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The Allahabad High Court decided on 30 September 2010 that the disputed 2.77 acres of land in the Ayodhya region in the District of Faizabad, India, where the Babri masjid once stood, will be divided among the three litigants. This majority 2:1 decision divided the disputed land between the Sunni Waqf Board, the Nirmohi Akhara, and the Hindu Maha Sabha who represent the party for ‘Ram Lalla’ or infant Ram. The central dispute of the case was over the title of the parcel of land. Although the three-judge bench upheld the decision, there was a dissenting opinion which held that the Babri masjid was not built on demolished ruins and that the ruins predated the construction of the mosque. The remaining judges held that, based on archaeological evidence, the Babri masjid was built after the demolition of a non-Islamic religious structure. The judges reasoned that there was insufficient documentary evidence for any sole party to hold the title over the land, and instead declared the title be jointly held by the three litigants.

When asked under what circumstances is abortion, or ijhāḍ, permissible and whether it is permissible to have an abortion if one has too many children, Allama Muḥammad Yusuf from Banuri’s Dār al-Iftā', responds that it is not permissible to terminate a pregnancy after fourth months and is only permissible if the mother’s health is at risk from the pregnancy. He adds that it is forbidden to terminate a pregnancy over financial fears of having many children, even if the fetus is less than four months.

Dr. Ali al-Qaradaghi considers the question whether cryptocurrency is a legitimate currency (ʿumla). Traditional Islamic law rulings define currency to reflect instruments with intrinsic value, such as gold or silver, or with credit value, which requires state backing. In his view, cryptocurrency has no inherent value [in the Middle East]. Rather, in his estimation, cryptocurrency’s value is in transactions. But even when it is used as credit, it has no state behind it or agreed-upon recognition [again, specifically with respect to the Middle East]. Thus, he concludes, it is not actually ḥaqq mālī (a property claim). Rather, it is a program or algorithm. He concludes on those grounds that investment in it is religiously prohibited (muḥarram) but only by means of the concept of “prohibition of the means" (taḥrīm al-wasāʾil). This is the lightest of prohibition types, because it is not prohibition for excessive interest (ribā) but to protect property (ḥifāza ʿala māl).

In response to a question on the abortion, or ijhāḍ, of a six month fetus with deformities in the thigh bones, Grand Muftī Shawky Ibrahim Allam of Egypt's Dār al-Iftā' states that scholars unanimously agree that if the age of the fetus reaches 120 days, the period when the soul is breathed into it, then it is impermissible to abort the fetus and absolutely prohibited in this case. However, he adds that if the mother’s physician decides that the survival of the fetus poses a danger to her life or health, then it is permissible to abort the fetus, prioritizing the stability of the mother’s life and health over that of the fetus.

The All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) in Lucknow, India responded to the Karnataka High Court’s decision that ḥijāb is not "essential" in Islam, and that state colleges are authorized to bar Muslim women from wearing it. The Board states that the High Court’s verdict contradicted Article 15 of the Indian Constitution, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, gender, caste, class, or place of birth, and guarantees individual liberty to all citizens, as well as the right to identity. They thus conclude that this decision is an injustice against the constitutional freedoms of Indian citizens. The Board also expresses concern with secular state courts making decisions on what is or is not essential religious practice, stating that “it is not in the jurisdiction of the courts to decide this but that of the ulemas [sic] and scholars.” They further note that the Indian Constitution accords every individual the right to determine what is essential in their religion. On a related matter, they add that the establishment of a common Uniform Civil Code—as has been further proposed—in a multi-religious country will interfere in the fundamental rights of religious freedom, and further negatively impact the religious and individual rights and freedoms of Muslim citizens in Indian. 

The All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) in Delhi, India responded to the Karnataka High Court’s decision that ḥijāb, or wearing a headscarf,  is not "essential" in Islam, and that state colleges were authorized to ban Muslim women from wearing it on their campuses.  The General Secretary of the AIMPLB, Hazrat Maulana Khalid Saifullah Rahmani Sahab, responded that hijāb is in fact an essential and agreed-upon part of Islamic law and practice (sharīʿa) and that some form of it is obligatory, or wājib, for every Muslim woman.

The Karnataka High Court passed an interim order in the petitions challenging the ḥijāb ban in colleges in the state. The petitions call into question the Government Order dated 05.02.2022, issued under sections 7 & 133 of the Karnataka Education Act of 1983. That order directs the College Development Committees all over the State to prescribe the ‘Student Uniform,’ presumably in terms of Rule 11 of Karnataka Educational Institutions Rules of 1995 (Classification, Regulation & Prescription of Curricula, etc.). A full bench of Justices on the High Court sat to hear several petitions filed by Muslim students who attend government pre-university colleges in the region and who were alleged prejudice from the ban. The Court issued this interim order, restricting girls from wearing headscarves, or ḥijāb, deeming it a use of religious symbols by students in governmental educational institutions that have established dress codes, and it request that the government reopen the educational institutions and allow the students to return to the classes at the earliest.

In this panel titled “Crypto Conundrum in Islamic Finance: Digital Assets and Shariah Compliance,” Dr. Mohamed Ali El Gari and  Dr. Mohd Daud Bakar consider the question whether cryptocurrency is permissible from an Islamic legal perspective. Dr. Bakar opines that cryptocurrency is an asset and not considered currency because it does not fulfill three conditions: use as a valid medium of exchange, stable stock value, and known unit of measurement. Although he acknowledges that cryptocurrency is in use as a medium of exchange, the electronic product currently lacks a stable stock value and known unit of measurement. However, he adds that if cryptocurrency comes to be backed by gold or silver, it could be deemed to be a rival to traditional currency and thus be understood as valid currency. Dr. El Gary opines that cryptocuruency can be permissible only if it is possible to establish that that it qualifies as wealth (māl) or as an asset according to the Islamic law (sharī'a). Doing so requires determining the presence of three conditions: the currency must be in use with a societal desire to normalize its usage, its use must be permissible under normal circumstances, and its must have a value assigned to it in habitual and customary practice. Applying these criteria to cryptocurrency, he concludes that it does meet all three conditions and thus determines that, while it is permissible to use because it is fungible, all the rules restricting the use of money under the rules of excessive interest (ribā) must apply. He further notes that one must be cautious in its use due to cryptocurrency’s speculative nature, which could border on gambling, but that this is not sufficient to say that it religiously impermissible (ḥarām) at presence. Collectively, the panel advises that those who are not very knowledgeable on the cryptocurrency and its attendant issues are to avoid it.  

Saudi Arabia's General Presidency of Islamic Research and Iftā respond to questions on abortion and the usage of ultrasound technology to determine the stage of a pregnancy. They state that although a fetus is recognized as the creation of a human being after 80 days based on the positions of Shaykh Muḥammad Ibn ʿUthāymīn and Shaykh ʿAbdul-ʿAzīz Ibn Bāz, with that marking the beginning of postpartum, if ultrasound technology identifies what appears to be an image of a human being prior to day 80, the fetus should still be recognized as the creation of a human being. They continue that if a pregnancy is past 80days, but ultrasound technology does not show a human image, then it is not considered a pregnancy.