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This statute repeals Law No. 38 of 1999 on Zakat Management. It provides the Islamic rationale behind zakat (alms), and stipulates the implementation and regulation of the National Zakat Management Body (BAZNAS - Badan Amil Zakat Nasional), as well as its branches at province and regency/municipality levels. BAZNAS is responsible for the collection, distribution, utilisation and reporting, of zakat, as well as infaq, sadaqah, and other Islamic social funding. The statute also prescribes as punitive measures a variety of fines and terms of imprisonment for breaches of provisions therein.

This statute regulates the provision of waqf (the permanent dedication by a Muslim of property, usually land, for pious, religious or charitable purposes). The statute, however, also permits a wakif (provider of waqf) to donate money through a shari'a financial institution (art 28). It provides for an Indonesian Waqf Body (Badan Wakaf Indonesia), which comprises an implementing body and an advisement council, and regulates the manner in which the Body may deal with waqf property.

The first respondent, the National Shari'a Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Syari'ah Nasional – Basyarnas), had made a decision on 16 September 2009 between the second respondent (PT. Atriumasta Sakti) and the applicant (PT. Bank Syariah Mandiri), ordering the applicant to return to the second respondent IDR 878,791,366. This figure comprised a banking provision cost payment of IDR 350 million, or one per cent of the value of the financing facility worth IDR 35 billion, because the Murabahah agreement between the two parties had been declared invalid by the first respondent; IDR 45,027,000 in project insurance monies; IDR 5,962,700 in upfront employee social security payments; IDR 298,135,000 to the DKI Jakarta Government Construction Structuring and Supervision Services; and instalment repayments of IDR 179,666,666. The applicant was also ordered to return to the respondent any other costs associated, provided those costs could be verified by the Public Accountants' Office. Basyarnas also decided that if the applicant failed to abide by its decision, the respondent could lodge an application with Bank Indonesia (the Indonesian central bank) to hand the applicant an administrative sanction, and reduce the applicant's credit rating.

The court noted that, pursuant to art 70 of Law No. 30 of 1999, as well as the Elucidation of Chapter VII of Law 30, in conjunction with Law No. 7 of 1989 as amended by Law No. 3 of 2006, and Supreme Court Circular No. 8 of 2008, a party to such a dispute may request that a religious court declare a Basyarnas decision null and void. Article 70, however, only applies if: a. the decision was based on the submission of a false document; b. a relevant document was concealed by the opposing party; or c. the decision was based on misleading information. In this instance, the applicant claimed that the first respondent had failed to consider material legal facts to its case, therefore invoking art 70(c). Based on a submission made by the second respondent that the applicant had failed to carry out the second and subsequent stages of liquidation deriving from the Murabahah financing facility, the first respondent had determined that the applicant had defaulted on its agreement with the second respondent. The applicant claimed that the first respondent had ignored the fact that it was actually the second respondent who had defaulted by:

1. failing to produce the original building permit and then failing to the applicant with a copy, pursuant to art 3(1) of the Murabahah agreement;
2. failing to pay the notary, pursuant to art 3(4) of the agreement; and
3. failing to transfer its own self-financing monies, pursuant to art 3(23) of the agreement.

While the second respondent had already shown the applicant a building permit management services contract between it and H. Jayadi Kusumah, as well as proof of payment of a quote for 1 March 2005 for IDR 3,212,500,000 to H. Jayadi Kusumah as a buliding permit enactment management fee, as well as permission for other construction for the Ruko Soho Carbella Square project, the applicant claimed that the first respondent had ignored the fact that the reliability of this quote had not been established. Moreover, the applicant had even requested to see the quote via the Basyarnas secretary, pursuant to trial procedures, but had been denied. This, the applicant claimed, precluded it from carrying out its end of the bargain. In short, the applicant claimed the second respondent had failed to hand over to the applicant its building permit, whereas the second respondent had claimed it had paid IDR 3,212,500,000 to H. Jayadi Kusumah to arrange the building permit and other necessary construction permits.

The applicant also claimed that there was a material disparity between the final draft of the Basyarnas decision and the decision provided to the Central Jakarta Religious Court insofar as the Religious Court had been told that Basyarnas would not accede to claims for damages until their reliability had been verified by the Public Accountant. While the Religious Court declared the Basyarnas decision null and void, the Supreme Court found that the Religious Court lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate the case, thereby reinstating the Basyarnas decision.

Pursuant to art 67(c) of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, in conjunction with Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, the applicant requested the court reconsider (peninjauan kembali) its decision on the grounds that the court had granted more than that sought by the respondents. It alleged that:

1. the court had unnecessarily found that the Central Jakarta Religious Court did not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate the case;
2. that the Basyarnas decision ordered it to return to the applicant other costs not related to the transaction in question; and
3. it had unnecessarily authorised the second respondent to ask Bank Indonesia to sanction the applicant if it failed to comply with its decision.

The applicant also claimed that Basyarnas had made a legal error by directing the secretary to register an official copy of the decision with the Central Jakarta Religious Court registrar, when Law No. 30 of 1999 requires that such decisions be registered with the State Court (Pengadilan Negeri). The applicant also claimed that the Supreme Court, in the first instance, had cited art 55 of Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari'a Banking, stating that as the dispute was a shari'a banking dispute, the religious courts had jurisdiction, only to then declare the religious courts did not have jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the applicant's review (peninjauan kembali) appeal, ordering it to pay costs of IDR 2.5 million. In doing so, it held that no legal error had been made by the court in the first instance. Rather, that the parties to the dispute had already clearly stated that the dispute would be resolved via arbitration, thereby invoking art 2 of Law No. 30 of 1999, and precluding the state courts and religious courts from having jurisdiction (art 3 of Law No. 30 of 1999). The court also noted that Supreme Court Circular No. 8 of 2008 conflicted with art 59(3) of Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Authority, and had accordingly already been rendered null and void by Supreme Court Circular No. 8 of 2010. Moreover, while the applicant had sought to invoke art 70(c) of Law No. 30 of 1999, it had failed to prove upon what misleading information its opponents' case had rested.

This statute makes amendments to Law No. 7 of 1989 on the Religious Judiciary.

The amendments contained within this revised statute on banking explicitly permit, as well as regulate, shari'a banking practices in Indonesia. Crucially, the statute states that Bank Indonesia (Indonesia's Central Bank) may set conditions and provisions to which banks wishing to practise shari'a banking must adhere.

This statute regulates shari'a banking practices and the establishment of shari'a banks in Indonesia. The statute acknowledges the principles of shari'a banking as forming part of the teachings of Islam. More specifically, it acknowledges the Islamic prohibition on riba (usury or interest) in a variety of forms, and how implementing a system based on profit and loss sharing can create a healthy and just investment climate.

This government regulation provides guidance on how to implement certain key sections of Law No. 41 of 2004 on Waqf.

This qanun regulates the formation and composition of Bank Aceh Syariah. Among other things, the qanun states that the bank is domiciled in Banda Aceh, is based on the principles of Islam, and its shareholders are the Acehnese Government (which holds at least 51 per cent of the shares), PT. Bank Aceh, Acehnese regency/municipal governments, and other shareholders.

This qanun regulates regional financial management in Aceh Tenggara (Southeast Aceh).

The plaintiff was a customer of the first defendant at the Lubuk Buaya Shari'a Micro-Service Unit. There he had entered into a Murabahah agreement (dated 7 July 2009), pursuant to which the first defendant executed a take over loan for the plaintiff to the value of IDR 200 million. The plaintiff was to return to the first defendant the loan and reward valued at IDR 153,600,000. Accordingly, the plaintiff was obligated to pay to the first defendant IDR 353,600,000. According to the plaintiff, the first defendant's profit was IDR 153,600,000, or equivalent to 76.5 per cent of the take over loan (IDR 200 million), which the plaintiff could not afford to pay. The plaintiff submitted that this was unlawful because, according to Islamic shari'a, the plaintiff was only entitled to 10 per cent of the profit, but had to pay to the first defendant 76.5 per cent of the contract price.

The Padang High Religious Court found that, as the parties had agreed to this profit margin, it was unable to intervene. While it did not object to the reasoning of the lower court, it handed down its own judgment, amending formulaic errors in the lower court's judgment.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Surabaya Religious Court (5718/Pdt.G/2014/PA.Sby), which had found that it did not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate his claim.

The court grappled with the ambiguity as to an appropriate dispute resolution forum for shari'a banking disputes. It noted that between Constitutional Court Decision No. 93 of 2012, art 55 of Law No. 21 of 2008 on Shari'a Banking, and art 49(i) of Law No. 3 of 2006 on Religious Judiciary, the religious courts were not only authorised to resolve shari'a banking disputes, but all facets of shari'a economy. It also noted, however, that dispute resolution, purusant to art 49(i) of Law No. 3 of 2006, provides that parties may decide not to resolve their disputes before a religious court. In this instance, as the parties had specifically designated the National Shari'a Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Syari'ah Nasional) as their preferred dispute resolution forum, art 1338 of the Indonesian Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata) mandated that the parties had to abide by the terms of their agreement. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal.

The plaintiffs submitted that they had entered into a murabahah financing agreement with the first defendant on 19 September 2011 for IDR 175 million. The money was to be used to finance a shop, and the plaintiffs agreed to repay the money to the first defendant within 60 months, leveraging their 224m² family property in Jabon village, Mojokerto. The plaintiffs submitted that they had chosen to borrow from a shari'a bank because they were both Muslims and wished to conduct business in accordance with the Qur'an and Sunnah.

Between October 2011-August 2012, the plaintiffs adhered to the repayment structure, and made 11 repayments (IDR 47,500,000). By September 2012, however, the plaintiffs' business had become less profitable as the number of market competitors increased. The plaintiffs still made their monthly repayment on 29 September 2012, but submitted that they had requested a restructuring of the agreement to accommodate their recent financial hardship. Moreover, they also submitted that the first defendant should have provided the plaintiffs with an opportunity to sell the property on their own to enable them to make future repayments. Instead, on 24 April 2013, the first defendant sent to the plaintiffs a letter stating its intentions to auction the leveraged property the following morning (25 April 2013).

The plaintiffs learned that the third defendant, who had successfully bid at auction for the property, had already visited the property before auction with an employee of the first defendant, expressing an interest to purchase it for IDR 225 million. The plaintiffs had rejected the offer, wishing instead to resolve the dispute through legal channels. The plaintiffs submitted that the first and third defendants had clearly colluded to acquire the plaintiffs' family property. Moreover, that the property should have been able to attract IDR 400 million at auction.

The plaintiffs requested that the court:

1. invalidate the auctioning of their property;
2. afford them the opportunity to sell their property on their own; and
3. prohibit the second defendant from dealing with the property.

The court found, however, that it was precluded from adjudicating the case as the parties had agreed to resolve any disputes before the National Shari'a Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Syari'ah Nasional).

The cassation applicant sought to challenge Decision: 46/Pdt.G/2012/PTA.Pdg of the Padang High Religious Court (lower court) on the grounds that it incorrectly applied the law. More specifically, it objected to the lower court's finding that it was not authorised to empty and auction the cassation respondent's home. The cassation applicant submitted that even after it had afforded the cassation respondent the opportunity to restructure its finance agreement, the cassation respondent was still unable to make the necessary repayments, despite being served with three subsequent written reminders.

The Supreme Court concurred with the cassation applicant's submission that the lower court had erred in its application of the law. It acknowledged the efforts made by the cassation applicant to assist the cassation respondent, and found no reason at law for the agreement between the parties to be avoided.

The plaintiff was the biological mother and beneficiary of the deceased's estate. Since 2007, the deceased had been a customer of the second defendant, the second defendant being an employee of the first defendant (PT. Bank Sumut Syariah Cabang Padangsidempuan). The deceased had always met his credit repayment obligations to the first defendant. On 26 April 2011, the deceased executed a musyarakah financing agreement with the first and second defendants to obtain IDR 700 million in additional capital for a term of 12 months, leveraging two properties. The co-defendants (also beneficiaries) had also drafted a written statement on 26 April 2011 which, principally, stated that if something ever happened to the deceased and his life insurance had not cleared to cover his financial obligations, that his beneficiaries would not sue the first defendant, and all finances owing would be repaid by his beneficiaries. On 13 July 2011, the deceased passed away due to illness.

The plaintiff submitted that she strongly objected to the third (and final) written reminder from the first and second defendants on 22 May 2012, pursuant to which the first and second defendants sought a repayment of of IDR 752 million. The first and second defendants granted the plaintiff a time allowance given the circumstances, but maintained that if the debt had not been repaid by 25 June 2012, they would have the fourth defendant auction the two properties.

The plaintiff submitted that, pursuant to clause 2 of the agreement, as the deceased's beneficiary, she was not obligated to bear the cost of the agreement. Therefore, the plaintiff requested, among other things, that the court invalidate or postpone the auctioning of the properties, at least until the court had passed judgment. Moreover, that the plaintiff and three co-defendants, as beneficiaries, be released from any financial obligations stemming from the musyarakah agreement, and that the written statement providing the first defendant with immunity, and compelling the deceased's beneficiaries to repay his debts, be declared null and void.

The court acceded to the plaintiff's request to be absolved from financial responsibility with regards to the musyarakah agreement, and to return the two properties leveraged pursuant to the agreement to the plaintiff. It did so on the grounds that the first-third defendants should have had in place an insurance policy to cover themselves in the event the deceased passed away (which he had). The court also declared null and void the written statement.

The appellants sought to challenge Decision: 967/Pdt.G/2012/PA.Mdn of the Medan Religious Court. The court allowed the appeal on the grounds that:

1. the respondent had sued the incorrect party;
2. the respondent did not have the necessary legal standing before the lower court, as she was not a party to the musyarakah agreement; and
3. the fourth appellant had never actually auctioned the properties.

The cassation applicants sought to challenge Decision: 0328/Pdt.G/2012/ PA.Btl. of the Bantul Religious Court (and Decision: 05/Pdt.G/2013/ PTA.Yk. of the Yogyakarta High Religious Court) on the grounds that the lower courts had erred in their application of the law. More specifically, the cassation applicants submitted that:

1. they could provide documentary evidence proving that the cassation respondents had indeed removed the security over the deed of title of a property belonging to a Prof Dr Kuswandi and replaced it with the deed of title belonging to the property of the second cassation applicant;
2. the Yogyakarta High Religious Court had failed to refer to the interlocutory decision of the Yogyakarta High Religious Court (21 March 2013), which painted a clear picture of the status of the case, as well as the fact that the cassation respondents had not proven what the Yogyakarta High Religious Court had directed them to;
3. the Yogyakarta High Religious Court had incorrectly recorded evidence produced by the cassation respondents;
4. the first and second cassation respondents had tied the cassation applicants to a debt of IDR 1.5 billion; and
5. one of the conditions of a mortgage is a power of attorney over that mortgage, and this had been omitted, rendering the mortgage null and void.

On the facts, the Supreme Court could not accept these reasons for cassation and, therefore, dismissed the appeal.

The cassation respondent had an iron sand transportation business and, in order to improve efficiency, had successfully applied for a credit facility (murabahah) from the cassation applicant to purchase a container truck. The agreement stated that, in the event of any dispute, the first course of action would be to resolve that dispute in a deliberative manner between the two parties, but if deliberations were to fail, both parties agree to resolve the dispute before the National Shari'a Arbitration Body (Badan Arbitrase Syariah Nasional).

The cassation respondent had acquired a credit facility from the cassation applicant for IDR 1.476 billion, with a down payment of IDR 265,100,000. The cassation respondent subsequently experienced many financial ups and downs, impeding his ability to make repayments to the cassation applicant. The cassation respondent, however, if late to make his repayment, would also pay the late fee associated therein.

On 3 August 2013 at 8:30pm, the cassation respondent repossessed the container truck, subject of the agreement. It did so after the cassation respondent was 17 days late to make a repayment. The parties had agreed that the cassation respondent would pay a late fee of 0.002 per cent of the nominal repayment per day, and after 30 days in default, the cassation applicant would be entitled to repossess the vehicle. Pursuant to art 1365 of the Indonesian Civil Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata), the cassation respondent had sought damages.

The South Jakarta Religious Court (lower court) had ordered the cassation applicant to return to the cassation respondent the vehicle subject of the credit facility agreement, as well as to pay to the cassation respondent damages of IDR 167,355,000. At the same time, the lower court ordered the cassation respondent to pay to the cassation applicant arrears of IDR 167,355,000, and a fine of IDR 209,193,750. The Jakarta High Religious Court then upheld this decision on appeal.

The cassation applicant sought to challenge the decision on the grounds that the lower courts both erred in their application of the law. Specifically, that the Jakarta High Religious Court had failed to provide reasons or clarity for its decision to uphold the decision of the South Jakarta Religious Court.

The Supreme Court upheld the appeal, concurring with the cassation applicant that the lower courts had failed to apply the law correctly. The court found that the parties had entered into a murabahah agreement on 17 December 2010, the subject of which (the vehicle) had been repossessed by the cassation applicant. The court believed that such conduct was a breach of the agreement rather than illegal conduct. Moreover, the right to take legal action must be based on one party's failure to fulfil an contractual obligation, meaning that the cassation respondent needed to explain which section of the agreement it believed the cassation applicant had contravened. Finally, the court reasoned, the vehicle was not seized by the cassation applicant. For those reasons, the court found in favour of the cassation applicant.

The appellants sought to challenge Decision: 0519/Pdt.G/2013/PA.Ska of the Surakarta Religious Court. The court, however, dismissed the appeal, noting that the plaintiffs' agreement to repay IDR 2.5 million per month, rather than the originally agreed upon IDR 3.5 million, had been rejected by the defendant. Therefore, auctioning the first appellant's properties could not be deemed unlawful.

The cassation applicants sought to challenge Decision: 160/ Pdt.G/2014/PTA.Smg. of the Semarang High Religious Court and Decision: 1721/Pdt.G/ 2013/PA.Pbg of the Purbalingga Religious Court, on the grounds that both courts had erred in their application of the law. More specifically, that:

1. the lower courts had failed to consider that the money obtained pursuant to the multi-service ijarah financing agreement was used for tabloid printing costs, while printing had stopped because the director of printing (Suyitno) had absconded, as stated in a report to Purbalingga Police, dated 21 October 2013;
2. the cassation applicants had provided a financial guarantee of IDR 25 million, which, while it was subsequently blocked by the cassation respondents, should have been used to reduce their arrears;
3. evidence was produced showing that the debt owed to the cassation respondents was in the name of Mulia Lastro Wibowo, not the cassation applicants, which should render the decision of the lower courts invalid; and
4. the Purbalingga Religious Court had noted in its judgment that the cassation respondents had produced witnesses, when in actual fact they had not.

The court allowed the appeal on the following different grounds:

1. that the Semarang High Religious Court was inconsistent in its findings with regard to the cassation applicants defaulting on repayments due, stating that a default had to be allowed until the agreement concluded in September 2016, while also concurring with the Purbalingga Religious Court that the cassation applicants had defaulted; and
2. that the Semarang High Religious Court decision lacked legal certainty because the cassation applicants, who were found to have defaulted, should have been ordered to pay damages rather than to simply discharge their arrears with the cassation respondents, because such an order did not remove the risk of the cassation applicants defaulting again.

The appellant sought to challenge Decision: 0133/Pdt.G/2014/PA.Mgl. of the Magelang Religious Court (lower court).

The court disagreed with the lower court's decision that it was precluded from adjudicating the case, instead finding that:

1. the religious judiciary, pursuant to art 49 of Law No. 7 of 1989 on the Religious Judiciary, as amended by Law No. 3 of 2006 and Law No. 50 of 2009, has the authority to examine shari'a economy cases; and
2. following Constitutional Court Decision No. 93 of 2013 (30 August 2013), the religious judiciary is the only judicial forum authorised to handle shari'a economy cases.

Therefore, the court, pursuant to art 15(2) of Law No. 20 of 1947 on Judicial Review, found that the Magelang Religious Court was authorised to adjudicate the case and ordered that it re-open the case.