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The parties' deceased parents owned a 5.25 ha property. On 20 December 1971, the parties' parents executed a document transferring ownership of that property to the defendant, who was their oldest child. The plaintiffs submitted that, around the time the document was executed, the parties' parents had explained that ownership of the property had been transferred to the defendant because he was deemed competent, willing and able to fulfil their wishes and share the property with his siblings if and when the parties' parents passed away. On 17 October 1995, the parties' father executed a document for the equal division of the property to the parties and, prior to his passing, divided the property accordingly. The plaintiffs submitted that the defendant's subsequent conduct ignored their father's dying wishes, and sought from the court a ruling declaring the defendant's conduct unlawful, and distributing the property in accordance with the 17 October 1995 document.

The defendant submitted that he had owned the property since 1968, after providing consideration of IDR 400,000 to its previous owner.

The court found that the plaintiffs' claim failed, however, because it did not clearly state the religion of the deceased and beneficiaries, nor did it state when the deceased had passed away.

The deceased passed away on 29 September 2007 in Balikpapan due to illness, leaving in his will seven properties. The plaintiffs were the nieces and nephews of the deceased, their fathers (also deceased) being the biological brothers of the deceased. They submitted that they had not been included in the will of the deceased as beneficiaries, and that, therefore, the will should be declared null and void. The first defendant was the wife of the deceased, and the third-fifth defendants were her adopted children. The second defendant was also a biological sibling of the deceased.

The plaintiffs submitted that the defendants had sold the bequeathed properties for a collective IDR 6.8 billion, without distributing to the plaintiffs their share of the proceeds. As there was no familial or blood relationship between the deceased and the third-fifth defendants, the plaintiffs submitted that they had no claim to the proceeds of sale.

The court found that the plaintiffs' claim failed, however, because it did not identify when the properties were sold. Moreover, while their claim did acknowledge that the properties had been sold, the plaintiffs still sought to have the properties stipulated as estate of the deceased that should be distributed in their favour. Rather, they should have requested that the proceeds of sale be stipulated as estate of the deceased. In addition, the court found that it was not authorised to invalidate a previous court determination handed down on 10 January 2012, which had found that the plaintiffs were not beneficiaries because their parents had passed away before the deceased.

The applicants submitted that their sister, Hj. Halakatani, A. Ma, had passed away on 2 June 2011, as evidenced by the issuance of her death certificate, dated 30 June. The deceased had never married and both her parents had passed away. The applicants requested that the court stipulate them as the beneficiaries of the deceased in order to access her funds.

The court acceded to the applicants' request on the grounds that they were the siblings of the deceased and were, therefore, eligible to be her beneficiaries.

The plaintiff had submitted an application for divorce, as well as this application for joint assets. The parties were divorced on 28 May 2015, having been married for 10 years. Rarely, however, had they displayed any signs of compatibility during those 10 years. The main asset in dispute was the parties' 72m² home in Padang, West Sumatra, which, the plaintiff submitted, the parties had acquired due to the financial assistance provided to them by the plaintiff's parents. More specifically, the plaintiff's parents had provided the parties with IDR 23 million for an initial down-payment to purchase the property, IDR 5 million to repair the foundation of the outhouse, IDR 5 million to build a fence and terrace, IDR 3.5 million to build a garage, IDR 17 million to repair damage caused by an earthquake, and IDR 14.25 million to repay arrears to prevent the home from being auctioned. In total, the plaintiff's parents had outlaid IDR 67.75 million.

After receiving counsel from the court, however, the plaintiff withdrew her application and agreed to resolve the dispute in a familial fashion.

On 18 May 2006, the applicant's husband passed away. He was survived by the applicant and their four children. The deceased had a plot of land in Gampong Gampa, which the applicant and one of the applicant's children wished to use to leverage a bank loan. The notary they had engaged required a stipulation from a shari'a court that the applicant and her children (the children were underage) were indeed beneficiaries under the will of the deceased.

As the applicant had met all the formulaic requirements of the application, and information provided by witnesses had corroborated with that of the applicant, the court acceded to the applicant's request.

The applicant was an only child from the deceased's first marriage. The deceased had remarried and had three other children. The deceased also left behind a property in East Jakarta, as well as a pension, having been a state high school teacher. The applicant requested that the court stipulate the passing of her father, and that she was the only beneficiary under her father's will. The applicant, however, in court, requested that the claim be withdrawn as she had neglected to include the names of the other beneficiaries under the will of the deceased. The court acceded to the applicant's request.

This fatwa states that personal ownership rights are to be protected by the state and are to be guaranteed in full. No person, including the government, is to reduce, marginalise or limit such rights. In the event of a conflict between personal rights and the public interest, however, the public interest is to prevail.

The government is permitted to revoke personal ownership rights for the sake of the public interest under the following conditions:

1. the government and rights-holder have deliberated, the rights-holder not being coerced at all into making a decision;
2. the rights-holder has been sufficiently compensated;
3. the party responsible for the public interest is the government;
4. the stipulation of the public interest by the People's Representative Assembly (DPR) or Regional People's Representative Assembly (DPRD) takes into account Indonesian Council of Ulama fatwa and opinions; and
5. the public interest may not be transferred for other purposes, especially those commercial in nature.

This fatwa states that an only daughter is entitled to one-half of her deceased parents' estate if she has no brothers. Male relatives are entitled to the remains of the estate of the deceased after the only daughter has received her share (one-half).

This fatwa states that Muslims may donate cash for the purposes of waqf. Such cash donations are to be used for shari'a-appropriate purposes and may not be sold, donated again, and/or bequeathed to another party.

This fatwa recommends that inherited plots of land that are not particularly expansive remain as one plot, rather than being divided between the relevant beneficiaries. This should be achieved by the beneficiaries working together in a cooperative fashion. If this is not feasible because one or more of the beneficiaries needs the financial proceeds that would be obtained through the sale of such land, it is preferable that one of the other financially-secure beneficiares purchase from any beneficiary in financial need their interest in the land. If this is not feasible, the fatwa preferences sale of the inherited land to the owner of one of the neighbouring plots of land. If this is not feasible, efforts should be made to sell the land to another Muslim who lives in the same kampung or village so that the plot of land may one day become the object of infaq/sadaqah or zakat, thereby furthering the general well-being of other Muslims, as per Islamic teachings.

On 26 March 2014, the applicants' mother passed away due to illness. The applicants' father had already passed away in 2002. The applicants requested from the Court a stipulation that the deceased had passed away and that they were indeed the beneficiaries under her will. Such a stipulation would enable the applicants to deal with the estate of the deceased, which included her financial savings stored with Bank Mandiri Syari'ah.

Pursuant to arts 171(9)(c) and 174(1)(a) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the Court acceded to the applicants' request on the grounds that they were indeed the biological children of the deceased, as corroborated by their own evidence and that provided by witnesses.

This fatwa defines a registered mortgage (rahn tasjily) as a guarantee (or collateral) in the form of an object in lieu of a debt. The collateral is transferred pursuant to an agreement stating that the object transferred to the mortgagee (murtahin) is only the proof of legal ownership, while the collateral (marhun) is to remain in the physical control, and at the disposal, of the mortgagor (rahin).

The fatwa states that rahn tasjily may be conducted pursuant to the following provisions:

1. the mortgagor transfers proof of legal ownership of an object to the mortgagee, which becomes collateral;
2. transfer of the collateral in the form of proof of legal ownership or a certificate does not transfer ownership to the mortgagee;
3. the mortgagor provides the mortgagee with the authority to sell the collateral, either via auction to to another party pursuant to shari'a principles, in the event of a default or inability to repay the relevant debt;
4. usage/disposal of the collateral by the mortgagor must be fair and in accordance with the parties' agreement;
5. the mortgagee may incur maintenance and storage fees, which are to be borne by the mortgagor, pursuant to an ijarah (rental) agreement;
6. the quantum of those fees is not to be related to the quantum of the debt owed;
7. the mortgagee may incur other necessary and incidental costs; and
8. the relevant insurance is to be covered by the mortgagor.

This fatwa commends and affirms the recommendation of the Indonesian President regarding modest-living. It also recommends that the President issue concrete instructions to officials regarding his instructions on modest-living and prohibitions on luxury and excess. The fatwa calls on Islamic scholars, teachers, preachers and the mass media to further explain Islamic teachings that advocate modest-living and prohibit luxury and excess, especially that resulting from forbidden and unlawful conduct.

This fatwa states that the burial of Muslim corpses is obligatory for the community (wajib kifayah), and that the government must make land available for public burials. Every Muslim may prepare a particular site for their own burial, and may state in their will (berwasiat) their desire to be buried in a certain place, circumstances permitting. The fatwa declares that the sale and purchase of land for the purposes of a gravesite is permissible, pursuant to the following conditions:

1. the conditions and pillars of sale and purchase are met;
2. the transaction is conducted in a simple manner, not being overly excessive or acquiring and using land in an excessive fashion;
3. Muslims are not to be buried alongside non-Muslims;
4. the administration and organisation thereof is to be carried out pursuant to shari'a provisions; and
5. the rights of other persons are not precluded as a result of retaining burial services.

The fatwa reiterates that the sale and purchase of land, as well as businesses selling land, for exorbitant burials, is forbidden (haram).

The plaintiff submitted that the first defendant had issued him with a murabahah financing facility (Murabahah Financing Facility Agreement No: PLS/2010/008/MRB) valued at IDR 330 billion, which he had used to finance the construction of a home. The plaintiff had obtained from the first defendant another murabahah financing facility (Murabahah Financing Facility Agreement No: PLS/2011/077/MRB) valued at IDR 1.459 billion, which he had used to supplement his own business capital to purchase stock for his chilli and red onion supplier business. The plaintiff had repaid IDR 1 billion of the collective total of the two agreements, leaving him IDR 3.789 billion in arrears. In order to be eligible for both agreements, the plaintiff had leveraged the following properties and their respective deeds of title:

1. three adjacent plots of land upon which were situated a home and restaurant;
2. two adjacent plots of land upon which were situated a home and warehouse;
3. a plot of land upon which was situated a home;
4. another plot of land upon which was situated a home, as well as two plots of farmland.

When the price of chilli dropped the plaintiff incurred substantial financial loss. Consequently, in 2010, 2011, and January-February 2012, the plaintiff repaid to the first defendant IDR 2.068 billion. Having defaulted nonetheless, the second defendant sold one of the plaintiff's properties for IDR 170 million at auction. The plaintiff submitted that the property would have sold for IDR 300 million if the sale had been made available to the public. Similarly, the plaintiff submitted that the first defendant had sold, in an underhanded manner, one of his leveraged properties for IDR 250 million, and another two for IDR 150 million each, when they all would have sold for IDR 300 million each had the sales been made available to the public. The plaintiff also submitted that he had already repaid to the first defendant IDR 2.638 billion, while the first defendant had threatened to auction the plaintiff's remaining leveraged properties. The plaintiff maintained that to relieve him of all his assets was contrary to the law given that he intended, in good faith, to repay the loans.

In dismissing the plaintiff's action, the court referred to the discrepancy in the plaintiff's submission: at point 2, the plaintiff submitted that both defendants had systematically, collectively, and collegially worked to relieve him of his assets, while at point 10, the plaintiff submitted that the first defendant had threatened to auction his remaining properties through the second defendant. The court also took issue with point 3 of the plaintiff's submission, noting that it suffered from insufficient clarity and detail with regard to the object of the auction, as well as the language used.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Medan Religious Court (lower court). The lower court had determined that the non-issuance of a building permit from the Medan Spatial and Building Service (Dinas Tata Ruang dan Tata Bangunan Kota Medan) constituted a force majeure. Accordingly, it found that:

1. the respondent (then plaintiff) was released from any liability under the murabahah credit facility agreement it had entered into with the appellant (the defendant) on 10 September 2013; and
2. that the appellant must return to the respondent two deeds of title to properties leveraged by the respondent in return for the murabahah credit facility.

The appellant challenged the decision of the lower court on the following grounds:

1. that the decision was erroneous and not based in law, insofar as the object of the agreement was stated as being three units, whereas it was for the purchase of building construction materials;
2. that the lower court had incorrectly labelled the credit facility an al-bai', per art 20(2) of the Compilation of Shari'a Economy Laws, rather than a murabahah credit facility, that is, a credit facility that benefits both parties, provided by a shahib al-mal (creditor), per art 20(6) of the Compilation of Shari'a Economy Laws;
3. that the lower was incorrect in defining the non-issuance of a building permit as a force majeure for the purposes of arts 1244-1245 of the Indonesian Civil Code, and also incorrect in applying the law because a force majeure only results in the parties being released from demands for damages, costs and/or profits to the party experiencing the force majeure, which causes it to default; and
4. that the force majeure submitted by the respondent had already passed because the notice of unsuccessful application for a building permit was dated 5 May 2014, while the appellant was only informed of the notice on 19 August 2014 (three months after the fact), which was contrary to the 14-day statute of limitations contained in art 17(3) of the murabahah credit facility.

The court acceded to the appeal, concurring with the appellant's submission that the respondent was required to inform the appellant of the issuance (or lack thereof) of any relevant building permit, pursuant to the terms of the agreement. Accordingly, the court overturned the decision of the lower court, and ordered the respondent to pay costs.

The plaintiffs, who granted authority to the Indonesian People's Consumer Protection Institute (Lembaga Perlindungan Konsumen Kerakyatan Indonesia) to appear on their behalf, submitted that the first defendant had sold their property (which was in the second plaintiff's name) to the second defendant, through the third defendant. The first plaintiff and first defendant had entered into a musyarakah financing agreement, dated 30 April 2013, pursuant to which the first plaintiff had leveraged the 469m² property.

After making a series of repayments, pursuant to the agreement, the first plaintiff's business was declared bankrupt. The first defendant then served on the first plaintiff several warning notices, as well as notices that the leveraged property would be sold at auction to cover the first plaintiff's default. The first plaintiff submitted that while he had received the notices, he had not taken any relevant action, not because he was ignoring the first defendant, but because he was unable to make any repayments due to the financial predicament of his mining company. Now, the first plaintiff submitted, he was able to make repayments, despite the first defendant having already auctioned the leveraged property. The plaintiffs submitted that they had never agreed to the auction because they had never had the opportunity to first consult and deliberate before a shari'a arbitration board.

After receiving counsel from the court, however, the parties were able to reconcile their differences and the plaintiffs withdrew their action.

The plaintiff and co-defendant were siblings and had two properties. They also had a younger sibling. The third defendant issued a notice, dated 28 April 2015, regarding the repayment of IDR 231,675,504. The notice stated that if that sum had not been repaid by 25 May 2015, that the first and second defendants would sell the two properties at auction. The properties were subsequently sold, the plaintiff claiming that as a result he suffered both material and immaterial loss.

The plaintiff's claim failed for several reasons:

1. Formulaic errors meant the plaintiff and co-defendant's younger sibling was not enjoined as a party to the action; and
2. The plaintiff's action lacked a legal basis and clear reason, while it failed to explain the facts that gave rise to the action.

This ministerial regulation makes amendments to its predecessor, Minister of Finance Regulation No. 93 of 2010 on Auction Guidelines.

The appellant sought to challenge Decision 196 of 2015 of the Pekalongan Religious Court. The appeal was dismissed, however, on the grounds that the appellant's application was still unclear. Specifically, the application had failed to explain:

1. how the appellant owned the properties;
2. what the relationship was between the appellant and third respondent, which affected the claim that the third respondent had threatened to auction the properties;
3. whether the appellant or co-respondent (or someone else) had received a financial loan from the third defendant;
4. what form the agreement took (i.e. what was the financial sum of the loan, and on what date was the agreement executed?);
5. what the collateral subject of the loan was;
6. if the appellant had agreed to the properties becoming collateral; and
7. whether the plaintiff or another party that had received the financial loan from the third respondent had defaulted on the loan.