SHARIAsource

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Albania (Republika e Shqipërisë), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Albania’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Commonwealth of Australia, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Australia’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Austria (Republik Österreich), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Austria's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Belarus (Respublika Belarus), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Belarus’ Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Kingdom of Belgium (Royaume de Belgique [French]/Koninkrijk Belgie [Dutch]/Koenigreich Belgien [German]), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Belgium’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of Bermuda, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Bermuda’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Federative Republic of Brazil (República Federativa do Brasil), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Brazil’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This citation manual provides an "open and compatible implementation of a uniform system of citation" for the laws, cases, and secondary materials of all jurisdictions, globally. The Indigo Book is available in both PDF (below) and HTML (through this link). It is not affiliated with The Columbia Law Review Association, Inc., The Harvard Law Review Association, the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc., or The Bluebook® A Uniform System of Citation®. 

The Greek General Secretariat, Ministry of the Interior drafted a bill designed to prioritize Greek civil law over religious (namely Islamic) family law. This was due to concern about the rights of young Muslim minority women. However, the bill was never brought before the Greek Parliament.

This document was issued by Texas state legislator, Representative Kyle Biedermann, as a "poll" sent to mosques across the state of Texas in January 2017 to provide information on the practices and beliefs regarding Islamic law, or sharīʿa. 

Plaintiff, a Muslim prisoner, challenged prison policies that (1) failed to provide a Muslim chaplain and an adequate number of Islamic services; (2) prohibited religious meetings without a volunteer present; (3) failed to provide ḥalāl meals and a location where he may perform five daily ṣalāt (prayers); and (4) prohibited him from wearing a kufi (prayer cap) or an Islamic medallion outside of his clothing. The Court found that plaintiff had not demonstrated that the prison's policies substantially burdened his ability to practice his religion, as required for a finding of a violation of the First Amendment or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and that where plaintiff had demonstrated a substantial burden, the prison had demonstrated that its policies were the least restrictive means of achieving the compelling government interest in safety and security.

Plaintiff Jerry Lemons, a Muslim prisoner confined in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, brought this complaint against the Respondents, prison officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, for a violation of his freedom to exercise his religion when the Respondents did not provide a special menu for an Islamic holy day in December 2008. The judge determined that the fact that a single meal service was disrupted or missed did not create a substantial burden on the Plaintiff’s ability to practice religion, and recommended that the Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim be dismissed.

Plaintiff Hilton Karriem Mincy, a Muslim prisoner at the Lycoming County Prison, brought this suit against the Respondents – the county prison, the prison warden and other prison officials – alleging that the prison’s inadequate food service during Ramadan, which included no hot meals at the end of the day and evening meals of insufficient caloric content to compensate for the absence of a daytime meal, constituted a failure to accommodate his religious beliefs and a violation of the RLUIPA. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania entered summary judgment in favor of the Respondents, and the Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The Court of Appeals determined that the Plaintiff identified no official policy promulgated by the prison administration which violated his constitutional rights, and there was no evidence to suggest that any named Respondent played a direct role or had any personal involvement in the preparation or storage of food.

Plaintiff Lavotte Saunders, a Muslim African-American male, brought this claim of discrimination based on race and religion against the Respondent, the Plaintiff’s former employer Apothaker & Associates. Two days after the Plaintiff was hired, he was fired on the basis of having a criminal record, but later discovered that several other employees of the Respondent had criminal records (including felony convictions) and were not fired. Therefore, the Plaintiff brought suit on the basis that he was fired as a result of disparate treatment due to religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. The Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. The Court found that claims of discrimination are subject to the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green burden shifting analysis: First, the Plaintiff had to state a prima facie case, and then the burden shifted to the Respondent to “articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee’s termination.” The Court found that the Plaintiff failed to state a prima facie case, because he could not prove that he was qualified for the position in the first place. Therefore, the Court granted the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff Joe Burgos Vega, a practicing Muslim prisoner at the Connecticut Department of Corrections (“DOC”), brought this action against the Respondents, officials at the DOC, claiming that Respondents’ 1) denial of the Plaintiff’s request to be circumcised; 2) denial of access to suitable Islamic prayer oils; and 3) frequently canceled Friday congregational prayer constituted a violation of his right to exercise his religion. The Respondents argued that they are entitled to qualified immunity from suit in their individual capacities. The Court sided with the Respondents, finding that 1) prisoners have no constitutional or statutory right to a surgery that is not medically necessary; 2) DOC officers did not violate the Plaintiff’s right with regard to prayer oils, because they provided him with access to the imam-approved commissary oil; and 3) that although prisoners have the right to participate in group religious services, the frequent Friday prayer cancellations were reasonable because they occurred due to a shortage of volunteer imams and that other opportunities for religious practice were available to Muslim inmates.

Appellant Amina Aden appealed her contempt citations and sentences, contending that they violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).  During the Appellant’s criminal trial for providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota cited the Appellant for criminal contempt for repeatedly failing to stand when the court convened and recessed as required by pretrial order. This Court found that the lower court erred in evaluating the Appellant’s former contentions that standing at these times would violate her religious belief. The Court found that in the RFRA context, the district court erred by evaluating the orthodoxy and sophistication of the Appellant’s belief, instead of simply evaluating whether her practice was rooted in sincerely held religious belief.  Because the district court only applied a First Amendment analysis, it did not apply an RFRA analysis that evaluated whether the pretrial order was the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling government interest.  Therefore, the Court vacated the contempt citations and remanded to the district court to evaluate whether the pretrial order was the least restrictive means to further that or other compelling interests.

Plaintiff Sturgeon Stewart, an inmate at the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) brought suit against Respondents Vernestene Dulin, head of prison food services, and various other prison officials for alleged violations of his rights to religious free exercise on the claim that the prison served Muslim inmates the same ḥalāl food menu for all meals of the day, and that these meals excluded meat. Ḥalāl food is meat prepared in accordance with Islamic ritual law, and free of pork and alcohol. The Plaintiff contended that this repetition was not a nutritional religious-accommodating alternative to regular prison meals. The Court found for the Respondents, determining that Muslim prisoners do not have a right under the First Amendment or the RLUIPA to be provided ḥalāl meat entrees. Rather, a correctional facility need only provide Muslim prisoners with food that is not ḥarām (prohibited under Islamic law). The Court found that, as long as the Plaintiff was given an alternative to eating non-ḥalāl meat, he did not suffer a substantial burden to his religious beliefs. The Court determined that the Plaintiff had been provided with alternatives to non-ḥalāl meat, but that the Plaintiff was “simply not happy with the substitutions offered.” Therefore, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff’s factual allegations, construed as true, failed to establish a violation of the Plaintiff’s federal rights.

The Plaintiff Nathaniel Hallman, a federal prisoner at the Lexington County Detention Center and an observing Muslim, brought this suit against the Respondents, Trinity Food Group, the Sheriff of Lexington County and several sheriff employees, for allegedly refusing to provide adequate and appropriate meals during Ramadan. The Respondents filed for summary judgment, asserting that the Ramadan meals provided to Muslim inmates were adequate. The Magistrate judge found that the prisoner requested to participate in Ramadan, during which members of the Islamic faith fasted during daylight hours. The detention center inmates observing Ramadan were not served a meal during the lunch period, but are provided a breakfast meal before sunrise and a dinner meal after sunset. The Magistrate judge recommended that the motions for summary judgment should be granted because the menu served to the inmates observing Ramadan was approved by a licensed dietician to ensure that the menu met those inmates' caloric and nutritional needs.

Plaintiff Andre Harvey, a Muslim inmate at the David Wade Correctional Center, filed this action against the Respondent, Chaplain Ray Anderson, for allegedly removing the Plaintiff from the list on inmates approved to receive a religious diet and for denying him access to the Islamic community chapel. The Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, and the Plaintiff did not file any response.  The Magistrate judge determined that the Respondent did not remove the Plaintiff from the list without cause, but instead that the Plaintiff himself failed to attend Friday prayer services and continued to not attend religious events, thereby warranting his removal from a list of Muslim inmates. The Magistrate judge therefore recommended that the motion for summary judgment be granted, and the complaint be dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff Daniel O’Neil Ruffin, the only practicing Muslim in the Downeast Correctional Facility in Machiasport, Maine, brought this suit against the Respondents, facility program manager Carol Geel, facility director Scott Jones, and former commissioner of the Maine Department of Corrections Martin Magnusson for allegedly violating his First Amendment rights by denying his request to be allowed to conduct religious services in the common area. The Respondents claimed that they denied the request because it would have been impracticable to assign an officer to supervise a single prisoner, and that they tried to accommodate the Plaintiff’s religious beliefs by allowing him to conduct services in his room. The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Court referred to a Magistrate judge for a recommended decision. The Magistrate judge recommended that the Respondents be entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer would not have known that the challenged conduct violated the Plaintiff’s rights.