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The Karnataka High Court ruled that the ḥijāb is not "essential" in Islam and upheld a Government Order dated 05.02.2022, issued under sections 7 & 133 of the Karnataka Education Act of 1983. That order directs the College Development Committees all over the State to prescribe the ‘Student Uniform,’ presumably in terms of Rule 11 of Karnataka Educational Institutions Rules of 1995 (Classification, Regulation & Prescription of Curricula, etc.), which bans headscarves in classrooms. A full bench of Justices on the High Court sat to hear several petitions filed by Muslim students who attend government pre-university colleges in the region and who were alleged prejudice from the ban. The Court issued this order, restricting girls from wearing headscarves, or ḥijāb, deeming it as not “essential” in Islam arguing that “what is not religiously made obligatory therefore cannot be made a quintessential aspect of the religion through public agitations or by the passionate arguments in court,'' and as a use of religious symbols by students in governmental educational institutions that have established dress codes noting that Muslim women’s  ḥijāb goes against their “constitutional spirit of ‘equal opportunity’ of ‘public participation’ and ‘positive secularism’.”

In the decision for this case, the Supreme Court of New South Wales declared that the the plaintiff, Thera Agri Capital No 2 Pty Ltd,  is entitled to be indemnified and ordered the defendant, The Bond & Credit Co, to pay out an insurance claim to the plaintiff that was defrauded by a customer. This case concerns whether the plaintiff insured, Thera Agri Capital No 2 Pty Ltd, is entitled to indemnity under a “Trade Credit Insurance Policy” issued by the defendant insurer, BCC Trade Credit Pty Ltd trading as “The Bond & Credit Co”. The trade credit insurance agreement, used to indemnify a seller against losses from the nonpayment of a commercial trade debt, was made to be sharīʿa-compliant, or in accordance with Islamic law, using a murābaḥa system, an Islamic sales contract where both parties agree on the markup price versus conventional interest-based loans. Although the insurer refused indemnity on the basis that the insured was defrauded and there was no purchase of goods, the court ordered that they must indemnify the insured because the murābaḥa agreement contractually obligated their customer to repay the funds.

The Scholars at Department of Dārul-Iftā' (Wifaqul Ulama) in the United Kingdom issued this fatwā in response to a question about the permissibility of using Bitcoin, a prevalent form of cryptocurrency. The council determines its use to be ḥarām, or impermissible according to their understanding of Islamic law. They determine this on the basis that Bitcoin does not meet a number of necessary characteristics associated with valid currency: namely, it is highly volatile in nature; it carries excessive risks associated with its volatility; and it lacks of validation in the its algorithmically and thus inherently decentralized system of production and economic exchange.

Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law examines the main characteristics of the legal thought of Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, a preeminent religious scholar jurist of Medina in the first half of the second century of the Muslim calendar (mid-eighth century CE). Numerous works in different languages have appeared over the past half century to introduce this school of Islamic law and its history, legal theory, and substance in contexts of Shīʿī law.

While previous literature has focused on the current status of the school in its developed and expanded form, this book presents an intellectual history of how the school began. The Jaʿfarī school emerged within the general legal discourse of the late Umayyad and early Abbasid periods, but was known to differ in certain approaches from the other main legal schools of this time. Namely, the Jaʿfarī school expanded the tools for legal interpretation generally and contracts specifically, to a degree unmatched by any of its counterparts in the Muslim legal tradition. In addition to sketching the origins of the school, the book examines Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq’s interpretive approach through detailing his position on a number of specific questions, as well as the legal canons, presumptions, and other interpretive tools he adopted.

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

In the Introduction to Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law, Hossein Modarressi introduces the topic of his study: the early development of the Jaʿfarī Islamic legal school. Modarressi notes that the Jaʿfarī school emerged in the late Umayyad period (i.e., the first half of the second Islamic century/mid-eighth century CE) and its eponym was Imam Abū ʿAbd Allāh Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765), a preeminent jurist of Medina and a revered member of the House of the Prophet (ahl al-bayt). Over the course of the Introduction, Modarressi draws on various sources to show how Imam al-Ṣādiq was revered by many as a leading jurist during his time. Modarressi notes that his project utilizes “all material that corresponds to the language and character of Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, as known through both historical and biographical accounts, and as such can reasonably be deemed reliable,” without regard to sectarian tendencies and doctrinal affiliations (p. 11).

This source is part of the Online Companion to Hossein Modarressi, Text and Interpretation: Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and His Legacy in Islamic Law (Harvard University Press, 2022).

Twenty-one scholars on the Syrian Islamic Council issued a fatwā on cryptocurrency that declared dealing with cryptocurrency to be religiously forbidden (ḥarām) because of the many risks associated with it, which they identify as ignorance about it, uncertainty [as to its fluctuating value], and its resemblance to gambling. They came to their decision after outlining their understanding of cryptocurrencies as goods that are intangible given that they are produced programmatically and exist on the internet. For them, this nature of digital currency bolsters the risk of loss in the event of a technical malfunction or computer hacking. Secondly, they understand cryptocurrencies to be decentralized, which creates ambiguity around its origin, authority structure, and reference points necessary for evaluating those currencies in trading and for setting pricing. That ambiguity in turn prevents any authority from controlling the flowing liquidity in the markets. Furthermore, they conclude that governments currently lack legal considerations that might aid in the oversight and control of cryptocurrency circulation. Because of these risks, they determine that trading cryptocurrency is forbidden unless so long as there are no changes in its structure or governance that can help eliminate the large degree of risk that comes with their usage currently, through proper oversight and issuance from central banks or trusted institutions.

In Civil Petition No.1289 of 2020, the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a wife has a right to be maintained by her husband and that this right is absolute under Islamic law “so long as she remains faithful to him and discharges, or is willing to discharge, her own matrimonial obligations” and that a Muslim husband is bound to maintaining his wife even if she can maintain herself out of her own resources. They ordered that the petitioner, Haseen Ullah, has been “evading his legal as well as moral obligation“ to pay the agreed upon dower and maintenance to his wife, Naheed Begum, and their five minor children. For these reasons, the Supreme Court found the petition to be baseless and dismissed it with costs throughout. 

This order implements the decision from the District Court of Colorado in Smith v. Crockett, a case in which a Muslim inmate sued Colorado state prison officials on allegations that they had violated his federal constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of religion and to a diet that confirmed to the dictates of his faith. In this case, petitioner Ray Anthony Smith, a Muslim inmate housed in a Colorado state prison, alleged a violation of his federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and his federal statutory right to a diet that complies with his faith. Specifically, he alleged that prison officials revoked his right to a ḥalāl diet upon observing him ordering non-ḥalāl food. Petitioner Smith submitted a request for reinstatement of his ḥalāl diet through the internal prison grievance system, which was denied. Smith initiated this federal lawsuit in 2020 alleging violations of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). His complaint alleges that the Colorado Department of Corrections, Dr. Muhammad Munir Chaudry, and The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFNCA) violated his rights by the wrongful revocation of his religious diet and mislabeling of ḥalāl food products. Upon review, U.S. District Judge William J. Martinez, who adopted the recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang that government officials not receive immunity but that the court dismiss Smith’s other allegations–including monetary damages against the government defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation of ḥalāl food products, and that the IFNCA and Dr. Chaudry be held liable for government actions. This order implements that recommendation and decision adopted by the district court.

On 9 November 2019, the Supreme Court of India declared the final judgement in the case regarding disputed land in the Ayodhya region in the District of Faizabad, India where the Babri masjid once stood. The court decided that the 2.77 acres of land be transferred over to a governmental trust for the purpose of building the Ram Janmabhoomi temple and an alternative 5 acres of land be given to the Sunni Waqf Board in order to build a mosque. This decision overturned the 2010 decision by the Allahabad High Court to divide the disputed land among three parties. Until its demolition in 1992, the 16th century Babri masjid existed at this site. Based on archaeological evidence that examined the foundations of the Babri masjid, as well as biographical evidence pulled from Sikh scriptural texts, the Supreme Court reasoned that land’s Hindu history predates the construction of the mosque and should thus be the site of a newly constructed Hindu temple.

In this decision, U.S. District Judge William J. Martinez adopts the recommendation of U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang in Smith v. Crockett, a case in which a Muslim inmate sued Colorado state prison officials on allegations that they had violated his federal constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of religion and to a diet that confirmed to the dictates of his faith. In this case, petitioner Ray Anthony Smith, a Muslim inmate housed in a Colorado state prison, alleged a violation of his federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and his federal statutory right to a diet that complies with his faith. Specifically, he alleged that prison officials revoked his right to a ḥalāl diet upon observing him ordering non-ḥalāl food. Petitioner Smith submitted a request for reinstatement of his ḥalāl diet through the internal prison grievance system, which was denied. Smith initiated this federal lawsuit in 2020 alleging violations of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). His complaint alleges that the Colorado Department of Corrections, Dr. Muhammad Munir Chaudry, and The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFNCA) violated his rights by the wrongful revocation of his religious diet and mislabeling of ḥalāl food products. Upon review of the record, Judge Martinez agreed with Judge Wang’s recommendation that the government officials were not entitled to immunity, as petitioner Ray Anthony Smith had made sufficient allegations to make out a prima facie claim. Also following Judge Wang’s recommendations, Judge Martinez dismissed Smith’s other allegations–including monetary damages against the government defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation of ḥalāl food products, and that the IFNCA and Dr. Chaudry be held liable for government actions.

In this paper, Muftī Faraz Adam considers whether Bitcoin can be considered currency in Islamic law by interpreting relevant classical legal texts with the aim of identifying the principles defining money in Islamic law. He identifies three necessary elements for currency to be money: that it constitute māl (wealth), taqawwum (legal value) and thamaniyya (monetary usage in exchange markets). He determines that Bitcoin constitutes wealth (māl) and has legal value (taqawwum), However, he determines that it cannot be considered to possess valid or stable monetary usage (thamaniyya) due to its volatility and associated risks. Muftī Adam further determines that this form of cryptocurrency does not pass the principle of preservation of wealth (hifẓ al-māl) that form part of the fundamental objectives of Islamic law (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa) and its associated values of justice or equity (‘adl).

The President of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen in India, Asaduddin Owaisi, responded to a recent Karnataka High Court decision ruling that ḥijāb, or wearing a headscarf,  is not "essential" in Islam, and that state colleges could validly bar Muslim women from wearing it on their campuses. He disagrees with the Court decision on grounds that it goes against the Indian constitution's fundamental rights to freedom of religion, culture, speech, and expression. He further concludes that the decision interferes in an individual’s right to worship. More broadly, his concern lies with secular state courts making decisions on what is or is not essential religious practice, noting that such questions are between an individual and God. He concludes that the High Court's decision will force Muslim women to decide between “Allah’s command to be educated” and God’s commands that facilitate spiritual connectedness in responding to what they understand to be a religious obligation, such as wearing ḥijāb.

In this paper, Muftī Muhammad Abu Bakar determines that cryptocurrency is permissible under Islamic law in principle as it is treated as a good with value, as evidenced by its high market price on global exchanges and its acceptance as a form of payment at a wide variety of global merchants. He further notes that the permissibility of cryptocurrency is determined by its classification as currency in a governing legal and regulatory environment. Where jurisdictions prohibit dealing with cryptocurrency, its usage is prohibited in Islamic law as well. Muftī Abu Bakar adds that, before trading with cryptocurrency, users must consider its volatility and associated risks, given that preservation of wealth is one of the fundamental objectives (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa) of Islamic law. He concludes that, overall, it is not advisable to buy cryptocurrency for investment purposes, but to utilize it as a system of payment instead. 

In this case, petitioner Ray Anthony Smith, a Muslim inmate housed in a Colorado state prison, alleged a violation of his federal constitutional right to the free exercise of religion and his federal statutory right to a diet that complies with his faith. Specifically, he alleged that prison officials revoked his right to aḥalāl diet upon observing him ordering non-ḥalāl food. Petitioner Smith submitted a request for reinstatement of hisḥalāl diet through the internal prison grievance system, which was denied. Smith initiated this federal lawsuit in 2020 alleging violations of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). His complaint alleges that the Colorado Department of Corrections, Dr. Muhammad Munir Chaudry, and The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFNCA) violated his rights by the wrongful revocation of his religious diet and mislabeling of ḥalāl food products. Upon reviewing the record, in Smith v. Crockett, U.S. Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang determined that the petitioner alleged actions that sufficed to make out a basic claim and recommended that government officials should not receive immunity. The Judge recommended, however, dismissal of Smith’s other allegations–including monetary damages against the government defendants for fraudulent misrepresentation of ḥalāl food products, and that the IFNCA and Dr. Chaudry be held liable for government actions.

In this video,  Sheikh Mustafa Umar approaches the question whether cryptocurrency is ḥalāl or ḥarām with hesitancy, cautioning other scholars from making any determinations without fully understanding decentralized currency. Noting that there are a wide variety of cryptocurrencies as well as varied intentions behind their usage, Sheikh Umar concludes that the cryptocurrencies might be permissible or disliked, but at this stage in its development, it is too early to say that it is impermissible (ḥarām) in Islamic law.

When asked about the permissibility of cryptocurrency, Muftī Muḥammad Taqi Usmani responded that, although he is not satisfied with it due to its speculative purposes which seem impermissible in principle,  he will have to defer his decision until a later date in the case that its use may expand into real trade. He mentions that its mass use is not likely due to the possibility of weakening economies at the hands of an elite few, so he does not encourage its usage. 

In this review and order to address noncompliant investment practices, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission determined that the New York-based robo-adviser Wahed Invest, LLC had made misleading statements on investments, breached its fiduciary duty to investors, and failed to comply with the law related to its sharīʿa advisory business. According to the SEC’s review, from September 2018 through July 2019, Wahed Invest advertised the existence of its own proprietary funds when no such funds existed, and the firm further promised investors that it would periodically rebalance their advisory accounts but did not do so. The SEC’s order also found that when Wahed Invest ultimately launched a proprietary Exchange-Traded Fund (ETF) in July 2019, it used its clients’ advisory assets to seed the ETF without prior disclosure to those clients of any conflicts of interest. The order further found that Wahed Invest marketed itself as providing advisory services compliant with sharīʿa, or Islamic law, including marketing the importance of its income purification process on its website. Despite these representations, the review board determined that Wahed Invest did not adopt and implement written policies and procedures addressing how it would assure sharīʿa compliance on an ongoing basis. Wahed Invest consented to the entry of the SEC’s order finding that the firm violated Sections 206(2) and 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Rules 206(4)-1(a) and 206(4)-7; the firm further agreed to the Commission’s cease-and-desist order, to pay a $300,000 penalty, and to retain an independent compliance consultant, among other requirements.

Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Hajj and Umrah made the decision, dated 6 June 2022, to assume full control over Ḥajj, the annual Islamic pilgrimage in commemoration of the rites of Abraham, his wife Hagar, and the would-be sacrifice of their son Ishmael. They issued the decision only weeks before Ḥajj season, to require pilgrims from Europe, America, and Australia for this year’s Ḥajj (1443H/2022AD) to petition individually rather than in groups via a new lottery system and to use their portal exclusively, rather than arrange their trips through the local groups that ordinarily lead, educate, and organize tours for Muslims in the West. The Saudi portal is meant to enable visa processing and monitor COVID-19 protocols.

In this video, Dr. Ziyaad Mahomed discusses the permissibility of cryptocurrency. After giving an overview of scholars’ rulings on the question, he determines that there is not enough known about cryptocurrency to determine whether its usage is permissible at this time. He adds that users should exercise caution when using cryptocurrency due to its volatility and the lack of Islamic legal standards on the practice. 

A nine-member panel at the Federal Court of Malaysia led by Chief Justice Tengku Maimun ruled in a unanimous decision that Section 66A of the Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment of 2003 was unconstitutional and void as the power of judicial review that it conferred was not a power that the Selangor state legislative assembly was authorized to give. The petition arose out of the High Court consideration of an application for judicial review wherein an organizational petitioner, the SIS Forum (of Malaysia), sought to challenge the validity of a fatwā [advisory Islamic law opinion].The Court stated that it is not concerned with the procedural or substantive validity of the fatwā, and was not asked to determine the courts are authorized to undertake such evaluations in the first place under clause (1A) of Article 121 of Malaysia’s Federal Constitution. The petition concerns only the question whether the Selangor State Legislative Assembly (SSLA) was authorized to enact section 66A of the ARIE 2003, conferring powers of judicial review on syariah (Islamic law) courts. The Court concluded that Selangor, a Malaysian state, cannot grant syariah courts the power to review the rulings of Islamic authorities, which is a power retained exclusively by civil courts. For further context on Islamic law in Malaysia, consult Tamir Moustafa's Constituting Religion: Islam, Liberal Rights, and the Malaysian State (Cambridge University Press, 2018).

Grand Muftī Shawky Ibrahim Allam of Egypt's Dār al-Iftā' states that all uses of cryptocurrencies, including trading, buying, selling, leasing, are religiously prohibited (ḥarām) because of their negative effects on the economy, disruption of the market equilibrium and the concept of work, and the lack of required legal protections and financial oversight for traders. The Grand Muftī also concludes that cryptocurrencies infringe on the rights of those in authority, dispossessing them of their special prerogatives in this domain, and may give rise to damages from uncertainty, ignorance, and fraud in novel banking processes, standards, and values. For him, this conclusion finds support in the general statement of the Prophet Muḥammad that "He who deceives us is not of us.” Given the high risks that cryptocurrencies pose to individuals and to government, he thus concludes that there is further support for their prohibition with reference to the Islamic legal canon of “no harm”; “lā ḍarar wa-lā ḍirār.” He came to his decision by reference to economists and other related experts.

In this excerpt from his manual on judicial practice, Abū Bakr Ahmad b. ʿAlī al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980) discusses "different types of duties to fight based on residence: an enhanced duty existed for people in frontier lands bordering enemy territory as compared to those living in the interior." Like many medieval jurists, Jaṣṣāṣ "privileges the ruler’s authority to utilize the jihād duty" for a variety of reasons, including additional strategic objectives beyond territorial defense. He also states that if a ruler desires to offensively engage the enemy in their territory, then the obligation is on individuals. For more on jihād, read Adnan A. Zulfiqar's essay “Territory and Jurisdiction” in the Roundtable on the History of Islamic International Law on the Islamic Law Blog.

In this Media Release, Jamia Ulama-i-Hind quotes their President Maulana Mahmoud Asa’d Madani to call the Karnataka High Court order that restricts the wearing of headscarves, or ḥijāb, in colleges in the state a deep disappointment and that the “verdict would have a direct impact on religious freedom” and negative implications for the education of Muslim women who can no longer wear their headscarves in classrooms. He emphasized that the decisions regarding religious matters should be based on the opinions of authoritative figures within the tradition and that the Courts should not intervene. He urges state governments to protect the traditions of communities and appealed to the youth to avoid protests and “taking the law into their own hands.”

In his work entitled al-Ashbāh wa-l-Naẓāʾir, Ibn Nujaym (d. 969/1563), examines similar historical legal cases and fatwas through collecting substantive legal canons and interpretive legal canons that “distinguish, explain, and guide varied outcomes in cases with seemingly similar facts.” As a principal work authored early in the Ottoman Era collecting legal canons in Ḥanafī law, Muslim jurists of many schools frequently reference his work. For example, drafters of the Ottoman Code of 1869, also known as the Mecelle, primarily relied on this work to select 99 legal canons to preface a new commercial code based on Ḥanafī law that would both modernize and reform Ottoman law based on traditional or classical Islamic legal norms, through reference to legal canons.

For more, view the full print edition or see Intisar Rabb, Doubt in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2015) and “Experiments in Tracking Canons across the Mecelle” (Islamic Law Blog, March 16, 2022).

This poem from Abū Nuwās’s anthology of poetry stresses that human beings have always lived with one another in mutual assistance. In her analysis of Islamic mirrors-for-princes literature on judging in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Louise Marlow points to Māwardī’s use of this poem to support a notion of justice that prioritizes moderation, balance, and harmony.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

The Allahabad High Court decided on 30 September 2010 that the disputed 2.77 acres of land in the Ayodhya region in the District of Faizabad, India, where the Babri masjid once stood, will be divided among the three litigants. This majority 2:1 decision divided the disputed land between the Sunni Waqf Board, the Nirmohi Akhara, and the Hindu Maha Sabha who represent the party for ‘Ram Lalla’ or infant Ram. The central dispute of the case was over the title of the parcel of land. Although the three-judge bench upheld the decision, there was a dissenting opinion which held that the Babri masjid was not built on demolished ruins and that the ruins predated the construction of the mosque. The remaining judges held that, based on archaeological evidence, the Babri masjid was built after the demolition of a non-Islamic religious structure. The judges reasoned that there was insufficient documentary evidence for any sole party to hold the title over the land, and instead declared the title be jointly held by the three litigants.

When asked under what circumstances is abortion, or ijhāḍ, permissible and whether it is permissible to have an abortion if one has too many children, Allama Muḥammad Yusuf from Banuri’s Dār al-Iftā', responds that it is not permissible to terminate a pregnancy after fourth months and is only permissible if the mother’s health is at risk from the pregnancy. He adds that it is forbidden to terminate a pregnancy over financial fears of having many children, even if the fetus is less than four months.

Dr. Ali al-Qaradaghi considers the question whether cryptocurrency is a legitimate currency (ʿumla). Traditional Islamic law rulings define currency to reflect instruments with intrinsic value, such as gold or silver, or with credit value, which requires state backing. In his view, cryptocurrency has no inherent value [in the Middle East]. Rather, in his estimation, cryptocurrency’s value is in transactions. But even when it is used as credit, it has no state behind it or agreed-upon recognition [again, specifically with respect to the Middle East]. Thus, he concludes, it is not actually ḥaqq mālī (a property claim). Rather, it is a program or algorithm. He concludes on those grounds that investment in it is religiously prohibited (muḥarram) but only by means of the concept of “prohibition of the means" (taḥrīm al-wasāʾil). This is the lightest of prohibition types, because it is not prohibition for excessive interest (ribā) but to protect property (ḥifāza ʿala māl).

In response to a question on the abortion, or ijhāḍ, of a six month fetus with deformities in the thigh bones, Grand Muftī Shawky Ibrahim Allam of Egypt's Dār al-Iftā' states that scholars unanimously agree that if the age of the fetus reaches 120 days, the period when the soul is breathed into it, then it is impermissible to abort the fetus and absolutely prohibited in this case. However, he adds that if the mother’s physician decides that the survival of the fetus poses a danger to her life or health, then it is permissible to abort the fetus, prioritizing the stability of the mother’s life and health over that of the fetus.

The All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) in Lucknow, India responded to the Karnataka High Court’s decision that ḥijāb is not "essential" in Islam, and that state colleges are authorized to bar Muslim women from wearing it. The Board states that the High Court’s verdict contradicted Article 15 of the Indian Constitution, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, gender, caste, class, or place of birth, and guarantees individual liberty to all citizens, as well as the right to identity. They thus conclude that this decision is an injustice against the constitutional freedoms of Indian citizens. The Board also expresses concern with secular state courts making decisions on what is or is not essential religious practice, stating that “it is not in the jurisdiction of the courts to decide this but that of the ulemas [sic] and scholars.” They further note that the Indian Constitution accords every individual the right to determine what is essential in their religion. On a related matter, they add that the establishment of a common Uniform Civil Code—as has been further proposed—in a multi-religious country will interfere in the fundamental rights of religious freedom, and further negatively impact the religious and individual rights and freedoms of Muslim citizens in Indian. 

The All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) in Delhi, India responded to the Karnataka High Court’s decision that ḥijāb, or wearing a headscarf,  is not "essential" in Islam, and that state colleges were authorized to ban Muslim women from wearing it on their campuses.  The General Secretary of the AIMPLB, Hazrat Maulana Khalid Saifullah Rahmani Sahab, responded that hijāb is in fact an essential and agreed-upon part of Islamic law and practice (sharīʿa) and that some form of it is obligatory, or wājib, for every Muslim woman.

Suyūṭī’s (d. 911/1505) al-Ashbāh wa-l-Naẓāʾir is a treatise collecting Shāfiʿī legal canons. It examines the similarities and differences between legal and interpretive outcomes in Islamic law in ways that show how and why one judgment or outcome is distinguished from another, and in the process highlights the substantive and interpretive legal canons that guide those legal outcomes. 

For more, view the full print edition and see The Legal Thought of Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti: Authority and Legacy (Oxford, 2017) by Rebecca Hernandez.

This excerpt is from Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-ʿAlāʾī's (d. 761/1359) al-Majmūʿ al-Mudhhab fī Qawāʿid al-Madhhab, which is a two-volume collection of substantive legal canons and interpretive legal canons, and the third-oldest known Shāfiʿī canons collection from the Mamlūk era. Substantive legal canons (qawāʿid fiqhiyya) are short formulas expressing fundamental principles and doctrines of Islamic law, while interpretive legal canons (qawāʿid uṣūliyya) are principles for interpreting textual sources. This excerpt provides the first few pages excerpted from the author's Introduction. 

For more, view the full print edition and read the commentary by Mariam Sheibani on the Islamic Law Blog.

This is the first volume of al-Timurtāshī's commentary of his compendium of Ḥanafī law, Tanwīr al-Abṣār wa-Jāmiʻ al-Biḥār.

Ibn Isḥāq's Kitāb al-maghāzī, is a compilation of reports on events that occurred during or prior to the life of the Prophet Muhammad, including his military expeditions. Ibn Isḥāq “arranged [the reports] into what he deemed to be their correct chronological order and to which he added his own comments” adding a chain of narration to most reports. This excerpt is on the birth of the Prophet. 

For more on the text, see Nicolai Sinai and William Montgomery’s entry on the Prophet Muhammad in Encyclopedia Britannica. 

The Karnataka High Court passed an interim order in the petitions challenging the ḥijāb ban in colleges in the state. The petitions call into question the Government Order dated 05.02.2022, issued under sections 7 & 133 of the Karnataka Education Act of 1983. That order directs the College Development Committees all over the State to prescribe the ‘Student Uniform,’ presumably in terms of Rule 11 of Karnataka Educational Institutions Rules of 1995 (Classification, Regulation & Prescription of Curricula, etc.). A full bench of Justices on the High Court sat to hear several petitions filed by Muslim students who attend government pre-university colleges in the region and who were alleged prejudice from the ban. The Court issued this interim order, restricting girls from wearing headscarves, or ḥijāb, deeming it a use of religious symbols by students in governmental educational institutions that have established dress codes, and it request that the government reopen the educational institutions and allow the students to return to the classes at the earliest.

In this panel titled “Crypto Conundrum in Islamic Finance: Digital Assets and Shariah Compliance,” Dr. Mohamed Ali El Gari and  Dr. Mohd Daud Bakar consider the question whether cryptocurrency is permissible from an Islamic legal perspective. Dr. Bakar opines that cryptocurrency is an asset and not considered currency because it does not fulfill three conditions: use as a valid medium of exchange, stable stock value, and known unit of measurement. Although he acknowledges that cryptocurrency is in use as a medium of exchange, the electronic product currently lacks a stable stock value and known unit of measurement. However, he adds that if cryptocurrency comes to be backed by gold or silver, it could be deemed to be a rival to traditional currency and thus be understood as valid currency. Dr. El Gary opines that cryptocuruency can be permissible only if it is possible to establish that that it qualifies as wealth (māl) or as an asset according to the Islamic law (sharī'a). Doing so requires determining the presence of three conditions: the currency must be in use with a societal desire to normalize its usage, its use must be permissible under normal circumstances, and its must have a value assigned to it in habitual and customary practice. Applying these criteria to cryptocurrency, he concludes that it does meet all three conditions and thus determines that, while it is permissible to use because it is fungible, all the rules restricting the use of money under the rules of excessive interest (ribā) must apply. He further notes that one must be cautious in its use due to cryptocurrency’s speculative nature, which could border on gambling, but that this is not sufficient to say that it religiously impermissible (ḥarām) at presence. Collectively, the panel advises that those who are not very knowledgeable on the cryptocurrency and its attendant issues are to avoid it.  

Saudi Arabia's General Presidency of Islamic Research and Iftā respond to questions on abortion and the usage of ultrasound technology to determine the stage of a pregnancy. They state that although a fetus is recognized as the creation of a human being after 80 days based on the positions of Shaykh Muḥammad Ibn ʿUthāymīn and Shaykh ʿAbdul-ʿAzīz Ibn Bāz, with that marking the beginning of postpartum, if ultrasound technology identifies what appears to be an image of a human being prior to day 80, the fetus should still be recognized as the creation of a human being. They continue that if a pregnancy is past 80days, but ultrasound technology does not show a human image, then it is not considered a pregnancy.