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Chapters on nominate contracts (endowment, sales, options, barter/ mu‘āwaḍa, hire and lease, partnerships -shirka, muzāra‘a, musāqāt, muḍāraba-, reward/ju‘āla, deposit, fungible and non-fungible loan, agency, financial and personal guaranty, assignment, settlement, pledge, gift), shuf‘a, wills, inheritance, marriage and divorce, mahr, and alimony took almost all of its substance from prominent Shi’i fiqh treatises. Other chapters (classification of properties, easement, usufruct, general rules of obligations and contracts, nationality, registration of civil status, domicile, engagement, guardianship, and evidence) are mainly influenced by Swiss and French Civil Codes and Swiss Code of Obligations.

Chapters on nominate contracts (endowment, sales, options, barter/ mu‘āwaḍa, hire and lease, partnerships -shirka, muzāra‘a, musāqāt, muḍāraba-, reward/ju‘āla, deposit, fungible and non-fungible loan, agency, financial and personal guaranty, assignment, settlement, pledge, gift), shuf‘a, wills, inheritance, marriage and divorce, mahr, and alimony took almost all of its substance from prominent Shi’i fiqh treatises. Other chapters (classification of properties, easement, usufruct, general rules of obligations and contracts, nationality, registration of civil status, domicile, engagement, guardianship, and evidence) are mainly influenced by Swiss and French Civil Codes and Swiss Code of Obligations.

In Indonesia, the Islamic practice of polygamy is circumscribed by specific provisions in Law No.1 of 1974 on Marriage. Mohammad Insa was a Muslim man who wished to take a second wife without any state interference, and without due consideration for the rights and feelings of his established wife. He argued that polygamy is a religious duty, and one that he was entitled to undertake in accordance with the 1945 Constitution, which guarantees freedom of religion. He petitioned the court for a judicial review of those legal restrictions on polygamous marriages. This decision to dismiss his petition was handed down by the court on 3 October 2007, after several months of lengthy deliberations and media attention. The court reasoned that art 28J(2) of the Constitution not only authorises the state to regulate religion, but obliges it do so.

The cassation applicant and cassation respondent had been married for 14 years and had four children. The parties, however, had begun to quarrel because, as the cassation respondent had submitted, the cassation applicant was disrespectful to the cassation respondent as the husband and head of the household. The cassation applicant was stubborn and difficult to deal with, and not afraid of rebutting or opposing the cassation respondent's words and wishes.

The cassation applicant submitted that the cassation respondent had failed to meet certain legislative requirements associated with filing for divorce, namely, that as a public servant, the cassation respondent had not yet first obtained the permission of his work superior before filing for divorce.

The Supreme Court held that the Samarinda High Religious Court's decision could not be overturned because it had not applied the law incorrectly, nor had there been a contravention of applicable law, or a failure to meet any other legislative requirements that would render a decision null and void.

The parties were married on 8 October 2000 and had two children. Before the Pontianak Religious Court (lower court), the cassation respondent had submitted that, since 2008, her marriage to the cassation applicant had become strained because the cassation applicant would often belittle the cassation respondent's parents, leaving the cassation respondent feeling offended. There were also issues pertaining to the ways in which the parties' families managed a relevant business, as well as allegations from the cassation respondent that the cassation applicant had been physically violent towards her, which necessitated a police report. The lower court had, accordingly, granted the cassation respondent an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in shughra), pursuant to art 39 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The cassation applicant appealed to the Supreme Court at cassation level on the grounds that the Pontianak High Religious Court, which had affirmed the decision of the lower court, had failed to summons him in an appropriate manner. The Supreme Court found that the cassation applicant had failed to establish this and, therefore, pursuant to art 30 of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, dismissed the appeal.

The parties were married on 14 July 1995 and had four children. Before the Padang Religious Court (lower court), the cassation respondent had filed for divorce from the cassation applicant, having alleged that the cassation applicant, since October 2011, had been an irresponsible husband, never providing the cassation respondent with any spending money. Moreover, since 2008, the cassation applicant had not provided the cassation respondent with any emotional support, leaving her in a distressed state.

The cassation applicant had incorrectly accused the cassation respondent of having had an extra-marital affair, while often becoming angry for no apparent reason, as well as denigrating her character to members of her family, causing the cassation respondent's family to often blame her if something went wrong. According to the cassation respondent's older sibling, the cassation applicant would also often threaten their children saying he would not allow them to see the cassation respondent. When the cassation applicant left the matrimonial home, he took the parties' children with him.

The lower court had granted the cassation respondent an irrevocable divorce (thalak satu bain sughra), but granted the cassation applicant custody of the parties' children. On appeal, the Padang High Religious Court had affirmed the cassation respondent's irrevocable divorce (thalak satu bain sughra), but granted her custody of the parties' four children.

The cassation applicant appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the Padang High Religious Court had not given sufficient consideration to the facts of the case, but had simply based its decision on art 105 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Finding the decision of the Padang Religious High Court not to contain any incorrect applications of the law, the Supreme Court, pursuant to art 30 of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, dismissed the appeal.

The parties were married on 18 September 2005. The plaintiff submitted, however, that only a few months after she and the defendant had married, she received a telephone call from a woman calling herself Ciah, claiming to have secretly married (nikah siri) the defendant and being five-months pregnant with the defendant's child. From thereon, this became a point of contention between the parties, despite the defendant never validating the claims made by this other woman.

The plaintiff alleged that other causes of tension between the parties included:

1. the defendant often being angry with the plaintiff for no apparent reason;
2. the defendant never contributing financially to the parties' domestic needs, thereby making the plaintiff assume he was spending his salary on his other wife;
3. the plaintiff and defendant having been separated since the end of 2013;
4. since the beginning of 2011, the defendant having not executed his spousal responsibilities vis-a-vis the plaintiff; and
5. notably, frequent quarrelling between the parties causing the plaintiff to want to move to Bireuen for work, but not being granted permission to do so by the defendant, the dispute escalating to the point that the defendant hit the plaintiff, causing her to seek medical treatment for facial bruising.

The plaintiff also claimed that, from January 2011-present, the defendant had failed to provide her with financial and emotional support. The plaintiff quantified the financial support she believed the defendant owed her at IDR 2 million per month for 41 months (IDR 82 million). The plaintiff also submitted that the defendant had failed to provide her with a true dowry (mahar) at the time of their marriage. Rather, the defendant had borrowed five grams of pure gold from the plaintiff's parents, which he had returned after they were married, vowing to the plaintiff that he would one day give to her five grams of pure gold, or the cash equivalent thereof. The defendant, the plaintiff submitted, never upheld that promise.

The court acknowledged that the plaintiff had appropriately sought and obtained a letter of permission from her superior officer to divorce the defendant, and that the defendant's objection to that letter was irrelevant insofar as the court was unauthorised to intervene in the affairs of a government agency. The court also noted that the parties had sought to reconcile their differences via mediation, but to no avail.

The court acceded to the plaintiff's application for an irrevocable divorce (talak ba'in shughra), acknowledging that the purpose of marriage, as envisaged in art 1 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and surat Al-rum verse 21, being a peaceful, hopeful and loving (sakinah, mawaddah dan rahmah) homelife was no longer feasible. Moreover, that ongoing conflict between the parties was sufficient reason to grant a divorce, pursuant to art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The court, however, dismissed the plaintiff's claim for back-payment maintenance costs (IDR 82 million), noting that the plaintiff, like the defendant, worked as a civil servant, who would had to have first obtained the defendant's permission to work. The court noted that if one of the plaintiff's reasons for wanting to divorce the defendant was due to a lack of financial support, to then demand money from the defendant would contradict her claim.

The court accepted the plaintiff's claim in part, distributed the estate (four properties, five vehicles) of the deceased as it saw fit, and ordered the parties to share costs.

The couple had already divorced on 27 April 2010 before the Banda Aceh Shari'a Court (Decision No. 01/Pdt.G/2010/MS-BNA). That decision had, however, only finalised the parties' divorce, as well as custody of their children. It had not determined the division of their joint assets.

In this instance, the court approved the plaintiff's application in regards to the 50/50 settlement of the parties' joint assets, which included a shop, and proceeds (IDR 90 million) from renting the shop from 1 June 2009-1 June 2012.

The court ordered the plaintiff to pay costs (IDR 2,461,000).

The applicants were married on 23 August 2013 but had no children of their own. They applied to the court to be granted legal custody of Muhammad Daud bin Bukhari (DOB: 2 February 2002), whom they had cared for and raised since the age of 2.

In its decision, the court acknowledged that the applicants had already cared for and raised the child from an early age, and that they had given him his name. Using its vested power, pursuant to art 49 of Law No. 3 of 2006, as well as figure (20) of the elucidation therein, the court acknowledged that it was authorised to adjudicate applications for child adoption. Moreover, it cited surat Al-Ahzab, verses 4 and 5, in support of the adoption of children in need, but not at the expense of forgetting their own biological lineage. Pursuant to art 39(1) and (2) of Law No. 23 of 2002 on Child Protection, in conjunction with art 12(1)(a)-(d) and (2)(a), as well as art 13(a)-(i) and (l) of Government Regulation No. 54 of 2007 on the Implementation of Child Adoption, the court acceded to the applicants' request to be granted lawful custody of the child. Their application was also assented to by the child's biological mother (his biological father had already passed away).

The applicants were married on 18 October 2013 by Tgk. H. Hanafiah, the then village imam. The second applicant's younger brother had acted as her marriage guardian (wali nikah), and the dowry (mahar) was five grams of pure gold. Due to a family dispute at the time, the marriage could not be convened at the local Office of Religious Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama). Accordingly, the applicants requested that the court ratify their marriage retrospectively. Both applicants were eligible for marriage, the second applicant having divorced her previous husband in Lhokseumawe Shari'a Court Decision No. 232 of 2012. The applicants submitted that, while they had already attended the Banda Sakti Office of Religious Affairs to request the issuance of a marriage certificate, the office was precluded from doing so as it could not locate any information relating to their marriage.

The court acceded to the applicants' request, acknowledging that while the parties did not have proof of their marriage in the form of a marriage certificate, they had already married. Moreover, the evidence provided by the witnesses in court did not conflict with the applicants' submissions. Therefore, the applicants' submissions, pursuant to art 7(3)(e) of Indonesian Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 1991 on the Compilation of Islamic Laws, had been established and were grounded in legal reasoning.

The Act replaced the Iranian Family Protection Act 1975 and modified other family law provisions as embodied in the Civil Code and the Divorce Act 1992. It contains procedural matters (Family Courts, Family Consultation Centers) as well as substantial ones (marriage, divorce, custody, nafaqa, alimony and pensions) and the criminal sanctions. Major changes introduced generally are:

A) The Family Court now involves a female consultant judge who is to give her opinion in each case, which the sitting judge (a man as in other courts) has to consider, but not to follow, in deciding the case;

B) The jurisdiction of the Family Court is now extended to additional matters, including child adoption, embryo donation, and sex change;

C) The process for divorce by mutual consent is facilitated;

D) The value of the Mahr (or the portion of the Mahr) for collecting which the debtor imprisonment provisions can be invoked is now limited to a specified amount (equal to 110 gold coin);

E) Temporary marriage needs not be registered now save in specific situations;

The parties were married on 29 January 2006 and had one child. The plaintiff submitted, however, that, since February 2010, the marriage had become quarrelsome. This was the result of the defendant having had an extra-marital affair, and subsequently having a child with the other woman.

Problems escalated in July 2014 with the plaintiff leaving the matrimonial home at the request of the defendant. Despite the plaintiff's efforts to reconcile with the defendant, even requesting the help of family, the plaintiff became convinced their differences were irreconcilable.

The defendant had been summonsed formally but failed to attend court. Due to the ongoing conflict between the parties, pursuant to art 39 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court granted the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain shughra).

The parties, of Lebanese background, were married in Kuwait in 1973, though had moved to Australia in 1985 and maintained dual citizenship. In October 1998 the parties divorced Islamically through a local Islamic centre, then in November 1998 attended the Lebanese embassy and executed a power of attorney to allow their respective lawyers in Lebanon to proceed with the divorce application (and bypass the Australian legal system). These proceedings were not possible in Australia due to the maintenance of a mandatory one year separation period before divorces are granted. The divorce was subsequently granted in November 1998 in the Jaafarite Canonical Court in Lebanon, with the decree that neither party had rights or obligations towards the other. The husband subsequently remarried. 

The wife appealed subsequently applied for a divorce in the Australian courts under s 104(4) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), stating that this outcome was a denial of natural justice. 

The case stemmed on the recognition of the Lebanese divorce on the grounds that the parties had no 'property of consequence' in Australia (it was in Lebanon, where the wife had initiated court proceedings against the husband) and that the parties sought to bypass Australian law.

This case was unsuccessfully appealed by the applicant in Taffa & Taffa [2012] FamCA 181.

The Court upheld the decision of the lower court to grant the respondent an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra), only amending the wording of the lower court's verdict slightly.

This regional regulation makes provision for the protection of women and children from violence. The regulation places the onus on families and parents to protect women and children from all forms of violence by instilling in each other, among other values, values relating to religion.

The parties were married on 18 August 2006 and had one child. After they married they lived in Ketapang, West Kalimantan. The applicant submitted that, since 2007, he and the respondent had quarrelled regularly because the respondent was often jealous for no apparent reason. Moreover, at the beginning of 2008, the respondent left the matrimonial home unbeknownst to the applicant, and had remained apart from the applicant for three years and six months, never returning. The applicant maintained that the parties had not communicated since, and that their differences were now irreconcilable.

Despite being summonsed formally, the respondent failed to attend the proceeding. The court concluded that the parties no longer loved each other as husband and wife, as envisaged in art 77(2) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Due to ongoing conflict between the parties, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court granted the applicant a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i).

The parties were married on 7 July 1996 in Ujung Padang. Due to work obligations, however, the parties lived in separate provinces. The applicant submitted that every time the respondent would visit him, the parties would quarrel because the respondent was too controlling. More specifically, the respondent would become displeased if the applicant had a guest visit him, would ignore the applicant's suggestions, advice or directions, and would become jealous of those close to the applicant, including the applicant's younger sibling. Furthermore, if the applicant visited the respondent, and the applicant's parents came to the respondent's home, the respondent's behaviour would often upset the applicant's mother. Problems escalated in September 1998 when the parties' second child was born and the respondent conducted the child's aqiqah (animal sacrifice) unbeknownst to the applicant.

The applicant's request was dismissed, however, as information from two witnesses produced by the respondent refuted several of the applicant's claims, and information from two witnesses produced by the applicant was, in the court's eyes, hearsay.

The parties were married on 23 December 2007 and had one child, born on 4 March 2008. They had lived with the respondent's parents for approximately three years. The applicant submitted, however, that, since September 2009, the parties' marriage had become quarrelsome because the respondent:

1. had never shown her appreciation for the applicant as the head of the household;
2. was not content with what she had, including the applicant's salary, which she found inadequate;
3. would often become jealous if the applicant returned home late; and
4. when angry, would use inappropriate language with the applicant.

As a result, the applicant had left the matrimonial home and returned to his family's home on 23 September 2009, where he had remained for the 11 months leading up to the proceeding.

The court, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, acknowledged that the parties' ongoing conflict constituted a sufficient reason to grant the applicant a revocable divorce (talak satu raj'i). Moreover, the court ordered the parties to abide by the terms of their post-marital agreement, which the court held to be binding at law. The agreement pertained to the matrimonial home, use of the proceeds if the home were to be sold, and child maintenance (calculated in accordance with the applicant's salary).

The parties were married on 21 February 2005 in Makassar and had two children. The plaintiff submitted that, since 2009, she and the defendant had quarrelled regularly because the defendant:

1. had been physically violent towards the plaintiff; and
2. would drink excessively and verbally abuse the plaintiff.

The plaintiff had returned to her parents' home in June 2010, where she had stayed for the three months leading up to the proceeding. After formal mediation failed to reconcile the parties, the court acknowledged that the parties' ongoing conflict, pursuant to art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(f) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, constituted a sufficient reason to grant the plaintiff an irrevocable divorce (talak ba'in shughra).