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In this case, petitioner Ray Anthony Smith, a Muslim inmate housed in a Colorado state prison, alleged a violation of his federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and his federal statutory right to a diet that complies with his faith. Specifically, he alleged that prison officials revoked his right to aḥalāl diet upon observing him ordering non-ḥalāl food. Petitioner Smith submitted a request for reinstatement of hisḥalāl diet through the internal prison grievance system, which was denied. Smith initiated this federal lawsuit in 2020 alleging violations of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). His complaint alleges that the Colorado Department of Corrections, Dr. Muhammad Munir Chaudry, and The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFNCA) violated his rights by the wrongful revocation of his religious diet and mislabeling of ḥalāl food products. Upon reviewing the record, in Smith v. Crockett, U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang determined that the petitioner alleged actions that sufficed to make out a basic claim and recommended that government officials should not receive immunity. The Judge recommended, however, dismissal of Smith’s other allegations–including monetary damages against the government defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation of ḥalāl food products, and that the IFNCA and Dr. Chaudry be held liable for government actions.

This order implements the decision from the District Court of Colorado in Smith v. Crockett, a case in which a Muslim inmate sued Colorado state prison officials on allegations that they had violated his federal constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of religion and to a diet that confirmed to the dictates of his faith. In this case, petitioner Ray Anthony Smith, a Muslim inmate housed in a Colorado state prison, alleged a violation of his federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and his federal statutory right to a diet that complies with his faith. Specifically, he alleged that prison officials revoked his right to a ḥalāl diet upon observing him ordering non-ḥalāl food. Petitioner Smith submitted a request for reinstatement of his ḥalāl diet through the internal prison grievance system, which was denied. Smith initiated this federal lawsuit in 2020 alleging violations of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). His complaint alleges that the Colorado Department of Corrections, Dr. Muhammad Munir Chaudry, and The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFNCA) violated his rights by the wrongful revocation of his religious diet and mislabeling of ḥalāl food products. Upon review, U.S. District Judge William J. Martinez, who adopted the recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang that government officials not receive immunity but that the court dismiss Smith’s other allegations–including monetary damages against the government defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation of ḥalāl food products, and that the IFNCA and Dr. Chaudry be held liable for government actions. This order implements that recommendation and decision adopted by the district court.

In this decision, U.S. District Judge William J. Martinez adopts the recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang in Smith v. Crockett, a case in which a Muslim inmate sued Colorado state prison officials on allegations that they had violated his federal constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of religion and to a diet that confirmed to the dictates of his faith. In this case, petitioner Ray Anthony Smith, a Muslim inmate housed in a Colorado state prison, alleged a violation of his federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and his federal statutory right to a diet that complies with his faith. Specifically, he alleged that prison officials revoked his right to a ḥalāl diet upon observing him ordering non-ḥalāl food. Petitioner Smith submitted a request for reinstatement of his ḥalāl diet through the internal prison grievance system, which was denied. Smith initiated this federal lawsuit in 2020 alleging violations of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). His complaint alleges that the Colorado Department of Corrections, Dr. Muhammad Munir Chaudry, and The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFNCA) violated his rights by the wrongful revocation of his religious diet and mislabeling of ḥalāl food products. Upon review of the record, Judge Martinez agreed with Judge Wang’s recommendation that the government officials were not entitled to immunity, as petitioner Ray Anthony Smith had made sufficient allegations to make out a prima facie claim. Also following Judge Wang’s recommendations, Judge Martinez dismissed Smith’s other allegations–including monetary damages against the government defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation of ḥalāl food products, and that the IFNCA and Dr. Chaudry be held liable for government actions.

Prison inmate Lawrence Cochran filed a §1983 claim against prison officials for allegedly violating his First Amendment rights by not allowing him to have food in his cell at night to break the Ramadan fast and by limiting his attendance of religious services. The Court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that incarceration necessarily curtails some freedom, and that, in this context, the curtailment did not go so far as to place a substantial burden on Muslim inmates’ ability to practice their religion.

The plaintiff, Dominic Ali, a Muslim inmate at the Northern New Hampshire Correctional Facility, sued several prison officials for allegedly violating his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and the state's constitution. The plaintiff alleged that the prison failed to provide jumu'a (Friday prayer) services for Muslim inmates, failed to ensure that he was provided with healthy food during Ramadan (the Islamic month of fasting), and denied him the ability to observe Ramadan by removing his name from the prison's internal Ramadan fasting list. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing suit. The Court agreed: it found that the plaintiff had not brought his grievances to the attention of the prison's commissioner, and therefore granted the defendants' motion.

This ministerial regulation makes provision for:

1. pilgrim registration requirements and procedures (arts 3-12);
2. pilgrim quotas (arts 13-14);
3. hajj guidance (arts 15-19);
4. the Hajj Administering Committee (Panitia Penyelenggara Ibadah Haji) (arts 20-22);
5. pilgrim-accompanying officials (arts 23-26);
6. pilgrim documentary and identity services (arts 27-28);
7. pilgrim transportation services (arts 29-33);
8. pilgrim accommodation and food/beverage services (arts 34-38);
9. pilgrim health services and monitoring (arts 39-43);
10. protection for pilgrims and pilgrim-accompanying officials (art 44); and
11. hajj administration coordination (arts 45-48).

Plaintiff William C. McKinnedy, a South Carolina inmate, brought this suit against the Respondents, over 30 South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) staff members and state government officials, alleging that the Respondents violated his religious beliefs by 1) refusing to provide a food tray prior to sun-up during Ramadan; and 2) not allowing the Plaintiff to attend the Eid feast at the conclusion of Ramadan. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, stating that on multiple occasions the Plaintiff informed the Chaplain that he did not consider himself part of the Muslim community. The Magistrate Court granted summary judgment for the Defendants, determining that the Defendants’ refusal to allow the Plaintiff to participate in Ramadan was related to a legitimate penological interest, such as security concerns.

The applicant submitted that, since the parties' marriage on 14 June 2013, he and the respondent had never been physically intimate because the respondent refused, and that even when they slept in the same bed, the respondent would place a doll between them. In addition, the applicant claimed that the respondent did not want to execute her responsibilities as a wife, including cooking and serving food, even when the applicant would do so himself, with the help of the respondent's parents.

In August 2014, the applicant felt he could no longer cope with the respondent's attitude and decided to leave the matrimonial home. Attempts by family to reconcile the parties were to no avail, as was judicial mediation. Moreover, the respondent failed to attend court, despite having been summonsed formally. The court found that ongoing conflict between the parties, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, was sufficient reason to grant the applicant a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i).

The parties were married on 16 August 2013. The plaintiff submitted that, as early as September 2013, the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome. This was the result of:

1. the defendant's parents meddling in the parties' domestic affairs, and their appearing not to like the defendant;
2. the defendant directing profanities at the plaintiff when the plaintiff would counsel him; and
3. the defendant not providing the defendant with enough financial support, even once saying to the plaintiff: 'kan lah di agiah makan tu, makan tu la nafkah ma (I've given you food, eat it).'

Problems escalated in March 2014 when the plaintiff felt their problems were irreconcilable, and while the defendant's parents continued to meddle in the parties' domestic affairs. The plaintiff left the matrimonial home and the parties had been separated since. Accordingly, the court granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra), on the grounds of ongoing conflict, per art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Kingdom of Swaziland (Umbuso weSwatini), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Swaziland's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This regional regulation prohibits all persons from opening restaurants, roadside stalls (warung), shops, and the like, as well as from serving food and drink during the month of Ramadhan in Tanah Laut regency, South Kalimantan (art 2(1)). Similarly, it prohibits all persons from eating, drinking, and/or smoking in public places (art 2(2)). These prohibitions apply from predawn (imsak) until the fast is broken (art 2(3)). All persons are also prohibited from conducting activities that disturb the peace, including conducting activities to wake people for their last meal (bagarakan sahur) if they disturb the peace (art 2(4)). The earliest such bagarakan sahur activities may start is 3.00am (art 2(5)). In addition, the operations of all places of general entertainment, such as karaoke, discotheques, and the like, are prohibited during Ramadhan (art 2(6)).

Contravention of art 2(1) or (6) carries a maximum penalty of three months' imprisonment and/or a fine of IDR 50 million (art 5(1)), while contravention of art 2(2) or (4) carries a maximum penalty of 15 days' imprisonment and/or a fine of IDR 100,000 (art 5(2)).

This regional regulation prohibits all persons from conducting the operations of any type of restaurant during Ramadhan in Banjarbaru, South Kalimantan (Kalimantan Selatan) (art 2(1)). Similarly, it prohibits all persons from eating, drinking, and/or smoking in such places, and in public (art 2(2)), and from disturbing the peace (art 2(3)). It also prohibits all persons and legal entities from carrying on the operations of any place of entertainment, such as karaoke establishments, discotheques, cafes, and salons (art 2(5)).

All persons operating an eatery of any sorts for people breaking the fast may open from 5.00pm (17.00) (art 3(1)), and all persons that sell food and drink in market places may commence trading from 3.00pm (15.00) (art 3(2)).

Contravention of art 2(1) and (5) carries a maximum penalty of three months' imprisonment and/or a fine of IDR 50 million (art 5(1)), while contravention of art 2(2) and (3) carries a maximum penalty of 15 days' imprisonment and/or a fine of IDR 100,000 (art 5(2)).

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Federal Republic of Somalia (Jamhuuriyadda Federaalkaa Soomaaliya), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Somalia's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has legal status. 

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Langsa Shari'a Court (lower court), which had granted the respondent a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i), but also ordered the respondent to pay to the appellant IDR 5 million for iddah (100-day period after divorce has been granted), IDR 2 million for mut'ah (divorce compensation) and IDR 1 million for kiswah (clothing). The lower court also granted the appellant custody of their two children, and ordered the respondent to pay IDR 1 million per month in child maintenance until the children had become of age. In regards to the parties' joint assets, the lower court ordered the parties to split on a 50/50 basis their house, two motorcycles, as well as a debt of IDR 94,033,368 owed to Bank BPD Aceh.

The Court concurred with the lower court's judgment, but increased the amounts of money made payable to the appellant, based on the respondent's income as a school teacher and food seller. The Court also removed the obligation on the respondent to pay kiswah as it was not included in the appellant's initial counterclaim, and was already included in the revised iddah payment.

The Court concurred with the lower court in its dismissal of other elements of the appellant's counterclaim with regards to another parcel of land and a separate debt the appellant claimed was a joint-debt of the parties.

This regional regulation makes provision for the eradication of social ills. It defines social ills as:

1. prostitution (both homosexual and heterosexual in nature);
2. drinking and selling alcohol and/or traditional alcoholic beverages;
3. opening a food and beverage stall during Ramadhan;
4. cock-fighting gambling activities;
5. lending money at a particular interest rate, with or without a guarantee, or with unofficial instalments;
6. vigilantism;
7. posting indecent images in public that contravene traditional and religious norms and mores;
8. women or men showing their aurat (parts of the body required to be clothed in public according to Islam);
9. toto gelap (number-predicting gaming); and
10. being intoxicated in a public place (art 2(1)).

The regulation states that the regent or an appointed officer is authorised to order the cessation of all social ill-related activities, purusant to current regulations and customary/religious norms (art 5(b)). Penalties for such conduct range from IDR 15-50 million and/or three months' imprisonment (art 11).

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Zimbabwe, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Zimbabwe's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Liberia, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Liberia's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of Jamaica, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Jamaica's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Panama (República de Panamá), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Panama’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This fatwa borrows the definition of 'mutual fund' (reksa dana) from Law No. 8 of 1995 on Capital Market, defining it as:

'... a container used to collect funds from society financiers to be reinvested in a securities portfolio by an Investment Manager.'

The fatwa qualifies that there are many components of a conventional mutual fund that contravene Islamic shari'a, from a contractual perspective, as well as from investment and profit-distribution perspectives.

Among other points, the fatwa stipulates that mutual funds may not be used to invest in non-halal investments, such as gambling enterprises, conventional financial institutes that rely on interest-bearing banking activities, non-halal food and beverage distributors and producers, and insider trading. Profits must also be divided proportionally to financiers.