SHARIAsource

Petitioner Muneer Awad sued defendant members of the Oklahoma Election Board seeking to prevent certification of election results of a proposed state constitutional amendment that would have prevented Oklahoma state courts from considering or using "Sharia Law." The Petitioner claimed this state constitutional amendment would have violated his federal constitutional First Amendment rights and sought a preliminary injunction. The Appellate Court determined that the Petitioner asserted the kind of direct injury-in-fact necessary to create First Amendment Establishment Clause standing. Specifically, the Appellate Court determined that because the amendment would have been certified a week after it was passed, the injury was imminent and not conjectural or hypothetical. The Appellate Court also found that the proposed amendment violated the Establishment Clause because it discriminated among religions, and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny. The Appellate Court ruled that the proposed amendment could not pass the strict scrutiny standard because the Oklahoma Election Board could not prove that the amendment was enacted to provide a compelling state interest, and therefore could not prove that the amendment was not “closely fitted” to that interest.

In Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017), the Supreme Court of India declared the practice of triple ṭalāq (instant divorce) a violation of Muslim women’s constitutional rights. This legislative act is the result of that judgment and criminalizes the practice of triple ṭalāq.

Ethiopian law allows personal and family law matters to be adjudicated in sharīʿa courts as long as all parties voluntarily submit to the courts’ jurisdiction. This Proclamation spells out three levels of sharīʿa courts: (1) the Federal First-Instance Court of Sharia, (2) the Federal High Court of Sharia (which hears appeals and cases above a certain monetary threshold), and (3) the Federal Supreme Court of Sharia. The courts apply Islamic law but follow civil rules of procedure. The Federal Courts of Sharia are the country’s only official courts that apply religious law.

A Toledan man named Ibn Ḥātim was accused of being a heretic by sixty witnesses on the initiative of a fellow Toledan called Ibn Labīd al-Murābiṭ. The judge consulted with the local jurists, and following their legal opinions, he sentenced the accused to death. However, he granted the accused the right to challenge the witnesses (iʿdhār). Ibn Ḥātim escaped from Toledo and found refuge in the neighboring kingdom of Badajoz. Ibn Labīd went after him, carrying a copy of the judge’s sentence (tasjīl) along with the legal opinions of a number of non-Toledan jurists. In Badajoz, the ruler withdrew his support from Ibn Ḥātim, who fled again, this time to Cordoba. While in Cordoba, the “moral” police arrested Ibn Ḥātim, and the judge imprisoned him, giving him two months to prove his innocence. Unable to do so, Ibn Ḥātim was crucified alive. A number of legal issues arise in the course of this case: should the process of iʽdhār—the right to challenge witnesses—be granted to those accused of heresy (zandaqa)? Should refuge be granted to them? What happens with the estate or inheritance of an executed zindīq? Can a judge reverse a sentence given by another judge? The source is a collection of court cases by Andalusi scholar Ibn Sahl (d. 486/1093), and it is based on information directly available to the compiler, who was also a witness of most of the events described.

Ibn Ḥārith al-Khushanī recorded the following case as a ḥikāya, an anonymous report: A Christian appeared before the judge Aslam b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, petitioning to be executed. The anecdote offers insight into the historical role of judges during a period of religious dissent in the Umayyad Caliphate, while the author's narrative voice demonstrates past judicial approaches to rationality, humor, and violent penalization. 

This text is part of Maribel Fierro, The Judges of al-Andalus, forthcoming.

Mohammad Fadel (Professor of Law, University of Toronto) and Connell Monette (Vice President of Academic Affairs, American Academy Casablanca) organized a PIL Forum Roundtable on the recent publication of al-Muwaṭṭaʾ – Recension of Yahya b. Yahya al-Laythī (d. 234/848) by Mālik b. Anas, distributed through Harvard University Press. This translation is based on the recently published Royal Moroccan Edition of the Muwaṭṭaʾ (Casablanca: Maṭbaʿat al-najāḥ al-jadīda, 2013/1434), and was commissioned by the Moroccan Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs. A team of Moroccan translators, under the supervision of Mohammad Fadel and Connell Monette, editors, working over the course of several years, prepared the translation.

Below are the essays contributed to the Roundtable on the ISLAMICLAWblog. Leading scholars which scholars comment on various aspects of the translation; some engage substantively with particular topics or themes in the Muwaṭṭaʾ, others comment on the translation and its style, and some combine elements of both.

Part of the Online Companion for Al-Muwaṭṭaʾ, the Royal Moroccan Edition: The Recension of Yaḥyā Ibn Yaḥyā al-Laythī.

Represents the regional surroundings in Islamic times of Mecca, the birthplace of the Prophet Muḥammad; and Medina, where the Prophet migrated and where Mālik was born, raised, and compiled and taught the Muwaṭṭa’.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the print edition al-Muwaṭṭaʾ, the Royal Moroccan Edition: The Recension of Yaḥyā Ibn Yaḥyā al-Laythī (Harvard Series in Islamic Law), edited and translated by Mohammad Fadel and Connell Monette (PIL/HUP, 2019).

Interactive map showing the geographical extent of the Ummayyad Caliphate, including significant urban centers from the Iberian Peninsula to the Arabian Peninsula. The map likewise indicates significant historical and religious sites in the Hejaz (modern-day Western Saudi Arabia, including Mecca and Medina), including battle sites like Badr and Khaybar as well as geographical demarcations of the Hajj such as Yalamlam and Dhãt al-'Irq.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the print edition al-Muwaṭṭaʾ, the Royal Moroccan Edition: The Recension of Yaḥyā Ibn Yaḥyā al-Laythī (Harvard Series in Islamic Law), edited and translated by Mohammad Fadel and Connell Monette (PIL/HUP, 2019).

SHARIAsource recommends viewing this map in Google Chrome; some features may not display properly when viewed in Safari.

Malik treats a host of issues that arise in connection with judicial rulings in this lengthy chapter of the Muwatta, beginning with the ethical duties of parties who participate in litigation, judges, witnesses, and litigants. The chapter deals with both general questions arising out of the law of evidence, and specific rules of evidence that apply in particular areas of the law.

Part of the Online Companion for al-Muwaṭṭaʾ, the Royal Moroccan Edition: The Recension of Yaḥyā Ibn Yaḥyā al-Laythī.

One of the longest chapters of the Muwatta', Malik includes in this chapter numerous reports about the earliest Muslim community concerning their performance of the Pilgrimage, one of the five pillars of Islam, and Malik's views on a number of rules that govern its performance.

Part of the Online Companion for al-Muwaṭṭaʾ, the Royal Moroccan Edition: The Recension of Yaḥyā Ibn Yaḥyā al-Laythī.

Plaintiff Syed Shamin brought this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against his former employer Siemens Industry, Inc. and his former supervisor Chandrashekar Dandekar (collectively, the Respondents). The Plaintiff alleged that after receiving derogatory comments about his accent at work and random “outbursts of yelling, profanity and insults” about his religion and ethnicity by his supervisor, the Plaintiff was discharged. The Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Illinois Department of Human Rights. After the EEOC mailed the Plaintiff a Dismissal and Notice of Rights to Sue letter, the Plaintiff commenced this action. The Respondents subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, stating that because the Plaintiff only initially checked the retaliation box on the EEOC claim, the Plaintiff’s discrimination and hostile environment claims are procedurally barred. The Court found that generally, a Title VII plaintiff cannot bring claims in a lawsuit that were not included in his EEOC charge. Therefore, the Court determined that it must not consider the Plaintiff’s discrimination and hostile environment claims, thereby partially granting the Respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

In a 3-2 decision, the Supreme Court of India declared triple ṭalāq unconstitutional and gave India’s parliament six months “to consider legislation” for handling triple ṭalāq. In its opinion, the Court cited global advances in Islamic family law (in India, called Muslim personal law) in “even theocratic Islamic states” as evidence of the need for reform.  The Court also noted that the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937, which protects the religious freedom of Muslims in India, does not constitutionally protect practices deemed “anti-Qur’anic.” Asserting that triple ṭalāq is such a practice, the Court held that it could not be protected under the Indian Constitution.

In December 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) considered the question whether Muslim citizens who lived in the Greek province of Thrace could be required to submit to the jurisdiction of Islamic law, as detailed by local experts called muftīs. In Greek law, Islamic law usually governed matters of family law—such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance—in cases involving the Muslims in Thrace. This arrangement was a legacy of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres and the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. When the ECHR considered whether this arrangement should persist, it considered a case in which a Muslim man had died, leaving everything to his wife in his will. His sisters contested the will, arguing that it improperly circumvented the authority of the muftīs. Greece’s highest court agreed with the sisters. With the will invalidated, the muftī distributed one-fourth of the estate to the widow, and the rest to the sisters, in accord with Islamic inheritance law. The widow appealed to the ECHR. This Court determined that the Greek government had misinterpreted the treaties, which did not require a separate legal framework for Muslims. It further noted that Greek case law was inconsistent about “whether the application of Sharia law [sic] is compatible with the principle of equal treatment and with international human rights standards.” In addition, the Court emphasized a right to "free self-identification”: people should be free to opt out of differential treatment from the government on the basis of belonging to a minority group, and the government should not force minorities into a special legal category in the name of protecting them. The Court held that Greece, by compelling the Muslim minority of Thrace to follow Islamic law, had violated Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.

In this passage, the Quran addresses the Islamic community as witnesses against mankind, declaring: “We have appointed you a middle nation, that ye may be witnesses against mankind, and that the messenger may be a witness against you.” Some suggest that this passage could be interpreted as having implications for legal procedure in Islamic courts. However, Ahmed El Shamsy maintains in "The Logic of Excluding Testimony in Early Islam" in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts that this passage does not have practical relevance to judicial procedure but rather relates to ethical witnessing in this world or the hereafter. 

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.  

Islamic finance creates financial products specifically aimed at Muslims that are sharīʿa compliant. Many scholars have condemned Islamic finance for condemning ribā (interest) on the one hand, particularly where usurious, but then many others have created workarounds that allow modern big-finance firms to avoid it in name only on the other hand. Those who argue against the workaround argue that nominal interest-avoidance goes against the spirit of the guidelines set forth in Islamic law (sharīʿa). Weighing in on the controversy, University of Toronto Law Professor Mohammad Fadel considers whether ribā might serve a function that goes beyond simple definitions of it as either interest or usury. Historically, the prohibition on interest was a means of regulating medieval financial industries, in ways that have little application to the modern financial instruments. The medieval prohibitions and the modern controversies about Islamic finance then, he argues, are misaligned and need rethinking. This post provides a "plain English" review of the article: Mohammad H. Fadel, Ribâ, Efficiency and Prudential Regulation: Preliminary Thoughts, 25 Wisconsin Journal of International Law 655 (2008).

In this excerpt, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044) cites a number of opinions regarding whether judges are permitted to rule according to their personal knowledge of a case. He focuses specifically on the question of how many additional witnesses are needed alongside a judge’s use of his own knowledge to render a valid verdict. In his chapter on circumstantial evidence in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Hossein Modarressi cites this source to illustrate some Shīʿī jurists’ endorsement of the validity of judicial knowledge.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

In this excerpt, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 908/1502–3), philosopher and chief judge of the southern Iranian province of Fars in the late fifteenth century CE, reports that the maẓālim courts were able to resolve many cases because of their ability to consider diverse forms of evidence. In contrast, he says that the traditional Islamic courts’ admission of only oral testimony could hamper Muslim judges’ ability to administer justice. In his chapter on circumstantial evidence in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Hossein Modarressi draws on Dawānī’s treatise and its illustration of how justice was obstructed in the traditional courts of his day through bureaucratic maneuvers orchestrated by the ʿudūl, or court clerks. The ʿudūl nitpicked at the specific wording of the petitions and various types of testimony, and they oversaw a lengthy process of determining the credibility of witnesses by bringing in further witnesses to testify for or against the main witnesses. Modarressi quotes Dawānī’s lament that as a consequence, “a small petition [lingered] around in the court for such a long time that the parties [got] fed up with the process. When the case is a criminal case, the purpose is completely lost” (115). Modarressi argues that these difficulties in traditional courts were exacerbated by the fact that Islamic legal procedure restricted judges to using testimony or oaths, and that these procedural rules were not open to modification.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

In this excerpt, Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201) relays cases in which a presiding judge revealed the falsity of the petitioner’s or defendant’s claim by employing shrewd investigative techniques to detect their guilt. For example, in one case the petitioner accused the defendant of failing to return money he had entrusted to him. The judge bade the petitioner to go to the mosque in Karkh where he claimed the money had been transferred and fetch a page of the Qurʾānic muṣḥaf kept there, so the defendant might swear his innocence on it. Once the petitioner was on his way, the judge asked the defendant whether he thought the petitioner had already reached the mosque. Although the defendant had claimed that he was not familiar with the site in question, he answered, “Not yet.” Having caught the defendant in a lie, the judge decided the defendant was deceitful and must return the money to the petitioner. In a second case, the judge of Hamadān discerned the dishonesty of a man who was called to give testimony by noting a difference in his stride. The man usually walked with a measured stride, taking a certain number of steps through the courtyard when he was called as a witness, but this time the judge noticed that the crossing took him several additional steps, “indicating that he walked slower to feign dignity.” The judge thus drew on his individual knowledge of the witness’s behavior to reject the latter’s credibility on the basis of subtle evidence. In his chapter on circumstantial evidence in Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, Hossein Modarressi cites these cases to illustrate how the judge might employ various forms of evidence, including his own knowledge, in order to resolve a case and achieve justice. However, he notes that both instances occurred before the stage of the case at which procedural due process begins, and thus they do not prove that the judge can employ personal knowledge later.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts, ed. Intisar A. Rabb and Abigail Krasner Balbale (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of primary sources and other material used in and related to the book.

Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Hajj and Umrah made the decision, dated 22 June 2020, to impose strict limitations on this year’s Hajj (1441H/2020AD) in light of the continued risks of the COVID-19 pandemic. Rather than cancelling the event altogether, these limitations will only allow Saudi pilgrims and those from other countries already inside the Kingdom to partake in this year’s Hajj.

In the book Ijhāḍ: Aḥkāmuh wa-ḥudūduh fī al-sharīʿa al-Islāmiya waʾl-qānūn al-waḍʿī [Abortion: Related Islamic Rulings and Limitations in Islamic Law and in Modern Law] Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Nujaymī discusses the regulations and prohibitions surrounding abortion in Islamic law.