SHARIAsource

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that if a court is convinced that a marriage is irreparable, it is to deem both parties' hearts as being broken, as it were, and that the ongoing conflict requirement in art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975 is, therefore, deemed as having been fulfilled.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that a high religious court (Pengadilan Tinggi Agama), while overturning the decision of a religious court (Pengadilan Agama), incorrectly applied the law because it failed to properly consider the exception submitted by the cassation respondent/original defendant, that the cassation applicant/original plaintiff was domiciled in Klaten. This was a relevant consideration given the relative authority of the court.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that divorce (talak) is articulated as 'Menyatakan jatuh talak satu ba'in sugro dari Tergugat atas Penggugat' ('to declare an irrevocable divorce from the defendant for the plaintiff').

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that gifts (hibah) that exceed one-third of an object of conflict gifted are contrary to legislative provisions.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence pertains to divorce and reasons for divorce. It states that the contents of art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975 are met if, on the facts, a reason for divorce has been established. Therefore, there is no need to apportion blame to one of the parties to the divorce.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that joint asset disputes, where the submission is that the assets in dispute have not been clearly articulated/identified, provided they have not been, and the considerations of the Menado High Religious Court are not comprehensive, the decision must be overturned.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that gifts (hibah) can be declared null and void if the recipient of the gift cannot establish that the item in question has been gifted to them.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that divorce applications cannot be invalidated, per arts 142(1) and 147(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code for Regions Outside Java and Madrua (Reglemen Acara Hukum Untuk Daerah Luar Jawa dan Madura), where a person with power of attorney for one of the parties does not have power of attorney for the other party.

Decided by the Supreme Court of India, Vishwa Lochan Madan v. Union of India decreed that fatwās issued by sharīʿa courts hold no legal leverage. 

University of Washington, School of Law

UCLA, School of Law

This course introduces the field of Islamic law. Islamic law is one of the oldest and most significant legal systems in the contemporary age, and this course is designed to give students a firm grounding in its principles, concepts, and doctrines. We will study the history, theory, and the role of Islamic law in the contemporary age. No previous familiarity with the field is necessary, and there are no course prerequisites. All readings are in English. The course will be divided into two main parts: the first will deal with Islamic law in the classical context, while the second will examine the role of Islamic law in the contemporary age. The first half of the course is oriented towards the historical legacy and theoretical framework of the Islamic legal tradition with a special emphasis on the development of the various schools of law. In the second half, we will study the challenges of modernity and Islamic law in the contemporary age, and will examine issues related to Islamic public international law, human rights, women and gender, and violence.

University of Kansas School of Law

Examines the history, doctrine, texts, and role of Islamic law throughout the world. The course focuses on the background and birth of the Arab-Islamic Empire, the life and times of the Prophet Muhammad, the development of Islam, the Moghul and Ottoman Empires, the Qurʾān and Sunna and other sacred texts, the principal schools of Islamic law, the status of women and religious minorities, and basic principles of some of the substantive areas of law, including criminal, family, inheritance, contract, business, and banking law.

This entry provides a definition and analysis of the term ḥadīth, drawing on works by SHARIAsource Senior Scholar, Joseph Lowry, Associate Professor in the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at the University of Pennsylvania.

Herein, Ibn Rushd I (d. 520/1126) reviews the prohibition of cross-confessional testimony. He clarifies that cross-confessional testimony is specifically forbidden between Christian and Jews, due to the historical presence of enmity between the groups, but is generally permissible in other cases such as among Zoroastrians. In Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Ahmed El Shamsy surveys Ibn Rushd as a springboard to discussing the admissibility of testimony which might be prohibited on a case-by-case basis if enmity is known to exist.   

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.  

In this opinion, addressed to the Official Gazette, the Secretary of the Guardian Council invalidated Article 26 –Note 1 of the Law on the Formation, Duties, and Election of National Islamic Councils 1996. He argued that because Guardian Council does not have any supervisory authority over the decisions of the City Councils (unlike legislative acts), religious minorities could not represent Muslims where majority of residents are Muslims.

In this source, al-Khallāl (d. 311/923) echoes the criteria adopted by al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) for determining the credibility of witness. His approach is largely in line with that of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) and the Companion Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī (d. between 42 and 53/662–73). However, Khallāl slightly diverges in permitting non-Muslims to testify in the specific case regarding the last wishes of a Muslim who dies while traveling, a scenario explicitly condoned in Qurʾan 5:106. Aḥmad rejects the notion of non-Muslim uprightness forwarded by Ḥammād b. Sulaymān (d. 120/737) and Khayr b. Nuʿaym (in office 120-27/738-45), maintaining that individuals outside the Muslim community could not possibly be considered righteous in an objective sense given that they transgress fundamental commandments, for example they partake in wine and pork.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.   

Ibn Wahb (d. 197/812), an Egyptian student of Mālik (d. 179/795), probes the legal implications of communal bias among Christians and Jews in the commentary. He writes that the presence of enmity between Jews and Christians results in a prohibition of the sale of slaves from one group to the other, as well as the prohibition of members of one group testifying against individuals from the other. In 8:425, Ibn Abī Zayd (d. 386/996) examines the positions of jurists on the admissibility of non-Muslim testimony in court. He relays the strict view of Mālikī jurist Ibn al-Qāsim (d. 191/806), which affirms the view of Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī (d. 96/715), that non-Muslim testimony is wholly barred on the basis of Quranic verse 65:2. Ibn al-Qāsim indicates that the earlier Quranic verse 5:106—which allowed non-Muslims to serve as witnesses for a Muslim’s last will—has been abrogated by the verse 65:2. Ahmed El Shamsy employs this source in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts to address the broader legal implications of individual or communal biases' influence on the admissibility of courtroom testimony.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.  

In this text Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980) and Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭaḥāwī (d. 321/933) documents the Hanafī position—upheld by al-Shāfiʿī’s (d. 204/820) teacher Mālik (d. 179/795)—which maintained stricter criteria for the qualification of witnesses. Mālik held that the testimony of witnesses who displayed any degree of heresy should be rejected automatically. In Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts Ahmed El Shamsy contrasts Mālik’s position with that of his student Shāfiʿī who had more leniently maintained that heretical beliefs can only disqualify a witness if they have no precedent and have no basis in any possible interpretation of revelation.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.  

In this excerpt from his legal treatise, the Hanafī jurist al-Sarakhsī relays how the imperial grand judge Yaḥyā b. Aktham (d. 242/857) upheld the Ḥanafī position regarding the eligibility of non-Muslims to serve as witnesses. Yaḥyā was said to have permitted non-Muslim testimony against any other non-Muslims. He explained his position, writing that, “consulting the opinions of the earliest jurists, I have found no one forbidding the testimony of the protected people, except two [conflicting] opinions attributed to Rabīʿa.” Further, Sarakhsī relays the Ḥanafī criterion for witness eligibility which developed in a specific hierarchical framework. Muslims were placed above non-Muslims and, within that, locals above outsiders (dhimmī vs. ḥarbī). As Ahmed El Shamsy notes in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, this framework equates the right to give testimony with the right to demonstrate legal authority (wilāya) over another.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.