SHARIAsource

Plaintiff Horace Crump, an inmate in the Michigan Department of Corrections, brought this compliant against the Respondent, Deputy Warden Winn at the Saginaw Correctional Facility, for changing the Muslim prayer time. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleged that the Respondent changed the Muslim prayer time in such a way as to place a substantial burden on the Plaintiff’s free exercise of his religion, and that this was done in retaliation for having complained about his and other Muslim inmates’ complaints during Ramadan. The Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, and the case was referred for a report and recommendation by a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge determined that the Plaintiff did not suffer a substantial burden, because while the Respondent did not offer a specific penological justification for changing the prayer time, the prison immediately reinstated the religiously required Friday prayer time, such that the Plaintiff did not in fact suffer a “substantial burden” on the practice of his religion. The magistrate judge then found that the fact that the Plaintiff did not suffer a substantial burden on the practice of his religion also showed that he did not suffer adverse action, a necessary element of his retaliation claim. For these reasons, the magistrate judge recommended that the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment be granted, and that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff Abdus Shahid brought this claim against the Respondent, the Borough of Eddystone, for discrimination against him on the basis of race, national origin and religion after the Respondent deliberately engaged in a four-year-long campaign to prevent him from living in or renting out a property he owned in Eddystone because it did not want a Muslim in the area. Following the complaint, the Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, which the District Court previously granted in part and denied in part, holding that while the Plaintiff was barred by the Heck v. Humphrey and Rooker-Feldman doctrines from challenging the validity of his convictions for violating Eddystone ordinances, there were also genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment on the remaining claim that Eddystone denied him a certificate of occupancy and preventing him from renting the property because of his race, religion and national origin. Following a jury trial, the Court analyzed testimony evidence about alleged statements by Eddystone officials acknowledging the existence of a discriminatory housing policy and evidence that similarly situated white property owners were treated more favorably. However, the Court determined that the Plaintiff failed his burden of proof with regards to his claim that the Respondent violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, because he produced no concrete credible evidence showing that he was treated differently than white property owners, and that the Respondent’s actions were anything other than genuine attempts to enforce the Eddystone housing code. The Court concluded that the Plaintiff failed to establish that the Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of race, religion or national origin. Therefore, the Court entered judgment in favor of the Respondent.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Bulgaria (Republika Bulgaria), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Bulgaria’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Chile (República de Chile), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Chile’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of Canada, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Canada’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the United Mexican States (Estados Unidos Mexicanos), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Mexico’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the United States of America, based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under the United States Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Guatemala (República de Guatemala), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Guatemala's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Honduras (República de Honduras), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Honduras' Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Dominican Republic (República Dominicana), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under the Dominican Republic’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Haiti (République d'Haiti), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Haiti's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Nicaragua (República de Nicaragua), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Nicaragua’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of El Salvador (República de El Salvador), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under El Salvador’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Costa Rica (República de Costa Rica), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Costa Rica’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Panama (República de Panamá), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Panama’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Republic of Cuba (República de Cuba), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Cuba’s Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has no legal status.

This brief, submitted by fifteen religious and civil rights organizations, addresses the notion that numerous conflicts often arise between job duties and religious convictions in areas of ritual law, including Sabbaths and other holy days, dietary restrictions, and dress for many Jews, Muslims, Christians and members of other faiths. These organizations point out that the headscarf (ḥijāb) is a particularly visible manifestation of a religious practice (more so than taking off holy days), and under the laws of the United States, it is entitled to no less a standard of reasonable accommodations, particularly in an era where online applications set the qualifications and in-person interviews may offer cause for discrimination if not for application of Title VII broadly. They further argue that “the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning gives the employer a perverse incentive to deny to religiously observant applicants any opportunity to discuss religion-based limitations on their appearance or scheduling. Under that reasoning, the employer’s ignorance automatically defeats a prima facie case, and thus effectively eliminates Title VII’s accommodation protections for those applicants. Under the Tenth Circuit’s position, then, observers of Sabbaths and other holy days will find themselves effectively excluded from a large and growing sector of the workforce that is hired through online applications (p. 10).” For reviews and commentary on the U.S. law implications of this case, see the SCOTUSblog Case Page.

Ibn Ḥārith al-Khushanī recorded the following case as a ḥikāya, an anonymous report: A Christian appeared before the judge Aslam b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, petitioning to be executed. But he was rebuked because he had committed no crime. The text explains that the Christian’s behaviour was motivated by his desire to die in imitation of Jesus, as an act of virtue (faḍīla), although—as our source points out—Jesus himself did not seek martyrdom. In response to the judge’s admonishment, the Christian explained that he would not in truth die. While his shibh, or likeness (i.e., a body that resembled his body), might perish, his real self would ascend to the heavens upon execution. The judge aimed to disprove this theory by ordering the Christian flogged. Thus, the judge illustrated that the Christian could indeed suffer pain and likewise would suffer death if a sword were to cut his neck.

Translation

Ibn Ḥārith said: I heard someone recounting that a Christian went [to the judge] asking to be put to death. Aslam reprimanded him asking him: “Woe unto you! Who provoked you to ask for your own death if you have committed no crime?” The stupidity and ignorance of the Christian led him to take upon himself a virtuous act (faḍīla) when nothing of the kind was attributed to Jesus, son of Mary – God bless Muḥammad and Jesus. The Christian told the judge: “You assume that if you execute me I would be the one killed.” The judge asked him: “Who else could be the one killed?” The Christian answered: “A likeness of me (shibhī) that was cast on a body is what you will execute, while my real self in that same hour will directly go to heaven.” Aslam then told him: “We lack sufficient information to have an opinion on the [outcome] that you argue for,[1]but you lack what it takes to make you realize that you are deceiving yourself. There is however a way to reveal what is right to us and to you.” The Christian asked the judge: “What could that be?” The judge Aslam summoned his court assistants (aʿwān) and told them: “Take the whip,” then ordered them to strip the Christian which they did, and then ordered them to beat him. When the Christian felt the flogging he became agitated and screamed. Aslam asked him: “On which back is the flogging taking place?” “On mine!” said the Christian. Aslam told him: “In the same way the sword will cut your neck, don’t be deluded into believing otherwise.”

A child born out of wedlock is typically not entitled to paternity recognition in Morocco. In an unprecedented move, the First Instance Family Court in Tangiers recognized the familial relationship connecting a father to his biological daughter. The Court also required the man to pay 100,000 MAD (10,500 USD) to the child through her mother for the material and moral harms caused to the child from denial of paternity or familial relations. The defendant appealed the judgment. On October 9, 2017, the Tangiers Court of Appeals overturned the First Instance Court decision, rejecting the DNA tests and any recognition of familial relation. The Court also invalidated the lower court’s use of international conventions, explaining that the child is so foreign to her father that the possibility of their future marriage would not be overruled.

The wife argued that the couple had a marriage ceremony in Damascus, and, should that Islamic ceremony not be legally recognized, that a valid marriage should be presumed because of the couple’s long cohabitation and public reputation as husband and wife. The husband argued that the couple was not present in Damascus at the time of the alleged marriage, and that they instead had an Islamic marriage ceremony at a flat in London. Accordingly, while the ceremony was religiously recognized as a marriage, it was not valid under English law. In its judgment, the Court ruled that where, as here, the only known or proven ceremony was one which might not have constituted a marriage under English law, then a marriage could not be presumed.