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A Muslim-naturalized American citizen of Egyptian national origin sued Homeland Secretary Michael Chertoff, along with officials at the Transportation Security Administration, under Title VII, as well as under the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), the Fifth Amendment, the Freedom of Information Act, and the Privacy Act, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin. The plaintiff was suspended from work with the Federal Aviation Administration after he failed to obtain a security clearance renewal following 9/11, and the plaintiff alleged that his security clearance was not renewed because he was Egyptian and Muslim. The defendant claimed that the Administration did not control who receives a security clearance, and that their action suspending him was merely a result of his failure to maintain his previous level of clearance. The Court held that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of religious or national-origin discrimination [with no allegation of barring practices of Islamic ritual law, for example] as articulated by McDonnell Douglas, and that without the security clearance, he was no longer qualified for his job. Accordingly, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Representing an Arab-American Muslim former employee of the Omni Hotels, the EEOC sued the hotel chain under Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination. The plaintiff claimed that the company fired the employee from his position because he was vocal in his community regarding American-Islamic relations following the events of 9/11. The company argued that his termination resulted from the employee’s lackluster sales at the hotel he was managing, and that the plaintiff resigned for his own personal reasons. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that, while the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of discrimination, it failed to provide evidence showing that the defendant’s defense was a pretext for discriminatory intent.

A Lebanese Muslim physician sued his former employer, represented by Secretary of Veteran Affairs Jim Nicholson, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination under Title VII. The plaintiff claimed that the VA Medical Center, his place of employment, subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his identity as both Lebanese and Muslim [presumably related to his observance of Islamic ritual law] and that his supervisors retaliated against him for filing a claim with the EEOC. He further argued that the employer's discrimination ultimately led to his termination. The Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative options before initiating a lawsuit in court, and that he had not demonstrated that his termination was retaliatory.  

The plaintiff, who won a judgment in the lower court, challenged the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine’s refusal to retry an employment discrimination case in which the jury refused to award damages despite finding the defendants guilty. In the underlying case, the plaintiff had sued his employer under §1981 and Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination as well as harassment based on his race and religion in the form of a wide range of offensive actions and statements aimed at the plaintiff, including likening the plaintiff to Osama bin Laden, telling him to go back to his own country, and attempts to shove pork in his mouth (Islamic law prohibits the consumption of pork). The plaintiff argued that on a guilty finding, the jury was obliged to award damages as a matter of law. The appellate court, however, pointed to precedent rejecting this argument, and thus affirmed the lower court’s decision not to retry the case.

An African-American Muslim bus driver sued her former employer, the City of New York, under federal and state law (including Title VII; Article 1, section 3 of the New York State Constitution, and New York City Administrative Law §8-107(1)), alleging gender, religious, and racial discrimination and for allowing a hostile work environment. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that she was subjected to a hostile work environment after securing accommodations for her to wear a headscarf (khimar) while on the job. She claimed that she was required to wear a baseball cap over the headscarf or to accept shifts that did not entail interaction with the public. The Court concluded that the complaints were not severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment claim before a jury; accordingly, it dismissed the Title VII and New York State Constitution claims. The Court permitted the employment discrimination claim under the NY City Administrative Law to proceed.

Plaintiff, a Muslim prisoner, challenged prison policies that (1) failed to provide a Muslim chaplain and an adequate number of Islamic services; (2) prohibited religious meetings without a volunteer present; (3) failed to provide ḥalāl meals and a location where he may perform five daily ṣalāt (prayers); and (4) prohibited him from wearing a kufi (prayer cap) or an Islamic medallion outside of his clothing. The Court found that plaintiff had not demonstrated that the prison's policies substantially burdened his ability to practice his religion, as required for a finding of a violation of the First Amendment or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and that where plaintiff had demonstrated a substantial burden, the prison had demonstrated that its policies were the least restrictive means of achieving the compelling government interest in safety and security.

Plaintiff Sturgeon Stewart, an inmate at the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) brought suit against Respondents Vernestene Dulin, head of prison food services, and various other prison officials for alleged violations of his rights to religious free exercise on the claim that the prison served Muslim inmates the same ḥalāl food menu for all meals of the day, and that these meals excluded meat. Ḥalāl food is meat prepared in accordance with Islamic ritual law, and free of pork and alcohol. The Plaintiff contended that this repetition was not a nutritional religious-accommodating alternative to regular prison meals. The Court found for the Respondents, determining that Muslim prisoners do not have a right under the First Amendment or the RLUIPA to be provided ḥalāl meat entrees. Rather, a correctional facility need only provide Muslim prisoners with food that is not ḥarām (prohibited under Islamic law). The Court found that, as long as the Plaintiff was given an alternative to eating non-ḥalāl meat, he did not suffer a substantial burden to his religious beliefs. The Court determined that the Plaintiff had been provided with alternatives to non-ḥalāl meat, but that the Plaintiff was “simply not happy with the substitutions offered.” Therefore, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff’s factual allegations, construed as true, failed to establish a violation of the Plaintiff’s federal rights.

This case was brought on appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia, which granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, prison officials (Warden Jack Lee, Assistant Warden Gene Shinault, and Correctional Officer K. Lester). Petitioner Leroy Lovelace was removed from a “pass list” (which gives inmates access to Ramadan prayer services and special meals) after prison officials claimed that he broke his fast by eating during the day. Lovelace argued that his removal was due to his complaints about expired food, and was thus in violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and the requirements of Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) (protecting prisoners from having their religious practices substantially burdened, without a compelling government interest). Section 3 of RLIUPA states that “No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person--is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C.A. §2000cc-1(a). The Court vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer Lester, the prison official who reported the alleged fast breaking, as well as against Warden Lee, who was in charge of overseeing the prison, concluding that both officials played direct roles in the incident. The Court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the plaintiff had made out a valid due process claim, and the Court affirmed the remainder of the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

Plaintiffs, Muslim prisoners, sued the Massachusetts Department of Corrections, alleging violations of state and federal law, including the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, § 1983, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Plaintiffs alleged that being patted down by female prison guards violated their First Amendment free exercise rights inasmuch as it contravened the tenets of their Islamic faith, which forbids intimate contact between unrelated members of the opposite gender. The Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment for most of the claims, but denied it with respect to the RLUIPA and the Massachusetts General Law claims, concluding that a jury would best be able to determine whether the alleged infraction violated the terms of these two statutes.

Plaintiff James McRoy claimed that prison officials violated his First Amendment free exercise rights by cancelling some of the scheduled Muslim prayer services without notice, limiting the number of services that Muslim inmates could attend each week, limiting the number of Muslim inmates who could attend each service at any given time, subjecting Muslim inmates to strip searches before they could leave their cells to attend services, prohibiting imams from bringing religious publications onto the prison’s premises, and prohibiting Muslim inmates from exclusively living together in one of the prison’s living units. The prison officials, however, claimed that their actions resulted from a lack of volunteers to organize services and the need to curtail inmate movement on some days because of heightened security concerns. The Court held that McRoy did not sufficiently demonstrate that a jury could conclude that he had been subjected to a violation of his rights. It thus entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

The Court reversed the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant prison officials, John McGinnis, Patrick McGann, and Gordon Lord. Plaintiff Wayne Ford sued under § 1983, alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights by the denial of his request to attend the Eid al-Fitr feast (the holiday at the end of Ramadan); prison officials had moved the event to fall several days after its official occurrence in order that it coincide with a weekend. Defendants argued that their denial of plaintiff inmate’s request to attend the event did not amount to a constitutional violation because the event, once moved, no longer fell on a date of religious significance. The Court concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate because the matter required closer scrutiny of the Turner/O’Lone Test (which balances prisoners' religious accommodation requests with legitimate penological concerns) than the District Court accorded it before finding in favor of either party.

The Court affirmed a decision by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Jerry Charles, who alleged a violation of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) to practice his religion. Specifically, the plaintiff requested accommodations that would allow him to have prayer oil, which he contended was a necessary part of his religious practice. The Department of Corrections challenged RLUIPA as unconstitutional, but the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute.

Plaintiff Horace Crump, an inmate in the Michigan Department of Corrections, brought this compliant against the Respondent, Deputy Warden Winn at the Saginaw Correctional Facility, for changing the Muslim prayer time. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleged that the Respondent changed the Muslim prayer time in such a way as to place a substantial burden on the Plaintiff’s free exercise of his religion, and that this was done in retaliation for having complained about his and other Muslim inmates’ complaints during Ramadan. The Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, and the case was referred for a report and recommendation by a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge determined that the Plaintiff did not suffer a substantial burden, because while the Respondent did not offer a specific penological justification for changing the prayer time, the prison immediately reinstated the religiously required Friday prayer time, such that the Plaintiff did not in fact suffer a “substantial burden” on the practice of his religion. The magistrate judge then found that the fact that the Plaintiff did not suffer a substantial burden on the practice of his religion also showed that he did not suffer adverse action, a necessary element of his retaliation claim. For these reasons, the magistrate judge recommended that the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment be granted, and that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff Kareem Hassan Milhouse, an inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania (“USP-Lewisburg”), filed aBivens-styled complaint against several Federal Bureau of Prisons and USP-Lewisburg officials. The Plaintiff asserted that he had been denied access to the courts on three occasions and denied the practice of his religious requirements in violations of his right to free exercise, on the bases that: (1) there was no Islamic chaplain for Muslim inmates nor services for Special Management Unit inmates to attend services physically, nor were services provided through the radio as were other institutional programs, and (2) there was no Islamic celebration after the Ramadan fast, nor special meal of the types given for holidays of other faiths, and no Muslim chaplain with whom to discuss articles of faith. [He believed both of these types of services to be requirements stipulated by Islamic ritual law.] The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. The District Court granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court found that the alleged conduct did not fall within the scope of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), which applies to free exercise of religion claims under the First Amendment raised by prisoners, because the Plaintiff did not establish that a “substantial burden” had been placed on his ability to exercise his religion. The Court further determined that the Plaintiff had alternative means of worship available to him and that the Defendants’ conduct of providing the meal to non-Muslim inmates did not inhibit or curtail his ability to express adherence to his Islamic faith and beliefs. Because the Plaintiff failed to meet the substantial burden test with respect to both of these freedom of religion claims, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

Plaintiff Jesse Copeland, an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, brought suit after he refused to leave a Muslim religious meeting after prison officials ordered the meeting’s conclusion and was disciplined for causing a disturbance and placed on disciplinary restrictions, including a six-month ban on attending other religious meetings. The Plaintiff filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, challenging the ban and other prison policies impacting Muslim inmates. The District Court dismissed the complaint and granted summary judgment for the Respondents, prison officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Fifth Circuit determined that there was no First Amendment free exercise violation under § 1983 nor a  violation of the Plaintiff’s rights under RLUIPA based on the Plaintiff’s six-month ban from attending religious meetings due to procedural bars to the Plaintiff’s recovery, including sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and mootness.

Petitioner Kofi Easterling, an inmate at Green Bay Correctional Institution (GBCI), filed suit against the Respondents, various prison officials, alleging that they ignored the Petitioner's instructions as to when Ramadan began. The Petitioner claimed that the Respondents’ Ramadan date violated his religious beliefs under the First Amendment and RLUIPA. In the District Court, the Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, to which the Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in response. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Respondents, finding that the Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim failed because he had produced no evidence of a substantial burden on his religious exercise. Because the Plaintiff failed to meet his burden under RLUIPA, he similarly failed to establish that the Respondents burdened a “central religious belief or practice” in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Therefore, the Respondents were entitled to summary judgment on the First Amendment and RLUIPA claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Plaintiff Charles Glenn, an inmate at the New Hampshire Department of Corrections (DOC) filed suit against the Respondents, various DOC prison officials, for alleged violations of his rights to free exercise [of his ability to exercise Islamic ritual law] under the First Amendment and RLUIPA. Specifically, the Plaintiff – a practicing Muslim – argued that there had been no Friday prayer (jumuʿa) services at the New Hampshire State Prison for the past three years and that he had no access to an Imam (a Muslim prayer leader), a Qur’an, or other Islamic literature, which placed constraints on his ability to practice Islam [specifically, it's ritual law aspects]. In conducting a Preliminary Review, the Court applied the four-part test for examining the constitutionality of a regulation that restricts an inmate’s First Amendment free exercise of religion found in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987). The Court assessed the four Turner factors -- (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate government interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether alternative means to exercise the right exist; (3) what impact accommodating the right will have on prison resources; and (4) whether there was an absence of alternatives to the prison regulation. The Court found that the prison’s policy of denying Friday Prayer (jumuʿa) services, which are a central and essential element of religious practice, impinged on the Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to exercise his religion.

Plaintiff Jack Robinson, a formerly incarcerated inmate at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn (“MDC”), brought an action against Respondent, Officer Jimminez, a correctional officer at MDC, for allegedly depriving the Plaintiff of his right to religious worship under the First Amendment. The Plaintiff claimed that, although he reserved the prison’s religious room for Friday prayer (jumuʿa) services, the Respondent allowed Jewish prisoners to also use the room. The Respondent argued that the Plaintiff’s religious service was “stopped due to a scheduling conflict with another group of inmates who had also reserved the religious room for the same time as plaintiff.” The Respondent moved for summary judgment, and the district court judge referred the Respondent’s motion to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation. The magistrate judge determined that the Respondent’s decision to stop one religious service was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests because the action was undertaken to maintain order and prevent an altercation between Muslim and Jewish prisoners, and therefore recommended that the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment be granted.

Plaintiff Derrick Lafurr Brown, a Muslim inmate confined in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, filed a suit against the Respondents, who were various prison officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, for interrupting the Islamic services [Friday services specified in Islamic ritual law] out of an alleged general bias against Islam. The magistrate judge determined that the prison officials were acting in response to the Plaintiff’s repeated disobedience, and that their measure of standing in the doorway to block entry to the services was related to a legitimate penological interest and therefore did not interfere with the inmate's free exercise of religion. The magistrate judge recommended that the plaintiff's civil rights claims be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff Tariq A. Vaughn, Sr., an inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics alleging that he told prison officials that he did not want to be housed with a Muslim inmate, and after he was placed in a cell with a Muslim inmate, that the Muslim inmate stabbed him in the head and back. The magistrate judge recommended that the Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint be dismissed with prejudice because it was frivolous, and alternatively for failing to state a claim for which relief can be granted. [There seemed to be no stated religious or Islamic law basis for the claim.]