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An Indian Muslim professor sued his former employer, CUNY, under Title VII, §1981, and §1983, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, and religion. The plaintiff argued that he was denied tenure and additional compensation because of his race and religion. The Court dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence to establish that the reason he was denied tenure and additional compensation was discrimination.

The plaintiff, Amr Elmenayer, sued his former employer, ABF Freight Systems, for failure to accommodate his religious practices and disparate treatment due to religion under Title VII. The plaintiff alleged that his supervisor failed to grant his reasonable request to attend Friday (jumu'a) prayer services. He also alleged that he was treated more harshly than other non-Muslim employees when he was terminated for failing to report an accident in a timely fashion, as per the company's policy. The defendant argued that it did try to accommodate the plaintiff’s religious practices by encouraging him to bid for a shift that would not conflict with his prayer duties. The Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had not made out a prima facie case of discrimination. This decision was affirmed in Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., 318 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003).

A Muslim man from Algeria sued his former employer, SUNY College at Brockport, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin. The plaintiff argued that he was not selected for a job at the university because of the Department of Foreign Languages’ head’s prejudice against him. The hiring committee voted in favor of the plaintiff for a permanent position, but the decision ultimately went to the department head, who the plaintiff claimed did not select him out of discriminatory animus toward his race and religion. The department head responded that the plaintiff was not hired because of his lack of research experience. The Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that a jury may find that the defendant’s reasons for not hiring the plaintiff were pretexts for discriminatory motives.

An Iranian Muslim worker sued his former employer, the University of Rochester, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on race and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that his termination in the months following 9/11 resulted from religious discrimination. The defendant produced documentation of the plaintiff’s poor work performance, citing that as the reason for termination, and the plaintiff did not rebut that evidence. The Court found that the timing of his firing was not enough to establish a discriminatory nexus, that the plaintiff failed to otherwise produce instances of explicit discrimination, and that the University had provided evidence of a legitimate reason for the termination, which the plaintiff did not rebut. The Court thus entered a decision of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

The plaintiff, a Lebanese Muslim teacher in Alaska who alleged a workplace discrimination claim, challenged the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska’s grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff sued under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of national origin and religion. Specifically, she alleged that she was not hired for a permanent position because of her religion and country of origin. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the lower court had not considered all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party (the plaintiff) in its consideration of the defendant’s summary judgment motion, and that a jury could reasonably find that the plaintiff successfully articulated a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court thus reversed and remanded the case to the District Court for further consideration. Even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the District Court again granted summary judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff attempted to appeal several times, but was not successful.

A Muslim man who sued his employer under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of religion, challenged the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York's decision granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff argued that his employer did not accommodate his religion when it refused to allow him to move his breaks to attend religiously-mandated Friday prayer (jumu'a) services. He further argued that he was treated differently (i.e., punished more severely for infractions such as failing to report an accident immediately) than non-Muslim employees. The Court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the instances of alleged discrimination, though not time-barred, were insufficient to create a prima facie case of discrimination. 

A Muslim worker sued his former employer under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FRCA), alleging religious discrimination and breach of contract. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was fired when his employer learned that he was a Muslim. The Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the Title VII claim, because the plaintiff failed to establish that an employee-employer relationship existed between himself and the defendant; and that it similarly did not have jurisdiction to hear the contract claim because it was below the requisite amount for diversity jurisdiction. With respect to the FCRA claim, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did not provide evidence showing that the decision-makers knew he was a Muslim when they decided to terminate his employment.

A Bangladeshi Muslim worker sued her former employer under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that she was fired and not rehired by the defendant because of her religion and national origin. On appeal, the defendant conceded that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of discrimination, but contended that she did not rebut or rebuff the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason the company had for not rehiring her—which it claimed was due to poor job performance in her previous job assignments. The Court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff offered no proof that she was not rehired due to religious discrimination.

A Muslim former Naval engineer sued the Secretary of the Navy under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was subjected to ethnic slurs and jokes, leading to a hostile work environment. The Court adopted the report by the magistrate judge granting the motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust proper administrative remedies before bringing the case to court. The Court further noted that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the compensatory damage issue.

A Pakistani Muslim worker sued his former employer under Title VII and New York State Human Rights Law, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin. The plaintiff claimed that he was terminated for discriminatory reasons, as his supervisor made comments that the plaintiff felt were derogatory. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was terminated because of inconsistencies in his re-accreditation application to qualify him for work at the healthcare organization (as plaintiff had failed to disclose that he was suspended when working for a previous employer). The Court held that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, and that, even if he did, the defendant had provided evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff’s employment. Accordingly, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

Additional information. The Court applied the McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 782 (1973) burden-shifting test.  This test requires plaintiffs to first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.  If they are successful, the burden shifts back to the defendant (usually a company or a company representative) to demonstrate they it a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.  Finally, it then becomes the burden of the plaintiff to prove that the reason articulated by the defendant was a pretext for the true discriminatory motive.

A Muslim worker sued the defendant, the Philadelphia Housing Authority, under Title VII and §1983, claiming that he was terminated from employment due to his Muslim religion and in retaliation for acting as a witness in other cases against his employer. The defendant argued that he was terminated due to his participation in several crimes, such as forgery and theft. The Court found no evidence of a connection between the inappropriate remarks that were made toward the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's termination more than a year later. Thus, in 2002, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

A Pakistani Muslim banker sued her former employer under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin. The plaintiff alleged that her coworkers and supervisors made derogatory remarks to her about her diet, dress, and prayer schedule; and that this discriminatory animus was the real reason that she was terminated. The defendant argued that she was fired for insubordination when she left work in the middle of a shift without permission. At the trial level, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the defendant, and the Eighth Circuit upheld this decision on appeal, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to rebut the legitimate non-discriminatory reason that the defendant offered for terminating her employment.

Two Muslim women who were prohibited by their respective employers from wearing a ḥijāb sued their employers on the grounds of religious discrimination. The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) decided whether these women had been unfairly dismissed by their respective employers when taking into account the 2000 EU directive on discrimination in the workplace. The ECJ ruled that the first employer's internal directive against religious symbols was not applied in a directly discriminatory manner against the first woman. While indirect discrimination could be a possibility it "may be objectively justified by a legitimate aim." As for the second case, the ECJ decided "that the willingness of an employer to take account of the wishes of a customer no longer to have the services of that employer provided by a worker wearing an Islamic headscarf cannot be considered a genuine and determining occupational requirement within the meaning of the directive."

Holding: To prevail in a disparate-treatment claim, an applicant need show only that his need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision, not that the employer had knowledge of his need. 

Judgment: Reversed and remanded, 8-1, in an opinion by Justice Scalia on June 1, 2015. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgement. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Facts: Respondent (Abercrombie) refused to hire Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim, because the headscarf that she wore pursuant to her religious obligations conflicted with Abercrombie’s employee dress policy. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit on Elauf’s behalf, alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which, inter alia, prohibits a prospective employer from refusing to hire an applicant because of the applicant’s religious practice when the practice could be accommodated without undue hardship.

Procedural Posture: The EEOC prevailed in the District Court, but the Tenth Circuit reversed, awarding Abercrombie summary judgment on the ground that failure-to-accommodate liability attaches only when the applicant provides the employer with actual knowledge of his need for an accommodation.

Sources: Opinion Syllabus; SCOTUSblog Case Page (with further reviews and commentary on the U.S. law implications of this case).