SHARIAsource

Sujak and Nuryani were married on 3 August 1982 and had two children (Tugik Dini Rike Nur Anggrainingsih (23) and Almaiciko Bawita Firnanda (13)). They also owned a property they had purchased with Nuryani's inheritance and Sujak's pension funds. The property had been placed in the name of their first child, Tugik, but was tenanted by Nuryani's mother (Wartini) and another family member (Rumini). On 5 February 2005, Nuryani passed away due to illness. On 12 February 2012, Nuryani's father, Joyo Suwito, passed away, also due to illness. On 23 December 2014, Tugik relocated to East Kalimantan with her husband. Then, on 8 December 2015, Sujak passed away. Since Sujak's passing, Almaiciko had been cared for by her uncle (Nuryani's younger brother), the applicant (Mutaal). As Almaiciko was still under the legal age of consent, the applicant sought from the court a stipulation that he was Almaiciko's legal guardian.

The court acceded to the application for guardianship, pursuant to arts 50(1) and 51(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, in conjunction with art 107(4) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, on the grounds that Almaiciko was under the age of consent (and not yet married) and that the applicant was a family member and, therefore, a legitimate applicant for guardianship.

The first applicant was the wife of the deceased, while the second to eighth applicants were the children of the applicant and decased. The applicants were all stipulated in the will of the deceased as beneficiaries (ahli waris). The deceased's savings were held with PT. Bank BPD Aceh (IDR 22,133,633), an additional deposit of IDR 6 million having been made on 4 December 1998. When the applicants sought to withdraw the savings of the deceased, however, the bank told them they needed to first obtain a court-issued stipulation declaring that they were indeed the beneficiaries under the deceased's will. The applicants' request was then dismissed by the court when they failed to attend the proceeding.

This government regulation states, in its preambular statement, that its purpose is to implement art 45 of Law No. 33 of 2004 on Fiscal Equalisation between Central and Regional Governments. Article 45 states that the procedures related to the provision, receipt, and use of gifts (hibah), both from home and abroad, is to be regulated in a government regulation. Accordingly, this government regulation makes provision for the provision of gifts received from both home and abroad, and the manner in which they are distributed to their intended recipient(s).

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that religious courts outside Java-Madura are authorised to make stipulations regarding Muslim inheritance and the beneficiaries thereof. With regards to the ownership of the house in dispute, however, it was determined that that was a matter for the state courts.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence pertains to inheritance law. It states that a dispute over the estate of a deceased person between beneficiaries (ahli waris) with a familial connection to the deceased cannot also include an ownership dispute, and, when strengthened by information provided by witnesses, must be dismissed.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that if a person submits to having rights over land based on a gift (hibah), that person must be able to establish ownership based on that gift, as specified in art 210(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Moreover, if the land is obtained based on a gift, then the land needs to be placed in the recipient's name immediately. If this does not happen and a dispute subsequently arises, the status of the land remains as is, unless a change of ownership can be established.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that:

1. Law No. 20 of 1947 regulates judicial appeals, and, therefore, cannot be applied to the drafting of a submission in the first instance; and
2. before applying art 210(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the plaintiff must first articulate the property it is claiming as a gift (hibah) in order that the court can ascertain whether or not that gift exceeds the one-third limit placed on parties who choose to make a gift of their own property.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that because of replacement beneficiaries, beneficiaries replaced, as well as those who have passed away, their time of passing must be clearly stated, both in court applications and judicial reports. If this requirement is not met, the application is to be dismissed for lack of clarity.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that a deed of distribution, per art 107 of Law No. 7 of 1989 as amended by Law No. 3 of 2006, must include all beneficiaries. If it does not, the deed can be impugned before a court and declared null and void.

The parties (except the third defendant) were siblings and beneficiaries under their deceased parent's will. The estate of the deceased comprised a 1093m² property, which had become the subject of a dispute between the parties. The plaintiffs submitted that, on 17 December 2013, the first and second defendants, unbeknownst to the plaintiffs, leveraged the property to obtain a murabahah financing agreement from the third defendant (a shari'a bank) for IDR 170 million. Moreover, the plaintiffs submitted that the third defendant, as a shari'a bank, had already contravened the principle of prudence, because the third defendant entered into the agreement without the approval of the plaintiffs.

The third defendant, however, submitted that, as it had not entered into contractual relations with the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs had no grounds on which to issue proceedings against it. The court acceded to the third defendant's objection and, therefore, dismissed the plaintiffs' application.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that gifts (hibah) that exceed one-third of an object of conflict gifted are contrary to legislative provisions.

This Supreme Court jurisprudence states that gifts (hibah) can be declared null and void if the recipient of the gift cannot establish that the item in question has been gifted to them.

The reconsideration (peninjauan kembali) applicant, previously the plaintiff/appellant/cassation applicant, herein referred to as the plaintiff, submitted a request for reconsideration in its claim against the reconsideration respondents and reconsideration co-respondents, previously the cassation respondents/defendants/respondents and co-cassation respondents/co-defendants/co-respondents, herein referred to as the defendants and co-defendants. The plaintiff submitted that he had purchased from a Bapak (Mr) Munasan a 250m² property on 29 August 1975, and that the village head was aware of the purchase. The property had been transferred into the plaintiff's name in 1979 for the purposes of property tax and regional building fees. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, however, on 29 July 2000, the property was bequeathed to another party, the fifth defendant, pursuant to a deed drafted by the first co-defendant. Furthermore, the fifth defendant requested that the first co-defendant have the second co-defendant issue the transfer of title in the name of the fifth defendant, with the second, third and fourth defendants serving as trustees (nadzir). On 12 May 2001, the plaintiff submitted that he was invited by the first defendant to discuss the matter of the land endowment. There he was shown a draft statement requiring his signature. Then, on 17 November 2010, the defendants, believing the statement was erroneous, drafted an invalidation of land endowment deed for the second co-defendant. On 29 July 2011 at the local office of religious affairs, the defendants prepared an invalidation report and invalidation declaration and deed of land endowment in relation to the property. The plaintiff submitted that, therefore, the defendants' conduct was evidence the plaintiff was the lawful owner of the property and that the defendants sought legal certainty over the matter in the form of a decision from the Bandung Religious Court. Moreover, that the plaintiff was entitled to IDR 500,000 per day for every day the court's decision was not implemented.

In dismissing this final appeal, the court found that the reason for reconsideration submitted by the plaintiff, that being that new evidence in the form of a relevant document had been discovered that had not been considered in the previous proceeding, failed to meet the prescribed requirement for new and admissible evidence in art 67(b) of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court.

The applicant was the husband of the deceased, who had died on 13 May 2014 due to illness. The applicant had married the deceased in 1987. The parents of the deceased had also passed away in 2001 and 2011, and the sibling of the deceased had passed away in 1991. As no one else had come forward as a potential beneficiary, the applicant, pursuant to art 49(b) of Law No. 3 of 2006 on Amendments to law No. 7 of 1989 on the Religious Judiciary, requested that he be stipulated by the court as the sole beneficiary of two apartments.

In acceding to the applicant's request, the court, citing arts 171(c) and 174(2) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acknowledged that the applicant, as the husband of the deceased, was a legitimate beneficiary.

A plot of land (a rice field) had been bequeathed to two brothers, Abdul Halim and Fatchul Isya'i. When the two brothers passed away, the land became the property of Abdul Halim's children (the first and second defendants), who gave Fatchul Isya'i's adopted son (the plaintiff) a portion of the land. The plaintiff submitted that, as he was also a Muslim, he was therefore entitled to half the plot of land, in accordance with provisions of Islamic law. The plaintiff also submitted that, assuming the court acceded to his request, he was entitled to IDR 10 million per day for every day the defendants failed to transfer to him control of half the plot of land.

The majority of the court referred to the definition of an adopted child (anak angkat) in art 171(h) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, which requires parenting responsibilities to be transferred from the child's biological parents to its adoptive parents, pursuant to a court decision. As the plaintiff had only been adopted by his adoptive parents pursuant to local custom (adat), however, the majority found that he did not have the required legal standing. Second, the plaintiff had failed to state clearly on what grounds he was suing the defendants. Third, if the plaintiff sought to establish that he was an adopted child, and that he was entitled to certain inheritance, these two applications would need to be made separately.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Ahmad Zaenal Fanani found the defendants' acknowledgment that the plaintiff was the adoptive child of Fatchul Isya'i to be a relevant consideration. Moreover, that according to Islamic inheritance law and the concept of wasiat wajibah, adopted children, pursuant to art 209(2) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and Indonesian Supreme Court Jurisprudence 312K/AG/2008, were entitled to a maximum of one-third of the estate of a deceased adoptive parent.

The appellant sought to challenge Malang Religious Court Decision No. 915 of 2015. The court, however, dismissed the appeal on the same grounds as the majority in the decision of the court of first instance. It also found that the issue pertaining to wasiat wajibah and inheritance for adopted children, as expressed in the dissenting opinion in the initial decision, to be irrelevant.

The cassation applicant sought to challenge Malang Religious Court Decision No. 915 of 2015, as well as Surabaya High Religious Court Decision No. 243 of 2015, on the grounds that the preceding courts had incorrectly applied the law or contravened the law, as provided in art 30(1)(b) of Law No. 14 of 1985, Law No. 5 of 2004, Law No. 3 of 2009 on the Indonesian Supreme Court.

In granting the cassation applicant's appeal, the Supreme Court found that the preceding courts had both erred in determining that the cassation applicant was not the adopted child of Fatchul Isya'i at law. The Supreme Court held that the acknowledgment from the cassation respondents that the cassation applicant was indeed the adopted child of Fatchul Isya'i was a relevant and conclusive consideration. Moreover, because Fatchul Isya'i had adopted the cassation applicant in 1982, prior to the enactment of the Compilation of Islamic Laws in 1991, art 171 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws was inapplicable to the facts of the case.

The plaintiffs were the biological children of the deceased, who had died on 10 April 1979. The wife of the deceased had also passed away on 25 June 2012. The deceased was his parents' only son, and his parents, the plaintiffs' grandparents, had passed away in 1980 and 1992. The deceased had left behind eight parcels of land, including:

1. a house;
2. four rice paddies, upon one of which was a shophouse, built by the second co-defendant and purchased by the first co-defendant, and a restaurant;
3. two durian plantations; and
4. another parcel of land.

The defendant, who was the plaintiffs' great uncle (younger brother of their deceased grandmother), controlled all eight parcels of land because, at the time of the death of the deceased, the plaintiffs were still in primary school (sekolah dasar). The plaintiffs submitted that the defendant was not a legitimate beneficiary because the deceased was the sole son of the original owner of all eight parcels of land, and they were his children. Furthermore, the first and second co-defendants enjoyed no right of inheritance over the rice paddy with the shophouse and restaurant as the plaintiffs had never sold to either of them the land or any part thereof. Moreover, the first co-defendant knew the right owner of the land, and knew that the plaintiffs were the children of the deceased.

The plaintiffs, therefore, sought a determination from the court that they were the true owners of the eight parcels of land. The defendant and two co-defendants refuted the plaintiffs' submissions, submitting that the house had actually belonged to the defendant's father, and that the the rice paddy on which the shophouse and restaurant were situated had been inherited by the defendant and first co-defendant, who had lawfully sold a part thereof to the second co-defendant. The defendant and two co-defendants also submitted that they had no connection whatsoever to the other parcels of land.

In dismissing the plaintiffs' application, the court noted that the plaintiffs had failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish their claim to the relevant parcels of land. The court also ordered the court bailiff to lift the caveat over the relevant parcels of land.

The deceased (IB) died on 27 November 2016, and was survived by his two beneficiaries, his wife (the first applicant) and daughter (the second applicant). The deceased left savings in a bank account with Bank BRI, Lamno. The applicants requested that the court stipulate them as beneficiaries of in order that they may administer the bank account of the deceased.

In acceding to the applicants' request, the court, pursuant to art 174(1)(a) of the Compilation of Laws, acknowledged that the evidence provided by the two witnesses corroborated with that provided by the applicants.

The Western Cape High Court in Cape Town declared the 1953 Wills Act inconsistent with the South Africa Constitution, because the statute’s provisions were previously interpreted to recognize only legal marriage and not Muslim marriages.