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This text documenting the positions of the jurist Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) relays a disagreement he had with the scholar Isḥāq Ibn Rāhawayh (d. 238/853). While Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal had maintained the non-Muslims might only testify regarding the last will of a deceased Muslim, Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh upholds the opinion suggested by earlier jurists that non-Muslim scripturalists might testify in Muslim courts so long as they only testify against members of their own faith communities. Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh cites an event in the Prophet Muḥammad’s life as Sunnaic proof for the admissibility of non-Muslim testimony in court. He relays an incident in which Muḥammad apparently accepted the testimony of Jewish individuals against a Jewish couple accused of adultery. Ahmed El Shamsy notes in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts that Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh seems to be one of the only jurists of his day to employ this anecdote to permit non-Muslim testimony.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.  

In this historical text, Wakīʿ documents the historical feud between Qaysī and Yamanī Arabs which precluded members of each group from testifying against the other in Muslim courts due to concerns of bias. The factional tension also affected political and judicial spheres. For example, Wakīʿ relates that the governor of Basra ʿUqba b. Salm (in office 149–50/766–67) was pressured into releasing an unjustly imprisoned man by the judge Sawār b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Qudāma (in office 138–56/ 755–73). The judge complied with this order because of pressure and instability due to factional political alliances. Given the degree to which Qaysī and Yamanī rivalries influenced the political sphere, it seems understandable that their testimony against each other was not accepted in the courtroom. Ahmed El Shamsy references this source in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts as the first of many historical cases in which progressive restrictions were placed on who might be permitted to give testimony resulting from increased political rivalry.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.  

In this passage, the Quran addresses the Islamic community as witnesses against mankind, declaring: “We have appointed you a middle nation, that ye may be witnesses against mankind, and that the messenger may be a witness against you.” Some suggest that this passage could be interpreted as having implications for legal procedure in Islamic courts. However, Ahmed El Shamsy maintains in "The Logic of Excluding Testimony in Early Islam" in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts that this passage does not have practical relevance to judicial procedure but rather relates to ethical witnessing in this world or the hereafter. 

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.  

This is one of many sources in which Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) and many others including companion Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī (d. between 42 and 53/662–73) echo the criteria forwarded by al-Shāfiʿī for determining the credibility of witness. However, these sources slightly diverge in permitting non-Muslims to testify in the specific case regarding the last wishes of a Muslim who dies while traveling, a scenario explicitly condoned in Q. 5:106.

In this literary source purportedly recounting early episodes of judges, Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798) issues a clever ruling for ʿAbbāsid Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd, effectively saving his son – a prince – from an accusation of zinā (fornication or adultery) by operation of the “doubt canon,” which requires legal officials to “avoid criminal punishments in cases of doubt.” The doubt here is a judicial knowledge, rather than established evidence by a confession or witnesses. He is rewarded by being made Chief Judge (qāḍī al-quḍāt) of Baghdad.

In his collection of biographies of judges and governors in the early Islamic empire, the historian Kindī (d. 350/961) provides a history of qāḍīappointments in Egypt. His entry for Isḥāq b. al-Furāt contains several anecdotes, one of which indicates that Isḥāq was the first non-Arab of mawlābackground (tribal client or associate) to be appointed to the position of qāḍī; the appointment took place in 184/800. Kindī’s accounts suggest that in spite of his foreign status, Isḥāq was well regarded by his contemporaries, who recommended him for the position because of his astute scholarship of Islamic law and his mastery of the Arabic language. Moreover, he was deemed one of the most important associates of Mālik b. Anas, the founder of one of the four principal Sunnī schools of law. In his chapter in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Mahmood Kooria uses this source to demonstrate the growing presence of non-Arab qāḍīs in early second/ninth-century Egypt. Nonetheless, the language spoken and used by these mawālī was Arabic, minimizing translation challenges within a Arab-dominated judicial system.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.

This decree established by the Abbasid caliph, al-Ṭāʾiʿ li-Allāh (r. 974-991) establishes the role of the Ṣāḥib al-Maẓālim as different from that of the judge. The Ṣāḥib, or officer, is tasked with investigating complaints of injustice in situations where the executive power must intervene.  In this capacity he can search “for types of evidence that are obscure and concealed.” In contrast, the judge must rely only on “solid and plain evidence.”

In this source, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā assumes the opinion of many Shīʿite jurists in a matter of judicial procedure: permitting the judges to rule according to their personal knowledge of a case. Hossein Modarressi comments that knowledge in this context was generally understood to mean instances in which the judge had personally witnessed an event occur. Some jurists also distinguish between knowledge acquired by the senses (ʿilm ḥissī) and knowledge acquired by "guessing" (ʿilm ḥadsī), which perhaps includes circumstantial evidence .

In this source, Ayatollah Khomeini seconds the opinion of many Shīʿite jurists in a matter of judicial procedure: permitting the judges to rule according to their personal knowledge of a case. Hossein Modarressi comments that knowledge in this context was generally understood to mean instances in which the judge had personally witnessed an event occur. Some jurists also distinguish between knowledge acquired by the senses (ʿilm ḥissī) and knowledge acquired by "guessing" (ʿilm ḥadsī), which perhaps includes circumstantial evidence .

Al-Māwardī explains the position of the Ṣāḥib al-Maẓālim and his wide reaching investigative authority. He writes that the officer “uses extra intimation and looks for clues through indications and circumstantial evidence (al-amārāt al-dālla wa shawāhid al-aḥwāl).” These investigative tactics are not available to the judges.

In his commentary on the legal treatise of his teacher Shāfiʿī, Muzanī (d. 264/878) appears to uphold his teacher’s cautious stance on allowing translation in the courtroom. Following Shāfiʿī verbatim, Muzanī warns of the dangers of litigation in a foreign language and asserts the need for two trustworthy individuals to serve as both translators and witnesses in any case involving a litigant speaking a foreign tongue. In his chapter in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Mahmood Kooria uses the example of Muzanī to show that Shāfiʿī’s opinion on translation and litigation in a foreign language went almost unchallenged throughout the ninth and tenth centuries.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.

In this excerpt from his treatise on judicial practice, the Shāfiʿī jurist Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058) addresses about twenty-five legal issues pertaining to the role of translation and translators in Muslim courts. He then subdivides these issues into four major categories, namely:(1) the legal status of translation, where he investigates the question whether translation should be considered testimony (shahāda) or a simple report (khabar) and outlines the divergence between Shāfiʿī and Abū Ḥanīfa on the subject; (2) the status of the translator as the father or son of the litigant or as a woman; (3) the identity of one litigant as a foreigner; and (4) the identity of both litigants as foreigners. Māwardī then derives the eligibility requirements for translators in court from the eligibility requirements for witnesses, implying similarity between the two roles. Māwardī thus concludes that the fathers and sons of litigants may not act as translators in court. Likewise, women’s translation may be used only in monetary lawsuits (iqrār bi-l-amwāl), in which they must also be accompanied by the translation of another woman and a man. Women may not serve as translators in marriage-related cases (iqrār al-ḥudūd wa-l-manākiḥ), with the exception of cases concerning adultery, in which a woman may serve alongside at least three other translators. In his chapter in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Mahmood Kooria uses this passage to point to a shift in the Shāfiʿī view on the status of translators and testimony, with Mawārdī expanding the Shāfiʿī treatment of this topic considerably.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.

In his treatise on Shāfiʿī law, Nawawī (d. 676/1277) reaffirms the views of his predecessors Ghazālī andRāfiʿī on translation in early Islamic courts. This excerpt from Nawawī’s treatise focuses on judicial practice more broadly, providing a series of recommendations for the qāḍīfor specific situations, such as when he is appointing a secretary (kātib); the secretary must be Muslim, impartial, acquainted with official reports and records, equipped with clear handwriting, and a qualified translator. In his chapter in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Mahmood Kooria uses the example of Nawawī to show that the shift in the Shāfiʿī stance regarding the status of translation and non-Arabic speakers in judicial proceedings that was inaugurated by Persian Shāfiʿī’s became an accepted view in the influential work of the Damascene Nawawī in the seventh/thirteenth century.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.

In these excerpts from the seventh/thirteenth-century literary collection, author ʿAlī b. Ḥāmid b. Abī Bakr al-Kūfī details the process of translating the book from Arabic into Persian(zabān-i Pahlawī) or the “language of the people of the ʿAjam” (lugha-yi ahl-i ʿajam). Kūfī contends that the translation was critical to making the text accessible to “the people of Fārs or other non-Arab countries.” In his chapter on translation and identity in early Islamic courts in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Mahmood Kooria points to these and other excerpts to suggest that the use of translation to ensure that justice and wisdom prevail plays a prominent role in Kūfī’s text.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.

In these excerpts, Baghawī provides interpretations of two Quranic verses pertaining to the heavenly court on the Day of Resurrection. Commenting on Q. 39:69 (“The earth will shine with the light of its Lord. . . .”), Baghawī presents reports explaining that God will manifest Himself (yatajallā) and illuminate the “open grounds of resurrection” (ʿaraṣāt al-qiyāma) with His light. Regarding the expression fī ẓulalin min al-ghamāmin Q. 2:210 (“God will come to them in canopies of clouds [fī ẓulalin min al-ghamām]”), Baghawī writes that God is in fact “shrouded in clouds, in ‘something like white fog’ (ka-hayʾat al-ḍabāb, abyaḍ).” He insists that the ẓulalimplied here connotes “canopies” or “awnings,” not “shrouds” or “shadows.” In his chapter comparing earthly justice with heavenly justice in the early Islamic imagination in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Christian Lange uses this source to highlight medieval exegetes’ efforts to avoid anthropomorphic interpretations of the Quran by reading verses in abstract terms.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

In this excerpt from his work of Quranic exegesis, Baghawī claims, on the authority of Saʿīd b. al-Musayyab and Ḍaḥḥāk, that God’s epithet al-muhayminis interpreted by some to mean “the judge” (al-qāḍī), and he reports that some even consider al-qāḍīone of the beautiful names of God. In his chapter comparing earthly justice with heavenly justice in the early Islamic imagination in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Christian Lange uses this source to argue that although God is not referred to as qāḍīin the Quran, medieval exegetes regularly identified Him as such in their exegetical works. Lange notes, however, that the inclusion of al-qāḍīamong the divine names did not become standard.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

In this text,Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā al-Balādhurīprovides an earlier account of the anecdote recorded in Kūfī’sFatḥnāma-i Sind aboutIbn Qāsim’s military expedition toDaybul to save Muslim prisoners. A translator figures prominently in the story, intervening to spare the life of the prison warden by translating accounts from the Muslim prisoners attesting to his kindness toward them. In his chapter in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Mahmood Kooria cites this text as an additional source on the anecdote showcasing the important role of translators.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.

In this excerpt from his chronicle, Ibn al-Jawzī relates an incident in 530/1135–6 in which a woman was publicly immolated in the central mosque. In his chapter comparing earthly justice with heavenly justice in the early Islamic imagination in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Christian Lange cites this example of punitive burning to make the point that judges viewed their own function in adjudication along lines similar to divine judgment: in spite of the circulation of ḥadīths such as “Only the Lord of Fire punishes with fire,” rulers and judges had no qualms about burning criminals.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

In this excerpt, Thaʿlabī claims, on the authority of Saʿīd b. al-Musayyab, that God’s epithet al-muhayminis interpreted by some to mean “the judge” (al-qāḍī); some even consider al-qāḍīone of the beautiful names of God. In his chapter comparing earthly justice with heavenly justice in the early Islamic imagination in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Christian Lange uses this source, among others, to argue that although God is not referred to as qāḍīin the Quran, medieval exegetes regularly identified Him as such in their exegetical works. Lange notes, however, that the inclusion of al-qāḍīamong the divine names did not become standard.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

In this excerpt, Māwardī, commenting on Q. 50:21 (“Every soul shall come, and with it a driver [sāʾiq] and a witness [shahīd]”), relates a report from Ḍaḥḥāk that explains the sāʾiqas God’s command. As for shahīd, Māwardī addresses the thorny question whether God, being all-knowing, should need witnesses by proposing two interpretations. First, he suggests that the witness (shahīd)is the resurrected themselves; second, he states that the sinner’s own hands and feet are the witnesses that testify against their owner. In his chapter comparing earthly justice with heavenly justice in the early Islamic imagination in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Christian Lange uses this source to highlight medieval exegetes’ efforts to avoid anthropomorphic interpretations of the Quran by reading verses in abstract terms.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale(ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.