” barred the Board from allowing the men to stay in the country. The Court reversed and remanded the case, as the congressional intent indicated that the proper requirement for the national security exception is “is a danger” and not the “may pose a danger” argued by the Attorney General.

Additional information. This case would be heard by the 3rd Circuit again in Yusopov v. Att’y Gen., Nos. 09-3074, 2011 WL 2410741 (3rd Cir. 2011).  8 U.S.C. §1231 (b)(3)(A) provides that “…the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”.  8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(B)(iv) says that withholding of removal detailed in (b)(3)(A) would not apply if “here are reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is a danger to the security of the United States.”

The plaintiff sued his former attorneys for malpractice, on the basis that they did not seek punitive damages in the plaintiff’s successful claim against Iran for being held hostage in Beirut in 1983. The plaintiff argued that by failing to name the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security as a defendant in that case, his attorneys prevented him from collecting substantial punitive damages under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. He also alleged that the attorneys charged him an excessive contingency fee. The Court dismissed the first claim, as the ability to collect punitive damages at the time was limited by President Clinton’s executive waiver of the punitive damages provision. The Court further ordered the parties to settlement discussions regarding the excessive fee complaint. The plaintiff later appealed this decision, but the case was ultimately dismissed.

Family members of an American citizen killed in a suicide bombing attack in Israel sued Iran and its Ministry of Intelligence and Security for her wrongful death, alleging that Iran financially supported Hamas, which took responsibility for the bombing at the time of the attack. Iran did not file an answer to the charges. Invoking the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act exception for state-sponsored terrorism (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), the Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding $9,879,023 to the victim’s husband for both economic and emotional loss of his wife. The Court awarded an additional $5,000,000 to each of the victim’s parents for emotional loss.

The sister of an American serviceman killed during the 1983 bombing in Beirut, allegedly by Hezbollah, sued Iran and its Ministry of Intelligence and Security, seeking compensatory damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages following her brother’s wrongful death. Invoking the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), she alleged that Iran should be liable for providing financial support to Hezbollah. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court entered judgment in the plaintiff’s favor, granting $2,500,000 in compensatory damages, while noting that punitive damages were not allowed against a foreign state.

The estate and family members of an American serviceman killed during the 1983 bombing in Beirut, allegedly by Hezbollah, brought suit against Iran and its Ministry of Intelligence and Security for his wrongful death. Invoking the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (a law that allows foreign nations to be immune from lawsuits from American citizens in most cases), they alleged that Iran should be held liable for providing financial support to Hezbollah. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court entered judgment in favor of the family, granting compensatory damages in the amount of $13,241,486 to the serviceman’s widow, parents, and children.

The widow of an American serviceman killed during the 1983 bombing in Beirut, allegedly by Hezbollah, brought suit against Iran and its Ministry of Intelligence and Security for compensatory damages for wrongful death, solatium (referring to “the mental anguish, bereavement, and grief that those with a close relationship to the decedent experience as a result of the decedent’s death”), intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages. She sued under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), alleging that Iran provided financial support to Hezbollah. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding her $18,297,000 in compensatory damages for economic and emotional loss. The Court noted, however, that it could not award punitive damages against a foreign state.

The survivor and the family of two men who were kidnapped and held for three weeks by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) sued the PKK under the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, as well as Syria, its Ministry of Defense, and several high-ranking Syrian officials under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (which allows individuals to sue nations that sponsor terrorism). Syria moved to have the case dismissed, citing a lack of jurisdiction, insufficient process, and failure to make a claim. The Court allowed the plaintiffs an opportunity to address the points brought up by the defendants in an amended complaint, denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. The defendant’s subsequent motion to dismiss was denied. In July 2009, a status report was filed by the defendant, and the case was still open as of August 2011.

Injured survivors of a suicide bombing attack in Israel, allegedly by Hamas, and the family members of the deceased, sued Iran, its Ministry of Information and Security, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard for compensatory damages for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of prospective income, and solatium (appropriate “when extreme and outrageous conduct has caused grief and anguish to plaintiffs closely related to a victim of terrorism”), as well as punitive damages. They brought suit under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), alleging that Iran should be liable for providing financial support to Hamas. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them  compensatory damages in the amount of $111,963,607.87 for physical damages and economic and emotional loss, as well as punitive damages in the amount of $300,000,000 against the Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

The children of an American citizen who was killed in a suicide bombing attack in Israel by Hamas sued Iran, its Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and several high-ranking Iranian officials. They brought suit under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), alleging that Iran should be liable for providing financial support to Hamas. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court awarded the victim’s estate $1,000,000 for the pain and suffering she experienced before death. The Court further awarded the four children compensatory damages in the amount of $3,000,000 each, for a total of $12,000,000. The Court also awarded punitive damages in the amount of $300 million against all defendants besides Iran jointly and severally.

The plaintiffs, the surviving family members and the estate of an American citizen who was assassinated, allegedly by Hezbollah, while serving as the president of the American University of Beirut, brought a wrongful death action against Iran. They sued under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), alleging that Iran should be liable for providing financial support to Hezbollah. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding compensatory damages in the amount of $31,525,296 to the family for economic loss as well as mental anguish.

The ACLU brought suit objecting to the use of taxpayer money to fund what it termed a religious charter school as a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The defendant academy and its sponsor, Islamic Relief, submitted a motion to dismiss, arguing that they were not a state actor. The Court found that the evidence regarding Islamic Relief’s role as a state actor was not clear, and thus denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision in 2011. As of August 2011, the case was still ongoing.

A Muslim employee of the U.S. Army, who was a Syrian of Turkish origin, sued his former employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of age and of religion and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that he was not offered a position after previously resigning because of his age, religion, and national origin. The defendant argued that he was not rehired because of poor work performance on past assignments. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that the defendant presented legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not rehiring plaintiff that the plaintiff did not rebut.

A Muslim female teacher sued her former employer, the Board of Education for the School District of Philadelphia, as well as the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination. The defendant school board argued that it suspended and ultimately fired the plaintiff under the Pennsylvania Garb Statue (Public Law No. 282) when she refused to remove her headscarf while teaching. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found in favor of the defendant Commonwealth, but against the School Board. The Third Circuit affirmed the decision against the Commonwealth but reversed the decision against the School Board, holding that, while the statute may present conflicts with the First Amendment, to bring a claim under Title VII, as the plaintiff did, requires proving that the accommodation would not be an undue burden for the employer. The Court further held that allowing teachers to wear religious garb would be an example of an undue burden, as it threatens the religious neutrality of the public school system. The Court upheld the conclusion of the District Court that “the Commonwealth was not [plaintiff’s] employer within the meaning of Title VII."

An Arab Muslim professor sued his former employer, Saint Francis College, under Title VII, §1981, §1983, §1985(3), §1986, and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act, alleging that the College denied him tenure because he was an Arab Muslim. At the trial level, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted the College’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded that decision, holding that discrimination against Arabs constitutes racial discrimination, and that the statute of limitations restrictions imposed by the lower court were incorrectly applied, as the acts in question occurred before the statute of limitations was passed into law.

An unmarried African-American Muslim worker sued the defendant, Del Monte Sales Company, under Title VII and §1981 for discrimination based on race, sex, marital status, and religion, as well as for libel, slander, and infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff argued that he was not hired for a job with the defendant due to his race and religion, alleging that his interviewer made derogatory and discriminatory remarks to this effect. The defendant argued that it did not hire the plaintiff because he was not outgoing or pleasant, which are necessary traits for a job as a salesman. The Court affirmed the decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska, which had granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss (noting a lack of evidence offered by the plaintiff).

An Indian Muslim professor sued his former employer, CUNY, under Title VII, §1981, and §1983, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, and religion. The plaintiff argued that he was denied tenure and additional compensation because of his race and religion. The Court dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence to establish that the reason he was denied tenure and additional compensation was discrimination.

A Muslim worker sued his former employer under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FRCA), alleging religious discrimination and breach of contract. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was fired when his employer learned that he was a Muslim. The Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the Title VII claim, because the plaintiff failed to establish that an employee-employer relationship existed between himself and the defendant; and that it similarly did not have jurisdiction to hear the contract claim because it was below the requisite amount for diversity jurisdiction. With respect to the FCRA claim, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did not provide evidence showing that the decision-makers knew he was a Muslim when they decided to terminate his employment.

A Bangladeshi Muslim worker sued her former employer under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that she was fired and not rehired by the defendant because of her religion and national origin. On appeal, the defendant conceded that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of discrimination, but contended that she did not rebut or rebuff the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason the company had for not rehiring her—which it claimed was due to poor job performance in her previous job assignments. The Court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff offered no proof that she was not rehired due to religious discrimination.

A Muslim former Naval engineer sued the Secretary of the Navy under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was subjected to ethnic slurs and jokes, leading to a hostile work environment. The Court adopted the report by the magistrate judge granting the motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust proper administrative remedies before bringing the case to court. The Court further noted that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the compensatory damage issue.

A Pakistani Muslim worker sued his former employer under Title VII and New York State Human Rights Law, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin. The plaintiff claimed that he was terminated for discriminatory reasons, as his supervisor made comments that the plaintiff felt were derogatory. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was terminated because of inconsistencies in his re-accreditation application to qualify him for work at the healthcare organization (as plaintiff had failed to disclose that he was suspended when working for a previous employer). The Court held that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, and that, even if he did, the defendant had provided evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff’s employment. Accordingly, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

Additional information. The Court applied the McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 782 (1973) burden-shifting test.  This test requires plaintiffs to first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.  If they are successful, the burden shifts back to the defendant (usually a company or a company representative) to demonstrate they it a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.  Finally, it then becomes the burden of the plaintiff to prove that the reason articulated by the defendant was a pretext for the true discriminatory motive.

A Muslim worker sued the defendant, the Philadelphia Housing Authority, under Title VII and §1983, claiming that he was terminated from employment due to his Muslim religion and in retaliation for acting as a witness in other cases against his employer. The defendant argued that he was terminated due to his participation in several crimes, such as forgery and theft. The Court found no evidence of a connection between the inappropriate remarks that were made toward the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's termination more than a year later. Thus, in 2002, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

A Pakistani Muslim banker sued her former employer under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin. The plaintiff alleged that her coworkers and supervisors made derogatory remarks to her about her diet, dress, and prayer schedule; and that this discriminatory animus was the real reason that she was terminated. The defendant argued that she was fired for insubordination when she left work in the middle of a shift without permission. At the trial level, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the defendant, and the Eighth Circuit upheld this decision on appeal, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to rebut the legitimate non-discriminatory reason that the defendant offered for terminating her employment.

Four Muslim prisoners brought a suit against the Michigan Department of Corrections, claiming that the meals that were provided to them during the month of Ramadan provided inadequate nutritional and caloric value. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant had failed to abide by a previous court ruling requiring them to provide a certain number of calories per day. In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that neither the defendant nor the previous judge had ensured that a similar situation would not occur the following Ramadan. The plaintiffs filed an "Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and/or Permanent Injunction." The Court denied it as moot, since Ramadan 2013 had already concluded, and Ramadan 2014 was too far into the future to warrant immediate action.

Plaintiff William Welch claimed the Saginaw Correctional Facility violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion by providing meals that provided insufficient nutrition and calories. The appellate court agreed that Welch had demonstrated a potential violation of his constitutional rights, and affirmed the district court's earlier denial of qualified immunity to the defendants. 

Two Muslim women who were prohibited by their respective employers from wearing a ḥijāb sued their employers on the grounds of religious discrimination. The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) decided whether these women had been unfairly dismissed by their respective employers when taking into account the 2000 EU directive on discrimination in the workplace. The ECJ ruled that the first employer's internal directive against religious symbols was not applied in a directly discriminatory manner against the first woman. While indirect discrimination could be a possibility it "may be objectively justified by a legitimate aim." As for the second case, the ECJ decided "that the willingness of an employer to take account of the wishes of a customer no longer to have the services of that employer provided by a worker wearing an Islamic headscarf cannot be considered a genuine and determining occupational requirement within the meaning of the directive."

To fund construction for a new building without violating Islamic law's prohibition against interest, the Islamic Center of Nashville (ICN) entered into an ijāra agreement with Devon Bank; the bank created a subsidiary for the purpose of the ijāra agreement. Under the agreement, Devon Bank had legal ownership of the building's title until ICN could fully purchase the building. After ICN paid for the building, ownership was transferred to ICN from Devon Bank. ICN applied for a property tax exemption, including for the time period in which Devon Bank held the title for the building. The state of Tennessee denied ICN the exemption for the period in which Devon owned the building, but granted it for the time after. ICN appealed that decision.The trial court ruled it had no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. 

To fund construction for a new building without violating Islamic law's prohibition against interest, the Islamic Center of Nashville (ICN) entered into an ijāra agreement with Devon Bank; the bank created a subsidiary for the purpose of the ijāra agreement. Under the agreement, Devon Bank had legal ownership of the building's title until ICN could fully purchase the building. After ICN paid for the building, ownership was transferred to ICN from Devon Bank. ICN applied for a property tax exemption, including for the time period in which Devon Bank held the title for the building. The state of Tennessee denied ICN the exemption for the period in which Devon owned the building, but granted it for the time after. ICN appealed that decision. The appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment on the basis of the Tax Injunction Act, which prohibits federal courts from hearing challenges to tax obligations if the taxpayer has adequate access to judicial review in state courts.  

To fund construction for a new building without violating Islamic law's prohibition against interest, the Islamic Center of Nashville (ICN) entered into an ijāra agreement with Devon Bank; the bank created a subsidiary for the purpose of the ijāraagreement. Under the agreement, Devon Bank had legal ownership of the building's title until ICN could fully purchase the building. After ICN paid the amount for the building's construction, ownership was transferred to ICN from Devon Bank. ICN applied for a property tax exemption, including for the time period in which Devon Bank held the title for the building. The state of Tennessee denied ICN the exemption for the period in which Devon owned the building, but granted it for the time after. ICN appealed that decision. 

This document is a beyānnāme, or declaration, sent by Recāī Efendi, the Ottoman reʾīsül-kuttāb (chief scribe), to Britain's ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. It justifies the Ottoman declaration of war on Russia by explaining Russia's violation of treaty obligations, and gives insight into eighteenth-century Ottoman attitudes to international law and its relationship with Islamic law.

This entry provides a definition and analysis of the term ijtihād, drawing on works by SHARIAsource Senior Scholar Sherman A. Jackson, King Faisal Chair in Islamic Thought and Culture and Professor of Religion and American Studies and Ethnicity at the University of Southern California.

Sherman A. Jackson, Legal Scaffolding and the Scope of Legal Injunctions in Post-Formative Theory: Muṭlaq and ʿĀmm in the Jurisprudence of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī, Islamic Law and Society 3, no. 2 (1996): 165–92.

*Note: All page numbers used as citations refer to the above article.

The South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) on Islamic Marriages and Related Matters drafted this bill in 2011 to "redress inequities and hardships arising from the non-recognition of these marriages." The bill proposes legislative measures to statutorily recognize Muslim marriages, arguing that the lack of such recognition unjustifiably discriminates against Muslim women on the basis of religion, marital status, gender, and sex.

Religion appears in the constitutions of the Arab world, almost all with Muslim majorities, in a variety of ways. But aside from ensuring a public role for religion, these states are far from theocratic and show considerable though subtle diversity within them. 

This is one of many sources in which Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) and many others including companion Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī (d. between 42 and 53/662–73) echo the criteria forwarded by al-Shāfiʿī for determining the credibility of witness. However, these sources slightly diverge in permitting non-Muslims to testify in the specific case regarding the last wishes of a Muslim who dies while traveling, a scenario explicitly condoned in Q. 5:106.

In chapter two of Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Hossein Modarressi examines procedural differences between criminal and ordinary courts during the ʿAbbāsid period. 

In chapter one of Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Ahmed El Shamsy examines selected criteria used to exclude the testimony of certain types of witnesses in Islamic courts of the second century AH / eighth century CE. Specifically, the chapter seeks to make three points:

1. In the early second century, Muslim judges presiding over court cases applied a notion of communal enmity among confessional groups as a criterion for determining the admissibility of witness statements by members of one group against those of another. This criterion was used both in cases that crossed confessional lines and in cases involving coreligionists only.

2. Over the course of the second century, this criterion fell out of use and was replaced by other criteria for interconfessional testimony. These criteria included the a priori exclusion of witness statements by members of certain groups as well as individual ascertainment of the probity of potential witnesses.

3. The oral and cryptic nature of the sources from the early second century presented significant obstacles to later scholars’ understanding of the reasoning that underpinned the early criteria. They consequently opened the way for a fundamental reconceptualization of who counted as an acceptable witness.