SHARIAsource

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Angola (Republica de Angola), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Angola's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire (Republique de Cote d'Ivoire), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Cote d'Ivoire's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status. 

The parties were married on 14 August 1987 and had two children (born 1988 and 1990). Initially, the marriage was harmonious, but, on 2 October 1995, the cassation applicant filed for divorce in the Surabaya Religious Court (lower court) (950/Pdt. G/1995/PA. Sby). During the divorce proceedings, on 18 and 23 September 1996, the cassation respondent reported the cassation applicant to the police for domestic abuse. During the proceeding, the cassation respondent successfully requested the lower court's permission for herself and the parties' children to live separately from the cassation applicant.

On 15 October 1996, the lower court dismissed the cassation applicant's request for a divorce, citing the interests of the parties' young children as its primary reason. This decision was later upheld by the East Java High Religious Court (No. 189/Pdt.G/1996/PTA.Sby), as well as the Indonesian Supreme Court (No. 157 K/AG/1998) on 5 February 1999.

While the parties remained under one roof, pursuant to court orders, they had not communciated nor been physically intimate with one another for 17 years. After the cassation applicant refused to act as his daughter's marriage guardian, the cassation respondent asserted that the family could no longer depend on the cassation applicant as a husband or father, and requested that the Surabaya Religious Court (lower court) grant her a divorce. The lower court (No. 355/Pdt.G/2012/PA.Sby), on 5 June 2013, granted the cassation respondent an irrevocable divorce (talak satu bain sughra) and ordered her to pay court costs (IDR 316,000).

The cassation applicant lodged an appeal in the Surabaya High Religious Court. The Surabaya High Religious Court (No. 304/Pdt.G/2013/PTA.Sby), on 29 October 2013, upheld the decision of the lower court, in favour of the cassation respondent.

On 19 December 2013, the cassation applicant submitted a cassation application to the Indoneisan Supreme Court, submitting that the decision of the lower court should be overturned because:

1. The cassation respondent had failed to fulfil the formalities required for the trial, and that the lower court should not have accepted the cassation respondent’s submissions if they did not satisfy the formal requirements;
2. The cassation respondent, as a civil servant, had failed to obtain permission from her superior officer to file for a divorce, pursuant to Indonesian Government Regulation No. 10 of 1983 on Permission to Marry and Divorce for Civil Servants, in conjunction with Indonesian Government Regulation No. 45 of 1990.

The Supreme Court held that these matters were non-justiciable at cassation level, found that the Surabaya High Religious Court had not erred at law, and dismissed the cassation applicant's reasons for cassation, ordering him to pay court costs (IDR 500,000).

The plaintiffs stated that Amaq Sidin and Inaq Sidin (husband and wife) had passed away in 1983 and 1986 respectively, and were survived by their five children and beneficiaries (three sons and two daughters):

1. Sidin bin Amaq Sidin (alias Amaq Kidi), who passed away in 1980, was married to Inaq Kidi, who also passed away in 1985. They were survived by three children:

• Kidi, who passed away in 2008, and was survived by three of her own children (14th, 15th and 16th plaintiffs);
• Mendur bin Sidin (alias Amaq Kidi) (first plaintiff);
• Sriti binti Sidin (alias Amaq Kidi) (second defendant);
• Nawati binti Amaq Mundri, who passed away in 1990, and was survived by her three children (eighth-tenth plaintiffs);
• Idaniati binti Amaq mundri (11th plaintiff);
• Ayuni binti Amaq Mundri (12th plaintiff); and
• Ariantini binti Amaq Mundri (13th plaintiff).

1. Cili (alias Inaq Saidi binti Amaq Sidin), who passed away in 2003, was married to Amaq Saidi, and was survived by seven children, two of whom had passed away (third-seventh plaintiffs);
2. Amaq Rusdi bin Amaq Sidin (first defendant);
3. Amaq Mugasih bin Amaq Sidin (second defendant);
4. Marike (alias Inaq Mundri binti Amaq Sidin), who passed away in 1982, having married Amaq Mundri in 1980, who had also passed away, was survived by:

• Nawati binti Amaq Mundri, who passed away in 1990, and was survived by her three children (eighth-tenth plaintiffs);
• Idaniati binti Amaq mundri (11th plaintiff);
• Ayuni binti Amaq Mundri (12th plaintiff); and
• Ariantini binti Amaq Mundri (13th plaintiff).

Amaq Sidin and Inaq Sidin left to their beneficiaries three plantations, two rice padis, and one coil made of pure gold with an estimated worth of IDR 1 billion. The plaintiffs claimed that, following the passing of Amaq and Inaq Sidin, the land and gold coil had remained in the possesion of the defendants as the deceaseds' sons, without being distributed among the other worthy beneficiaries. The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants had sold several portions of the bequeathed land to the co-defendants. Accordingly, the plaintiffs requested that the court distribute the assets of the deceased pursuant to Islamic inheritance law (hukum faraidl), that those portions of the aforementioned land already sold be included as part of the assets of the deceased, that a caveat be placed on that land not yet transferred to any third party, and that the plaintiffs' case be prioritised over any other related proceedings already on foot.

In enforcing the rights of the children of those beneficiaries who had passed away prior to Amaq and Inaq Sidin, the court cited arts 74(1) and 85(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, which permits the children of a deceased beneficiary to assume their entitlement. Moreover, the court noted that male children were entitled to twice the share of female children, per art 176 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The court stipulated as beneficiaries the plaintiffs and ordered the defendants to transfer to the plaintiffs their share of the assets of Amaq and Inaq Sidin, as it had outlined and quantified, and ordered the defendants to auction parts or all of the properties if such a transfer was not physically feasible. It also ordered the defendants to pay court costs (IDR 2,371,000).

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (Shri Lanka Prajatantrika Samajavadi Janarajaya/Ilankai Jananayaka Choshalichak Kutiyarachu), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Sri Lanka's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has some legal status. 

This regional regulation makes provision for public order in Sukoharjo, Central Java (Jawa Tengah). Article 21(2) permits the regional government to close (permanently or temporarily) places of entertainment or activities that disturb the implementation of religious worship (peribadatan).

This regional regulation is an example of a legislative instrument that, arguably, Islamises public life without specifically referring to Islam or religion (agama). It prohibits the distribution and/or sale of alcoholic beverages in public places in Muaro Jambi, Jambi (art 2(1)). Hotels, bars, and restaurants stipulated by the regent are exempted from the prohibition (art 2(2)). It also prohibits alcohol points of sale from being within a 500m radius of places of worship, schools, hospitals, residential areas, and office blocks (art 3).

In preambular statement (b), this regional regulation states that Parepare Municipal Regulation No. 6 of 1999 on the Retribution of Licensing for Alcohol Points of Sale needs to be revoked and replaced with a regulation that prohibits alcoholic beverages. It states that the prohibition on alcoholic beverages in this regulation is, among other things, a way of implementing religious values and the morals of a religious umat (community) (art 4). Accordingly, this regulation prohibits all legal entities and persons from producing, storing, distributing, channelling, placing, promoting, and selling alcoholic beverages in the region (art 5(1)), while all persons are prohibited from consuming alcohol in the region (art 5(2)). Foreigners visiting Parepare are exempted and may bring and consume alcoholic beverages with an alcohol content of five per cent (art 6).

This regional regulation, in its preambular statement, states that prostitution contravenes religious, legal, moral, and customary morals, while alcohol-related activities can damage society's morals and threaten the nation's future. This regulation prohibits prostitution (arts 4 and 5), as well as any other movements or behaviour that exhibit 'sensitive' parts of the body with the intent to stir up lust in public or places frequented by the public (art 6). It also prohibits any behaviour or conduct that may facilitate prostitution (arts 7-9), as well as the production, sale, distribution, and consumption of alcohol (arts 11-13).

A Toledan man named Ibn Ḥātim was accused of being a heretic by sixty witnesses on the initiative of a fellow Toledan called Ibn Labīd al-Murābiṭ. The judge consulted with the local jurists, and following their legal opinions, he sentenced the accused to death. However, he granted the accused the right to challenge the witnesses (iʿdhār). Ibn Ḥātim escaped from Toledo and found refuge in the neighboring kingdom of Badajoz. Ibn Labīd went after him, carrying a copy of the judge’s sentence (tasjīl) along with the legal opinions of a number of non-Toledan jurists. In Badajoz, the ruler withdrew his support from Ibn Ḥātim, who fled again, this time to Cordoba. While in Cordoba, the “moral” police arrested Ibn Ḥātim, and the judge imprisoned him, giving him two months to prove his innocence. Unable to do so, Ibn Ḥātim was crucified alive. A number of legal issues arise in the course of this case: should the process of iʽdhār—the right to challenge witnesses—be granted to those accused of heresy (zandaqa)? Should refuge be granted to them? What happens with the estate or inheritance of an executed zindīq? Can a judge reverse a sentence given by another judge? The source is a collection of court cases by Andalusi scholar Ibn Sahl (d. 486/1093), and it is based on information directly available to the compiler, who was also a witness of most of the events described.