SHARIAsource

Constitution for Nepal in English, published with the permission of Constitute.

Constitution for Pakistan in English, published with the permission of Constitute.

Constitution for Sri Lanka in English, published with the permission of Constitute.

Constitution for India in English, published with the permission of Constitute.

The Asia Bibi case is one of the recent manifestations of the blasphemy laws in Pakistan. The Applicant, Asia Bibi, a Christian woman, was sentenced to death by the trial court after allegedly uttering blasphemous statements against the Prophet Mohammad to fellow Muslim field workers. Despite serious questions regarding the quality of her defense and the truthfulness of the allegations against her, the appeal to the Lahore High Court was dismissed.

The Khoja Case, also known as the Aga Khan Case, is one of the rare cases profiling the Shia Imami Nizari Ismaili community (henceforth “Ismailis”). Decided in the High Court of Bombay in 1866 by the Honourable Sir Joseph Arnould, this case was brought by a series of Ismaili plaintiffs who argued that the Ismaili Community was a Sunni community, and therefore did not owe allegiance to the Aga Khan as its leader. The Court held that the Ismaili Community was in fact a Shi’a community, that the Aga Khan was the authoritative head of the community, and therefore, that he had the right to exercise his traditional modes of authority.

A district court in Lahore, Pakistan, ruled against a man who had remarried without obtaining his wife’s permission. Judicial magistrate Ali Jawad Naqwi ruled that the accused, Shehzada Saqib Suhail, had illegally pursued a third marriage without first obtaining the consent of the complainant, Ayesha Khalil, who at the time was his second wife. The magistrate ruled that the accused had “solemnized third marriage during the existence of marriage with the complainant and therefore accused namely Shahzada Saqib Suhail is convicted u/s 6(5) of Muslim Family Ordinance.” In its opinion the court cited section 6 of Muslim Family Ordinance 1961 which stipulates the manner and practice of polygamy in Pakistan. 6(5) of the Ordinance disallows any man from contracting an additional marriage without the permission and consent of the Arbitration Council. Under the ordinance, an application for permission must be submitted to the Chairman of the Arbitration Council along with the necessary fees, reasons for marriage, and importantly, proof of consent of existing wife or wives. The court found that no such permission had been obtained from the second wife the complainant, Ayesha Khalil, nor from the Arbitration Council when the third marriage was established, and sentenced accused with six months of simple imprisonment and fine of Rs.2,00,000/.

The Pakistan Supreme Court has acquitted Asia Bibi of blasphemy charges, removing her from death row. A Pakistani Christian woman, Asia Bibi, was arrested in 2010 after a dispute with her Muslim co-workers in which they claimed that she insulted the Prophet Muhammad. The state prosecutor charged her with blasphemy and the trial court sentenced her to death. The courts subsequently dismissed her appeal to the Lahore High Court. After a lengthy series of appeals, the Pakistan Supreme Court acquitted Asia Bibi of blasphemy charges, vacating her sentence. The decision navigates between affirming the law and reversing its application to Ms. Bibi. The Court notes on the one hand that blasphemy was a severe offense under classic Islamic law, and it upholds capital punishment for it, citing Muhammad Ismail Qureshi v. Pakistan (PLD 1991 FSC 10). The Court concludes, on the other hand, that the prosecution failed to prove its case against the appellant “beyond reasonable doubt.” It noted “glaring and stark contradictions in the evidence,” and cited evidence that the prosecution’s witnesses harbored ill will against Asia Bibi and thus may have fabricated the allegations. According to the Court, “even if there was some grain of truth in the allegations … the glaring contradictions in the evidence … clearly show that the truth in this case had been mixed with a lot which was untrue.” In the end, the Court notes the abuse of the blasphemy charge, and condemns people with “nefarious designs” who level false allegations of blasphemy, citing Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri v. the State (PLD 2016 SC 17). This decision thus upholds blasphemy laws but cautions against broad and false applications of it.

The Shah Bano case is a landmark and controversial case in India’s Supreme Court which dealt with the question of the length of time a Muslim ex-husband would have to provide his ex-wife with monthly maintenance payments after a divorce, considering Muslim personal law and Indian civil law.

In Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017), the Supreme Court of India declared the practice of triple ṭalāq (instant divorce) a violation of Muslim women’s constitutional rights. This legislative act is the result of that judgment and criminalizes the practice of triple ṭalāq.

The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 is promulgated by Pakistani President Mohammed Ayub Khan's administration. The Ordinance represents the post-1947 statutory reform in Muslim family law in the Indian subcontinent and is today in force in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. The Ordinance laid out the basic rights and obligations of a Muslim family, including provisions regulating the procedures for talaq and khul'.

In a 3-2 decision, the Supreme Court of India declared triple ṭalāq unconstitutional and gave India’s parliament six months “to consider legislation” for handling triple ṭalāq. In its opinion, the Court cited global advances in Islamic family law (in India, called Muslim personal law) in “even theocratic Islamic states” as evidence of the need for reform.  The Court also noted that the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937, which protects the religious freedom of Muslims in India, does not constitutionally protect practices deemed “anti-Qur’anic.” Asserting that triple ṭalāq is such a practice, the Court held that it could not be protected under the Indian Constitution.

“Held, where the plaintiff sued for the custody of her minor sister, as her legal guardian under Muhammadan law, that the fact of the plaintiff being a prostitute was, although she was legally entitled to the custody of a minor, a sufficient reason for dismissing the suit in the interests of such a minor.”

President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan issues a juvenile justice system ordinance, to provide protection of the rights of children involved in criminal litigation. 

A legislative act produced under British India that consolidates and amends the law relating to the solemnization of the marriages of Christians. Broken into nine sections, it also includes legal forms related to marriage, such as a marriage certificate and notice of marriage.

In Danial Latifi & Anr v. Union of India, the Supreme Court of India (the “Court”) considers whether the Muslim Women Protection of Rights on Divorce Act, 1986 (“the Act”) abrogates its ruling in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and Others (“Shah Bano”).[1] In Shah Bano, the Court held that divorced Muslim women unable to support themselves have a right to lifetime maintenance under Section 127 of the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure, which does not conflict with Muslim Personal Law[2] ostensibly limiting rights to mahr[3] and maintenance during the period of iddat.[4] [5] In Danial Latifi, the Court holds that the Act did not overturn Shah Bano, but instead that divorced Muslim women who are unable to maintain themselves are entitled to receive a one-time lump sum payment during the period of iddat sufficient for lifetime maintenance. The Court chiefly justifies this ruling by arguing that abrogating Shah Bano, would violate various constitutional rights of Muslim women. The Court also makes prudential arguments concerning the impact of abrogating Shah Bano on divorced Muslim women’s economic circumstances, and moreover holds that abrogation would be contrary to Islamic law.

[1] Danial Latifi & Anr v. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC 740 (India).

[2] India has a uniform criminal code, but different personal codes addressing family law for various religious communities. This dual system is very controversial in India.

[3] A sum agreed upon prior to marriage to be given to a wife in two parts (one deferred and one immediate).

[4] The roughly three-month period where re-marriage is forbidden to divorced women.

[5] Shah Bano produced political backlash resulting in the passage of the Act referenced above, with the intention of overturning the ruling. See supra note 1.

In Farooq Siddiqui v. Mst. Farzana Naheed,[1] the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan (“the Court”)[2] considers whether surrogacy can be reconciled with Pakistani law and sharī‘a, and whether the law needs to be updated. The underlying case involved a Pakistani doctor living abroad who orally contracted with a Pakistani woman to serve as a surrogate, as his wife was unable to conceive, creating a “false drama of marriage” as a cover.[3] When the child came due, the surrogate refused to give the child to the doctor, and litigation commenced. The lower courts held the contract invalid and ordered the doctor to pay maintenance.[4] The Federal Shariat Court does not address the instant case specifically, but holds that surrogacy contracts, with the exception of “test tube babies,” are un-Islamic and void.[5]

[1] Farooq Siddiqui v. Mst. Farzana Naheed (2017), 2017 PLD (FSC 78) (Pakistan).

[2] As part of his project of Islamification of Pakistan, then-Prime Minister Zia created the Shariat Court with authority to decide whether Pakistani law is consonant with Sharia. Several justices are required to be Islamic law scholars. See Niaz A. Shah, Women the Koran and International Human Rights Law 101 (2006).  

[3] Supra note 1.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

In Javed & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.,[1] the Supreme Court of India (the “Court”) considers whether a non-retroactive state law barring elected members of various local governments from having more than two children is violative of various articles of the Indian Constitution (the “Constitution”). The law was challenged by disqualified candidates who argued that the law was discriminatory, arbitrary and unreasonable, that it violated fundamental rights per Article 21, and interfered with religious freedom guarantees in Article 25.[2] The Court holds that the law is reasonable and not arbitrary or discriminatory given India’s overpopulation problem and the perception of a clear nexus between reducing population and encouraging local leaders to be role models.[3] The Court also holds that contesting and holding elected office are not fundamental rights, and even if they were, the public health limitation would mean that the law does not encroach on such rights.[4] But the focus of this paper is on the Court’s analysis with respect to religious freedom, where the Court in effect holds that the public health and welfare limitation must govern and that regardless, polygamy, and having more than two children is not an “integral part” of Islam and there is no conflict with the Muslim personal law.[5]

[1] Javed & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 369 (India).

[2] Supra note 2 (Article 25 of the Indian Constitution is analogous to the American 1^st amendment’s religious freedom protections, but with an explicit public health limitation).

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] See id. (India has separate personal codes addressing matters such as marriage for different religious communities..

The fatwa is a unanimous decision by forty Muslim muftis, affiliated with the Sunni Ittehad Council in Pakistan, declaring honor killing of women as “un-Islamic” or heresy (kuffur) and an “unpardonable sin” (gunah-e-qabir). The decree explicitly states that burning a woman alive, in the name of honor, for marrying a person of their choosing, is heresy and against the commands of Islam. The fatwa quotes a Quranic verse, verse number 232 of Surat al-Baqarah: [translated from the Urdu translation of the verse – as used in the fatwa – into English] “Oh woman’s family, do not say no to women for wanting to marry the husband [of their choice] if the two of them have consented to the marriage.” The fatwa states that Islam is the true guardian of rights of women and that it is imperative upon the leaders of an Islamic nation/government (hukumat) to ensure protection of women’s rights. For that purpose, the government should pass and implement laws that make burning and killing of women an unpardonable crime. The oppression and torture unleashed upon women has no relation to Islam. The fatwa then refers to an example (sunna) of the Prophet Muhammad, as narrated in Sahih-Bukhari: The Prophet (s.a.w.) terminated the marriage contract (nikkah) of a woman who complained to him (s.a.w.) that she did not like the man her father had married her off to. The fatwa condemns the act of burning alive or killing one’s child for marrying someone of their choice and then “appeals” to the parents to focus on the ethical education and upbringing of their children in line with the teachings of Islam; and that the upcoming month of Ramadan will be devoted to raise awareness about women’s rights. Finally, the fatwa states that those who burn women and girls alive should be hanged to death.

The particular newspaper reporting (in Roznama Dunya) on this fatwa includes the names of twenty four clerics who signed the fatwa (the total number of clerics who joined in issuing the fatwa were forty but the newspaper article explicitly mentions just twenty four names).

In October 2016, Pakistan's Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) passed legislation amending the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (Act XLV of 1860) and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), in order to deter and prevent offences in the name or pretext of honour. The amendments introduce limitations on the waiver of qisas (pardon), available to the perpetrators of Qatl-i-amd (intentional homicide), consistent with Islamic criminal law principles. Specifically, the new law introduces Ta’zir—discretionary judicial punishment—for an offender guilty of fasad-fil-arz (spreading mischief on Earth), particularly if the offence is committed in the name or pretext of honor. Under the new law, a court may punish such offender with imprisonment for life after considering “the facts and circumstances of the case.”