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A Somali Muslim bus driver for American University sued his former employer and supervisor under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin as well as retaliation for asking for reasonable religious accommodation. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was frequently denied the chance to attend Muslim Friday prayer services and that his supervisors made several derogatory comments regarding Muslims. He further argued that he was ultimately terminated because of his religion and in retaliation for filing a complaint regarding a lack of reasonable religious accommodation (in the form of a schedule that accommodated his weekly prayer services). The Court found that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case and that there was enough evidence for a jury to conclude that the University’s reason for firing the plaintiff was a pretext for actual discrimination. However, the Court dismissed the retaliation claim, as the plaintiff did not present any evidence to support it.

The EEOC represented a group of Muslims suing their former employer, Norwegian Cruise Lines, under Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination. The plaintiffs claimed that these discriminatory motives caused the company to target them for increased scrutiny, to create a hostile work environment by allowing their co-workers to verbally harass them (in part, by referring to them as terrorists), and finally, to terminate them. The plaintiffs further entered a complaint for negligent infliction of emotional distress on these bases. The defendants argued that they terminated the plaintiffs for inconsistent answers given to background questions and because they were “positive matches in the FBI database.” The Court dismissed the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, but concluded that the discrimination case could go forward as plaintiffs had established a prima facie discrimination case such that a jury could find that the company’s reasons given for terminating the plaintiffs were pretexts for a discriminatory reason.

A Pakistani Muslim bank employee suffering from irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) sued his former employer, Bank of America, under Title VII alleging discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin; under the American Disabilities Act (ADA) for discrimination on the basis of disability; and under Title VII and the ADA for retaliatory firing following his filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  Specifically, the plaintiff argued that his religious beliefs required him to take several prayer breaks throughout the workday, and that this practice ultimately led to his firing. The defendant responded that the employee was fired because of poor work performance. The Court found that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, and that, even if he did, the defendant had provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating his employment that the plaintiff did not dispute. The Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant company and dismissed the retaliation claim, concluding that the plaintiff had established no connection between the EEOC filing and his termination. 

The EEOC represented an African-American Muslim suing his former employer under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination and a hostile work environment. The plaintiff claimed he had been the recipient of many offensive comments (such as being called a “towel head” and “Taliban”) and degrading actions (such as his co-workers hiding his time card while he was at prayer services). The Court reversed and remanded a decision by the District Court for the District of Maryland to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. This Court held that a jury could find that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment and that his employer had notice of the ongoing conduct; it thus denied the defendant company’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the case to proceed.

An Arab-American police officer in New York City sued his employer under §1981 (providing “a cause of action for race-based employment discrimination based on a hostile work environment”), New York Executive Law Section 290, and New York Administrative Code Section 9-101 (both state laws imposing “liability on aiders and abettors of unlawful discriminatory practices”), as well as laws prohibiting the creation of a hostile work environment. The plaintiff worked for the NYPD’s Intelligence Division and claimed that the Department made him read anti-Muslim and anti-Arab rhetoric in the form of briefings from an anti-terrorism consultant. According to the plaintiff, these briefings entailed the consultant instructing the reader to not trust Muslims in law enforcement and making comments like “a good Muslim…can’t be a good American.” The Court held that a jury could find that the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to allow a hostile work environment claim to proceed. It thus denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the case to go forward. The case was ultimately closed in 2010 after an order of dismissal without ever going to trial. The plaintiff did not lodge an explicit claim on the basis of Islamic law, but his allegations about religion may have included ritual practice or dress related to Islamic law.

The Muslim plaintiff sued her former employer, Supervalu Holdings, under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination. Specifically, she argued that the company overlooked her for a position with more responsibility because of her religion. The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, as she neither proved that non-Muslims were treated better, nor did she allege that she suffered an adverse employment action (as the higher-level position did not offer additional compensation or benefits). Thus, this Court affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Representing a Muslim former employee of the defendant, the EEOC sued the company, operating as a car dealership, under Title VII, alleging that it subjected the employee to a hostile work environment because of his religion and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged he suffered numerous instances of harassment because of his religion after 9/11, including being called Taliban by his supervisor and receiving a warning saying he was acting like a Muslim. The Court held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find the conduct severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment claim, and thus reversed the District Court’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The case settled in October 2007.

Holding: To prevail in a disparate-treatment claim, an applicant need show only that his need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision, not that the employer had knowledge of his need. 

Judgment: Reversed and remanded, 8-1, in an opinion by Justice Scalia on June 1, 2015. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgement. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Facts: Respondent (Abercrombie) refused to hire Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim, because the headscarf that she wore pursuant to her religious obligations conflicted with Abercrombie’s employee dress policy. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit on Elauf’s behalf, alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which, inter alia, prohibits a prospective employer from refusing to hire an applicant because of the applicant’s religious practice when the practice could be accommodated without undue hardship.

Procedural Posture: The EEOC prevailed in the District Court, but the Tenth Circuit reversed, awarding Abercrombie summary judgment on the ground that failure-to-accommodate liability attaches only when the applicant provides the employer with actual knowledge of his need for an accommodation.

Sources: Opinion Syllabus; SCOTUSblog Case Page (with further reviews and commentary on the U.S. law implications of this case).

Representing an Arab-American Muslim former employee of the Omni Hotels, the EEOC sued the hotel chain under Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination. The plaintiff claimed that the company fired the employee from his position because he was vocal in his community regarding American-Islamic relations following the events of 9/11. The company argued that his termination resulted from the employee’s lackluster sales at the hotel he was managing, and that the plaintiff resigned for his own personal reasons. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that, while the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of discrimination, it failed to provide evidence showing that the defendant’s defense was a pretext for discriminatory intent.

The plaintiff, who won a judgment in the lower court, challenged the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine’s refusal to retry an employment discrimination case in which the jury refused to award damages despite finding the defendants guilty. In the underlying case, the plaintiff had sued his employer under §1981 and Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination as well as harassment based on his race and religion in the form of a wide range of offensive actions and statements aimed at the plaintiff, including likening the plaintiff to Osama bin Laden, telling him to go back to his own country, and attempts to shove pork in his mouth (Islamic law prohibits the consumption of pork). The plaintiff argued that on a guilty finding, the jury was obliged to award damages as a matter of law. The appellate court, however, pointed to precedent rejecting this argument, and thus affirmed the lower court’s decision not to retry the case.

An African-American Muslim bus driver sued her former employer, the City of New York, under federal and state law (including Title VII; Article 1, section 3 of the New York State Constitution, and New York City Administrative Law §8-107(1)), alleging gender, religious, and racial discrimination and for allowing a hostile work environment. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that she was subjected to a hostile work environment after securing accommodations for her to wear a headscarf (khimar) while on the job. She claimed that she was required to wear a baseball cap over the headscarf or to accept shifts that did not entail interaction with the public. The Court concluded that the complaints were not severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment claim before a jury; accordingly, it dismissed the Title VII and New York State Constitution claims. The Court permitted the employment discrimination claim under the NY City Administrative Law to proceed.

The plaintiff, Wafaa Elwakil, brought this action against her former employer, Target Media Partners, claiming a violation of her rights pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff claimed that the company subjected her to discriminatory treatment because of her race, religion, and ethnicity; created a hostile work environment; and unlawfully retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the Kenner Police Department. The company filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims for Title VII discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation because the court found that the evidence indicated that the plaintiff did not engage in a "protected activity" for the purposes of her Title VII claim.

The plaintiff, Regina Z. Muhammad, filed a lawsuit against her former employer, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, asserting claims of religious and sexual harassment, religious-based disparate treatment, and retaliation under Title VII. The plaintiff contended that after her supervisor discovered she was Muslim, he made a number of discriminatory comments, and then certified other employees with whom the plaintiff had been co-trained, but not the plaintiff. The respondent subsequently filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court denied the respondent's motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff could prove that her lack of training, which ultimately resulted in her termination, had a significant detrimental effect on her employment.

The plaintiff, Dennis Balk, a former professor at the New York Institute of Technology (NYIT) in Bahrain, brought this suit against the New York Institute of Technology after he was fired. Balk alleged that he was fired from his position after a daily Bahrain newspaper, Al-Ayam, published an article stating that he had posted to his class website a controversial cartoon depicting the Prophet Muhammad in rags. Balk brought this claim, which alleged discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin in violation of Title VII. The plaintiff also brought a motion to compel the deposition of Dr. Mohammed Hussein, the Executive Director of the Middle East for NYIT. The District Court determined that Dr. Hussein's deposition was necessary in the "interest of justice" within the meaning of the Walsh Act because of his alleged involvement in the plaintiff's firing. The District Court additionally found that given Dr. Hussein's periodic travel to the US, it was not unreasonable to compel Dr. Hussein to appear.

The plaintiff, a Turkish Muslim former employee of the defendant, challenged the New York Supreme Court of King’s County decision granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case. The plaintiff had sued her previous employer under Executive Law §296 and the Administrative Code of New York §8-107, alleging that the company created a hostile work environment, subjected her to constructive termination, and retaliated against her for filing a discrimination claim. This Court reversed the lower court’s decision on the hostile work environment and constructive discharge, concluding that the plaintiff had presented enough evidence to allow the claims to move forward to a jury.

An Arab Muslim truck driver for Swift Transportation Company sued his former employer under Title VII, Tennessee state law, and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), alleging discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and religion, as well as intentional economic harm under state law and the FMLA. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that non-Arabs and non-Muslims received better work assignments and that fellow drivers made “hateful” comments regarding his religion and national origin. However, he did not provide any specifics regarding these claims. The defendant claimed that it terminated the plaintiff because the plaintiff did not report an accident within the timeframe mandated by the company. The Court granted the defendant company’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, the defendant had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating employment, and because the plaintiff did not exhaust all administrative measures before pursuing a case in court. The plaintiff madeno explicit connection to Islamic law, except that to complain of perceived bias on the basis of his religion, which may have included religious practice.

An Indian Muslim physician, who formerly worked at a Veteran Affairs Medical Center, sued the Secretary of Veteran Affairs under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin; the failure to promote; retaliation; a hostile work environment; and constructive discharge.  The defendant argued that the plaintiff did not receive a promotion due to unsatisfactory work performance. Concluding that the plaintiff did not prove he suffered an adverse employment action and therefore failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

The Court granted the defendant Marriott International’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. Plaintiff Nagy Edrisse sued Marriott and several of its employees under Title VII, § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The plaintiff alleged that the hotel created or tolerated a hostile work environment in that his direct manager made frequent derogatory racial, religious, and ethnic statements, including asking the plaintiff whether he was going to blow up the building and whether he was a terrorist. Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed that the hotel fired him out of discriminatory animus based on his religion, race, and ethnicity. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was fired due to inappropriate behavior at the workplace (including using racial slurs directed at fellow employees), rather than his race, religion, or ethnicity. The Court dismissed the claim against the employees who were not directly involved, but denied summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the facts were sufficient to make out a prima facie case to move forward. In other words, the Court concluded that a jury could consider the evidence presented to be severe and pervasive enough to allow for a finding of a hostile work environment.

The Court denied defendant Merrill Lynch’s motion for summary judgment, adopting the opinion of the magistrate judge, which held that the employee established a prima facie case of discrimination. Plaintiff Abdul-Giyath Mayale-Eke sued his former employer and direct supervisor under Title VII, §1981, the Rhode Island Fair Employment Act, and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff alleged that, as a Muslim who had immigrated from Nigeria, he was treated differently and ultimately fired from his position as an investment specialist because of his race, national origin, and religion; specifically, he claimed that he was frequently asked questions about his heritage and was subject to derogatory comments. Defendant Merrill Lynch claimed that it fired plaintiff after giving him numerous warnings of his failure to meet set performance standards. The Court ultimately denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had alleged enough specific facts to make the claim not just conceivable but plausible before a jury.

Masroor Siddiqui, a Muslim of Pakistani origin, sued his former employer, Autozone, under Title VII, alleging race-based harassment; discrimination based on race, ethnicity, national origin, and religion; and retaliation. The plaintiff claimed that he was subjected to a hostile work environment when, after 9/11, he was barraged with racial epithets. He further alleged that he was passed by for promotions because of his race, religion, and national origin (citing comments from his supervisor that they would never promote “people like him”), and that he was ultimately terminated as a result of these factors. The defendant argued that, even if the court found that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of discrimination, the company legitimately denied the promotion of, and ultimately fired, the employee because of poor work performance. The Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the hostile work environment claim, concluding that no jury would consider the evidence produced by the plaintiff severe or pervasive enough for a hostile work environment claim; however, the Court denied the motion for summary judgment in respect to the promotion claim, allowing the case to go forward.