SHARIAsource

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that if a court is convinced that a marriage is irreparable, it is to deem both parties' hearts as being broken, as it were, and that the ongoing conflict requirement in art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975 is, therefore, deemed as having been fulfilled.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that a high religious court (Pengadilan Tinggi Agama), while overturning the decision of a religious court (Pengadilan Agama), incorrectly applied the law because it failed to properly consider the exception submitted by the cassation respondent/original defendant, that the cassation applicant/original plaintiff was domiciled in Klaten. This was a relevant consideration given the relative authority of the court.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that divorce (talak) is articulated as 'Menyatakan jatuh talak satu ba'in sugro dari Tergugat atas Penggugat' ('to declare an irrevocable divorce from the defendant for the plaintiff').

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that gifts (hibah) that exceed one-third of an object of conflict gifted are contrary to legislative provisions.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence pertains to divorce and reasons for divorce. It states that the contents of art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975 are met if, on the facts, a reason for divorce has been established. Therefore, there is no need to apportion blame to one of the parties to the divorce.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that joint asset disputes, where the submission is that the assets in dispute have not been clearly articulated/identified, provided they have not been, and the considerations of the Menado High Religious Court are not comprehensive, the decision must be overturned.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that gifts (hibah) can be declared null and void if the recipient of the gift cannot establish that the item in question has been gifted to them.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that divorce applications cannot be invalidated, per arts 142(1) and 147(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code for Regions Outside Java and Madrua (Reglemen Acara Hukum Untuk Daerah Luar Jawa dan Madura), where a person with power of attorney for one of the parties does not have power of attorney for the other party.

Decided by the Supreme Court of India, Vishwa Lochan Madan v. Union of India decreed that fatwās issued by sharīʿa courts hold no legal leverage. 

This is an English translation of the 2014 fatwā issued in the Malaysian state of Selangor entitled “Fatwā Pemikiran Liberalisme Dan Pluralisme Agama,” or “Fatwā on the Thought of Liberalism and Religious Pluralism.” It is significant and controversial for explicitly naming the activist organization Sisters in Islam as "deviant" from the teachings of Islam for promoting "liberalism" and "religious pluralism." 

This is the original (Bahasa Indonesia) fatwā issued by the Indonesian ‘Ulema Council (MUI) in 2005 that declared that “religious pluralism, liberalism, and secularism are notions that are against Islam." 

This is the English translation of the original Bahasa Indonesia fatwā issued by the Indonesian ‘Ulema Council (MUI) in 2005 that declared that “religious pluralism, liberalism, and secularism are notions that are against Islam."

In response to the decision that the Federal (civil) High Court holds jurisdiction over syariah courts on the matter of legal custody in Indira Gandhi Mutho v. Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & ORS (2013), Pathmanathan Krishnan successfully appealed his case in 2015 to the Civil Court of Appeals in Pathmanathan Krishnan v. Indira Gandhi Mutho & Other Appeals (2015). The Court of Appeals held that first, the Judicial Commissioner had no jurisdiction to determine the issue of the children’s conversion to Islam as the validity of the conversion of any person to the religion of Islam and status of whether a person is a Muslim or not was “a matter falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Shariah Court under section 50 of the Administration of the Religion of Islam (Perak) Enactment 2004.” Secondly, the court held that the learned Judicial Commissioner had “committed a grave error when he approached the jurisdiction issue” by venturing into the constitutional construct of the fundamental liberties.

These materials include (i) a compendium of the Sharia Courts Laws enacted by the sharīʿa states, in the form of the Zamfara State Sharia Courts Law annotated section by section to show variations between it and all the rest; (ii) tables correlating the sections of the Zamfara State Sharia Courts Law with the Area Courts laws of 1967-68, from which the Zamfara law was derived; (iii) other statutory materials; (iv) materials on civil procedure in the Sharia Courts; (v) selected decisions by state High Courts and the federal Court of Appeal on matters related to the Sharia Courts, including their jurisdiction and the law applicable in them; (vi) information on the judges of the Sharia Courts, including their numbers, qualifications, and remuneration; (vii) data on caseloads of courts in the sharīʿa states, including the High Courts and Sharia Courts of Appeal, 2011-2015; and (viii) data on numbers of judgments of amputation and stoning to death imposed by Sharia Courts, 2011-2015, and numbers of appeals from such judgments going to High Courts and Sharia Courts of Appeal.

These materials are a part of The Nigeria Papers – a SHARIAsource Special Collection, compiled and edited by Independent Scholar Philip Ostien and others. 

A female applicant filed a complaint against the Traffic Police for refusing to grant her a motorcycle license. The Court of Administrative Justice rejected the argument that the police department was allowed to issue such a license only for men and stated that riding a motorcycle has nothing to do with gender and is not prohibited under law.

In April 2022 [1443 AH], the Dār al-ʿUlūm al-Sharʿiyya press published The Islamic Emirate and Governmental System, authored by the Chief Justice of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, ʿAbd al-Ḥākim al-Ḥaqqānī, with a foreword by the current Taliban head, Hibatullāh Akhunzāda. The book was published in Arabic, with the intention of reaching a broad Muslim audience, beyond Afghanistan. The 312-page book discusses governance, education, laws of war (jihād), political leadership, education, and the rights and roles of women. The book opens by stating that, following the withdrawal of American-allied forces from Afghanistan, the goal of the new Islamic State is the implementation of divine law in accordance with Islamic law generally and Hanafī jurisprudence specifically. This book claims to be a manifesto encompassing the political and governance policies of the Taliban, even though it definitely represents the beliefs of al-Ḥaqqānī and his allies, rather than the philosophy of the entire Taliban movement—which has some internal variation. The book's principal assertions follow.

The book begins by defining two types of government: al-jabāya and al-hidāya. Al-jabāya refers, essentially, to the levying of taxes, while al-hidāya refers to religio-moral guidance. The author maintains that an Islamic government should be one of al-hidāya, where the government serves the role of providing advice and guidance to the people, rather than al-jabāya, wherein a government exploits the poor for the personal gain of government officials. Under a government of al-hidāya, the author asserts that the legitimate form of law is divine, not man-made.

The book acknowledges several sources of sharīʿa. Those sources include but are not limited to the Qur’ān, the ḥadīth (prophetic reports), qiyās (deductive analogical reasoning), ijmā‘ (scholarly consensus), and khayr (benevolence).

The book further establishes that the justice system of the Islamic Emirate should be in accordance only with Hanafī jurisprudence, and that no credence should be given to other schools of Islamic law that are and have historically been minoritarian in Afghanistan. The author asserts that accommodations made for religious minorities will lead to the justice system falling apart, as in the Ottoman Empire.

According to the author, citizens of the Islamic Emirate may continue to adhere to local customs (in Afghanistan: Pashtunwali or the code of the Pashtun people). Such customs may be upheld so long as they do not conflict with sharīʿa and may include wearing traditional Afghan clothes.

The head of the global Islamic state, the book asserts, should be called the Amīr al-Mu’minīn and should be appointed according to the same methods used in selecting the first Four Rāshidūn Caliphs after the death of the Prophet Muḥammad: through the formation of a council of influential and prominent people, not through democracy, which the author considers un-Islamic. Obedience to the Amīr al-Mu’minīn by the entire Islamic world is mandatory, the author asserts, and disobedience is punishable by death. As to criteria for leadership, the author maintains that the Amīr must be a man, and that women are to stay home and avoid participation in politics, for fear that their participation would compromise the political state.

The book discusses the various political institutions that form the Islamic Emirate: a Council of Ministers, the Armed Forces, and a Judiciary. It also calls for the creation of an all-male legislative body known as the Islamic Council.

On education, the book maintains that the educational system should include mandatory education in madrasas, and optional non-Islamic education. The author states that a co-educational system is forbidden (ḥarām), but that education of women itself is not necessarily prohibited (ḥarām). According to the author, a woman’s education should occur within the home and should be carried out by her family members. Further, he maintains that women should pursue careers that are suitable for them, such as medicine, caretaking, home sciences, and teaching; and they are to interface only with other women and girls in those professions.

The book specifically discusses women’s roles in society. It requires women to fully cover themselves in ḥijāb and stipulates that they should not engage in any pursuit that would require them to be alone for longer than three days. Finally, the author notes that women should not travel long distances without a male guardian, and that they should not unnecessarily leave their residences.

Overall, the book’s claims are seldom backed with references, and the sources employed by the author are not listed.