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The plaintiffs were survivors, family members, and representatives of the estates of the American victims of the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. The plaintiffs sued Iran, utilizing an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) that allows the prosecution of foreign states that sponsor terrorism for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful death. The plaintiffs pointed to the financial ties between Hezbollah (who allegedly orchestrated the attack) and Iran when arguing that Iran should be held liable. Iran did not file an answer to this claim. The court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding $1 billion in punitive damages.

The plaintiff , an American citizen whose wife was killed in a suicide bombing in Israel, sued Iran under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (allowing suit against sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism), for intentional infliction of emotional distress and economic loss due to wrongful death of his wife in a suicide bomber’s attack in Israel. The plaintiff argued that Iran and its Ministry of Information and Security should be held financially liable, as there were financial ties between the group that claimed responsibility for the attack, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Iran. Iran failed to make an appearance or file an answer. The Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him $10,380,568 for emotional and economic loss.

Additional commentary. The FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A. §1605(a) is the terrorism exception to FSIA and what plaintiffs depend on to get jurisdiction over Iran. §1605(a)(1) stays that “A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case not otherwise covered by this chapter in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act if such act or provision of material support or resources is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.” While there is no direct connection to Islamic law, there is a dispute that centers around whether Iran -- an Islamic constitutional state -- sponsors military operations conceived of as jihad under the guise of Islamic law.

Plaintiffs, a group of individuals harmed in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, brought tort claims for damages incurred during that attack against thirty-two distinct defendants. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the charges against seven of the thirty-two defendants, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a Saudi government charity, and several Saudi princes, concluding that none of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) exceptions (which would allow suit to proceed against sovereigns or diplomats) were applicable in those cases. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and further dismissed the case against a Saudi banker for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The defendant, an American Muslim man accused of attending a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, appealed a conviction for making false declarations to a grand jury, obstructing justice, and for making false material statements to the FBI. Specifically, the defendant was convicted for traveling to Pakistan in 1999 and attending a “jihadist training camp” in Afghanistan. While attending these camps were not a crime in 1999, the defendant subsequently lied about his travels and experiences. He argued that his conviction should be overturned because the lower court admitted irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence, and misapplied the sentencing guidelines for terrorism-related convictions. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, concluding that neither the admitted evidence nor the application for the terrorism sentencing guidelines was inappropriate. While the case did not relate to Islamic law directly, the rules governing jihad, and petitioners' views of them, are often based on false definitions of Islamic law.

Two Uzbek “independent Muslim” men, Bekhzod Bakhtiyarovich Yusupov and Ismoil Samadov, applied for asylum and withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(A). Both men had entered the country on student visas and subsequently remained in the United States illegally. The Board of Immigration Appeals found that, while the men would be eligible for asylum under CAT, the national security exception to withholding removal, 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(B)(iv), applicable according to the Attorney General when “there is evidence that would permit a reasonable person to believe that the alien may pose a danger to national security,” barred the Board from allowing the men to stay in the country. The Court reversed and remanded the case, as the congressional intent indicated that the proper requirement for the national security exception is “is a danger” and not the “may pose a danger” argued by the Attorney General.

Additional information. This case would be heard by the 3rd Circuit again in Yusopov v. Att’y Gen., Nos. 09-3074, 2011 WL 2410741 (3rd Cir. 2011).  8 U.S.C. §1231 (b)(3)(A) provides that “…the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”.  8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(B)(iv) says that withholding of removal detailed in (b)(3)(A) would not apply if “here are reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is a danger to the security of the United States.”

The plaintiff sued his former attorneys for malpractice, on the basis that they did not seek punitive damages in the plaintiff’s successful claim against Iran for being held hostage in Beirut in 1983. The plaintiff argued that by failing to name the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security as a defendant in that case, his attorneys prevented him from collecting substantial punitive damages under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. He also alleged that the attorneys charged him an excessive contingency fee. The Court dismissed the first claim, as the ability to collect punitive damages at the time was limited by President Clinton’s executive waiver of the punitive damages provision. The Court further ordered the parties to settlement discussions regarding the excessive fee complaint. The plaintiff later appealed this decision, but the case was ultimately dismissed.

Family members of an American citizen killed in a suicide bombing attack in Israel sued Iran and its Ministry of Intelligence and Security for her wrongful death, alleging that Iran financially supported Hamas, which took responsibility for the bombing at the time of the attack. Iran did not file an answer to the charges. Invoking the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act exception for state-sponsored terrorism (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), the Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding $9,879,023 to the victim’s husband for both economic and emotional loss of his wife. The Court awarded an additional $5,000,000 to each of the victim’s parents for emotional loss.

The sister of an American serviceman killed during the 1983 bombing in Beirut, allegedly by Hezbollah, sued Iran and its Ministry of Intelligence and Security, seeking compensatory damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages following her brother’s wrongful death. Invoking the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), she alleged that Iran should be liable for providing financial support to Hezbollah. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court entered judgment in the plaintiff’s favor, granting $2,500,000 in compensatory damages, while noting that punitive damages were not allowed against a foreign state.

The estate and family members of an American serviceman killed during the 1983 bombing in Beirut, allegedly by Hezbollah, brought suit against Iran and its Ministry of Intelligence and Security for his wrongful death. Invoking the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (a law that allows foreign nations to be immune from lawsuits from American citizens in most cases), they alleged that Iran should be held liable for providing financial support to Hezbollah. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court entered judgment in favor of the family, granting compensatory damages in the amount of $13,241,486 to the serviceman’s widow, parents, and children.

The widow of an American serviceman killed during the 1983 bombing in Beirut, allegedly by Hezbollah, brought suit against Iran and its Ministry of Intelligence and Security for compensatory damages for wrongful death, solatium (referring to “the mental anguish, bereavement, and grief that those with a close relationship to the decedent experience as a result of the decedent’s death”), intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages. She sued under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), alleging that Iran provided financial support to Hezbollah. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding her $18,297,000 in compensatory damages for economic and emotional loss. The Court noted, however, that it could not award punitive damages against a foreign state.

The survivor and the family of two men who were kidnapped and held for three weeks by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) sued the PKK under the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, as well as Syria, its Ministry of Defense, and several high-ranking Syrian officials under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (which allows individuals to sue nations that sponsor terrorism). Syria moved to have the case dismissed, citing a lack of jurisdiction, insufficient process, and failure to make a claim. The Court allowed the plaintiffs an opportunity to address the points brought up by the defendants in an amended complaint, denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. The defendant’s subsequent motion to dismiss was denied. In July 2009, a status report was filed by the defendant, and the case was still open as of August 2011.

Injured survivors of a suicide bombing attack in Israel, allegedly by Hamas, and the family members of the deceased, sued Iran, its Ministry of Information and Security, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard for compensatory damages for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of prospective income, and solatium (appropriate “when extreme and outrageous conduct has caused grief and anguish to plaintiffs closely related to a victim of terrorism”), as well as punitive damages. They brought suit under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), alleging that Iran should be liable for providing financial support to Hamas. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them  compensatory damages in the amount of $111,963,607.87 for physical damages and economic and emotional loss, as well as punitive damages in the amount of $300,000,000 against the Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

The children of an American citizen who was killed in a suicide bombing attack in Israel by Hamas sued Iran, its Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and several high-ranking Iranian officials. They brought suit under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), alleging that Iran should be liable for providing financial support to Hamas. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court awarded the victim’s estate $1,000,000 for the pain and suffering she experienced before death. The Court further awarded the four children compensatory damages in the amount of $3,000,000 each, for a total of $12,000,000. The Court also awarded punitive damages in the amount of $300 million against all defendants besides Iran jointly and severally.

The plaintiffs, the surviving family members and the estate of an American citizen who was assassinated, allegedly by Hezbollah, while serving as the president of the American University of Beirut, brought a wrongful death action against Iran. They sued under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (allowing sovereign states that financially sponsor terrorism to be sued), alleging that Iran should be liable for providing financial support to Hezbollah. Iran did not file an answer to the charge. The Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding compensatory damages in the amount of $31,525,296 to the family for economic loss as well as mental anguish.

The ACLU brought suit objecting to the use of taxpayer money to fund what it termed a religious charter school as a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The defendant academy and its sponsor, Islamic Relief, submitted a motion to dismiss, arguing that they were not a state actor. The Court found that the evidence regarding Islamic Relief’s role as a state actor was not clear, and thus denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision in 2011. As of August 2011, the case was still ongoing.

A Muslim employee of the U.S. Army, who was a Syrian of Turkish origin, sued his former employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of age and of religion and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that he was not offered a position after previously resigning because of his age, religion, and national origin. The defendant argued that he was not rehired because of poor work performance on past assignments. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that the defendant presented legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not rehiring plaintiff that the plaintiff did not rebut.

A Muslim female teacher sued her former employer, the Board of Education for the School District of Philadelphia, as well as the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination. The defendant school board argued that it suspended and ultimately fired the plaintiff under the Pennsylvania Garb Statue (Public Law No. 282) when she refused to remove her headscarf while teaching. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found in favor of the defendant Commonwealth, but against the School Board. The Third Circuit affirmed the decision against the Commonwealth but reversed the decision against the School Board, holding that, while the statute may present conflicts with the First Amendment, to bring a claim under Title VII, as the plaintiff did, requires proving that the accommodation would not be an undue burden for the employer. The Court further held that allowing teachers to wear religious garb would be an example of an undue burden, as it threatens the religious neutrality of the public school system. The Court upheld the conclusion of the District Court that “the Commonwealth was not [plaintiff’s] employer within the meaning of Title VII."

An Arab Muslim professor sued his former employer, Saint Francis College, under Title VII, §1981, §1983, §1985(3), §1986, and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act, alleging that the College denied him tenure because he was an Arab Muslim. At the trial level, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted the College’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded that decision, holding that discrimination against Arabs constitutes racial discrimination, and that the statute of limitations restrictions imposed by the lower court were incorrectly applied, as the acts in question occurred before the statute of limitations was passed into law.

An unmarried African-American Muslim worker sued the defendant, Del Monte Sales Company, under Title VII and §1981 for discrimination based on race, sex, marital status, and religion, as well as for libel, slander, and infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff argued that he was not hired for a job with the defendant due to his race and religion, alleging that his interviewer made derogatory and discriminatory remarks to this effect. The defendant argued that it did not hire the plaintiff because he was not outgoing or pleasant, which are necessary traits for a job as a salesman. The Court affirmed the decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska, which had granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss (noting a lack of evidence offered by the plaintiff).

An Indian Muslim professor sued his former employer, CUNY, under Title VII, §1981, and §1983, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, and religion. The plaintiff argued that he was denied tenure and additional compensation because of his race and religion. The Court dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence to establish that the reason he was denied tenure and additional compensation was discrimination.