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This regional regulation makes provision for Muslim dress requirements in the regency of Agam, West Sumatra. It states that all members of Muslim society must (wajib) wear Muslim dress while conducting themselves on a daily basis. Non-Muslim members of society are, similarly, expected to wear appropriate and polite clothing. Article 4 sets out specific dress requirements for Muslim men and women. It states that women are to wear long, loose-fitting clothing that covers their hips and chest, reaches their ankles, with a veil (kerudung) that covers their hair and chest. Meanwhile, men are to wear loose-fitting trousers that reach their ankles or below their knees, but they may wear either a short- or long-sleeved shirt.

This fatwa declares that homosexual intercourse is forbidden (haram) and constitutes a crime (jarimah). It recalls that Allah SWT created human beings and living creatures to procreate and to regulate their sexual inclination based thereon. The fatwa defines 'homosex' (homoseks) as sexual activity between persons of the same sex, 'lesbianism' (lesbi) as sexual activity between two women, and 'gay' as sexual activity between two men. It declares that homosexuality is an abnormality that must be cured and a deviation that must be corrected. The fatwa recommends that the Indonesian People's Representative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) and government together enact legislation to proscribe the existence of a homosexual community and prescribe heavy penalties for homosexual intercourse.

Muslim inmate John McGlothlin brought a case under §1983, alleging that the prison chaplain and other prison officials violated his right to free exercise under the First Amendment. The plaintiff claimed that Muslim inmates were treated differently from fellow inmates of other religious beliefs, exemplified by comparing the announcements on the bulletin board for Muslims with one run by the Christian Fellowship. A report by the U.S. Magistrate recommended that this case should be dismissed, and the District Court agreed. Specifically, the Court found that the plaintiff’s claims against the prison’s non-denominational chaplain should be dismissed as the chaplain was not a state actor; it further dismissed the claims against the other officials because the plaintiff’s claims failed to demonstrate a disparity of treatment based on religion.

Muslim inmate Imam Abd’Allah Halim Abdul Akbar (aka Phillip M. Hudson) sued several prison officials under §1983, alleging a violation of his First Amendment free exercise rights. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the prison denied his attempts to start a Muslim inmate group. The prison officials argued that the denial resulted from the plaintiff’s failure to follow the proper procedures for creating such a group. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the prison did not deprive the plaintiff of his ability to practice his religion and that the regulations governing creation of inmate groups were consistent with legitimate penological objectives of preventing gang activity and maintaining order in the prison population. 

Faris Matiyn, an inmate at the Attica prison, mounted a § 1983 claim against the commissioner of the New York State Department of Corrections and prison superintendent Walter Kelly. The plaintiff alleged that the prison violated his First Amendment free exercise right by not allowing Sunnī and Shīʿī Muslims—the two major Muslim denominations—to have separate worship services. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff did not speak for the majority of the Sunnī Muslim community and that keeping the two groups together satisfied legitimate penological objectives, such as maintaining a safe prison environment. 

A Somali Muslim bus driver for American University sued his former employer and supervisor under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin as well as retaliation for asking for reasonable religious accommodation. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was frequently denied the chance to attend Muslim Friday prayer services and that his supervisors made several derogatory comments regarding Muslims. He further argued that he was ultimately terminated because of his religion and in retaliation for filing a complaint regarding a lack of reasonable religious accommodation (in the form of a schedule that accommodated his weekly prayer services). The Court found that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case and that there was enough evidence for a jury to conclude that the University’s reason for firing the plaintiff was a pretext for actual discrimination. However, the Court dismissed the retaliation claim, as the plaintiff did not present any evidence to support it.

Mr. Zafar Hasan, a Muslim of Indian heritage, sued his former employer, Foley & Lardner LLP, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion, race, national origin and color. The plaintiff claimed that his work assignments were cut and he was ultimately terminated because he was Muslim. For support, he points to the cut in his assignments that occurred immediately after 9/11, a comment made by one partner that “those people [Muslims] don’t belong here…they should kick them all out,” a warning by another partner to be careful about displaying articles the plaintiff had written on his view that Islam is a peaceful religion, and the fact that the other two Muslims in his department were either transferred or terminated in the same time period. The defendant company responds that it cut Mr. Hasan’s work and then terminated him due to poor work performance. The Circuit Court reversed and remanded the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois’s grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had presented enough direct evidence of religious discrimination to allow the case to move forward.

The EEOC represented a group of Muslims suing their former employer, Norwegian Cruise Lines, under Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination. The plaintiffs claimed that these discriminatory motives caused the company to target them for increased scrutiny, to create a hostile work environment by allowing their co-workers to verbally harass them (in part, by referring to them as terrorists), and finally, to terminate them. The plaintiffs further entered a complaint for negligent infliction of emotional distress on these bases. The defendants argued that they terminated the plaintiffs for inconsistent answers given to background questions and because they were “positive matches in the FBI database.” The Court dismissed the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, but concluded that the discrimination case could go forward as plaintiffs had established a prima facie discrimination case such that a jury could find that the company’s reasons given for terminating the plaintiffs were pretexts for a discriminatory reason.

A Pakistani Muslim bank employee suffering from irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) sued his former employer, Bank of America, under Title VII alleging discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin; under the American Disabilities Act (ADA) for discrimination on the basis of disability; and under Title VII and the ADA for retaliatory firing following his filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  Specifically, the plaintiff argued that his religious beliefs required him to take several prayer breaks throughout the workday, and that this practice ultimately led to his firing. The defendant responded that the employee was fired because of poor work performance. The Court found that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, and that, even if he did, the defendant had provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating his employment that the plaintiff did not dispute. The Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant company and dismissed the retaliation claim, concluding that the plaintiff had established no connection between the EEOC filing and his termination. 

A Pakistani Muslim hospital employee sued his employer under Title VII, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law (after receiving a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC)), alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin and a hostile work environment. The plaintiff argued that he received negative performance evaluations because he was absent from work on several Fridays and other days in observance of Islamic religious prayer services and holidays, in compliance with Islamic ritual law. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie discrimination claim, as he never articulated any adverse employment action suffered. The Court, however, allowed Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim to move forward as it raised a material question of fact that should be decided by a jury. 

The EEOC represented an African-American Muslim suing his former employer under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination and a hostile work environment. The plaintiff claimed he had been the recipient of many offensive comments (such as being called a “towel head” and “Taliban”) and degrading actions (such as his co-workers hiding his time card while he was at prayer services). The Court reversed and remanded a decision by the District Court for the District of Maryland to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. This Court held that a jury could find that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment and that his employer had notice of the ongoing conduct; it thus denied the defendant company’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the case to proceed.

The plaintiff, a Muslim occupational health physician, sued his former employer, the Department of Veteran Affairs and its Secretary, Jim Nicholson, under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination and retaliation for filing a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). He filed the claim after he heard his supervisor refer to Muslims as a threat and after his supervisor’s wife made comments about how she and her husband do not like Muslims and the way they live—presumably referring to his observance of prayers, fasting, and other aspects of Islamic ritual law. The plaintiff discovered that his position was being eliminated sometime after these comments were made, but continued to consult with his former employer about infectious diseases. Three months following his position’s elimination, the plaintiff saw a job advertisement for the same position at his former place of employment and filed a claim with the EEOC for discrimination. Immediately after his supervisor found out about his claim, the plaintiff contends that he was no longer allowed on the property and that other employees were barred from contacting him for consultations. The Court concluded that the timing was questionable enough that a jury could find that the events described were examples of retaliation. The Court reversed and remanded the decision of the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi to grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, allowing the case to go forward. The parties ultimately settled the case, and the case was closed in December of 2008.

An Arab-American police officer in New York City sued his employer under §1981 (providing “a cause of action for race-based employment discrimination based on a hostile work environment”), New York Executive Law Section 290, and New York Administrative Code Section 9-101 (both state laws imposing “liability on aiders and abettors of unlawful discriminatory practices”), as well as laws prohibiting the creation of a hostile work environment. The plaintiff worked for the NYPD’s Intelligence Division and claimed that the Department made him read anti-Muslim and anti-Arab rhetoric in the form of briefings from an anti-terrorism consultant. According to the plaintiff, these briefings entailed the consultant instructing the reader to not trust Muslims in law enforcement and making comments like “a good Muslim…can’t be a good American.” The Court held that a jury could find that the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to allow a hostile work environment claim to proceed. It thus denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the case to go forward. The case was ultimately closed in 2010 after an order of dismissal without ever going to trial. The plaintiff did not lodge an explicit claim on the basis of Islamic law, but his allegations about religion may have included ritual practice or dress related to Islamic law.

The Muslim plaintiff sued her former employer, Supervalu Holdings, under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination. Specifically, she argued that the company overlooked her for a position with more responsibility because of her religion. The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, as she neither proved that non-Muslims were treated better, nor did she allege that she suffered an adverse employment action (as the higher-level position did not offer additional compensation or benefits). Thus, this Court affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Representing a Muslim former employee of the defendant, the EEOC sued the company, operating as a car dealership, under Title VII, alleging that it subjected the employee to a hostile work environment because of his religion and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged he suffered numerous instances of harassment because of his religion after 9/11, including being called Taliban by his supervisor and receiving a warning saying he was acting like a Muslim. The Court held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find the conduct severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment claim, and thus reversed the District Court’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The case settled in October 2007.

A female Muslim employee sued her former employer under Title VII and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA) for discrimination based on religion. The plaintiff claimed that she was suspended and then terminated from her job for failing to remove her religiously mandated head-covering (ḥijāb). The Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff’s claim was untimely, having passed the statute of limitations for both Title VII and the DCHRA.

Holding: To prevail in a disparate-treatment claim, an applicant need show only that his need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision, not that the employer had knowledge of his need. 

Judgment: Reversed and remanded, 8-1, in an opinion by Justice Scalia on June 1, 2015. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgement. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Facts: Respondent (Abercrombie) refused to hire Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim, because the headscarf that she wore pursuant to her religious obligations conflicted with Abercrombie’s employee dress policy. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit on Elauf’s behalf, alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which, inter alia, prohibits a prospective employer from refusing to hire an applicant because of the applicant’s religious practice when the practice could be accommodated without undue hardship.

Procedural Posture: The EEOC prevailed in the District Court, but the Tenth Circuit reversed, awarding Abercrombie summary judgment on the ground that failure-to-accommodate liability attaches only when the applicant provides the employer with actual knowledge of his need for an accommodation.

Sources: Opinion Syllabus; SCOTUSblog Case Page (with further reviews and commentary on the U.S. law implications of this case).

The Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, represented a number of Somali Muslims working at a JBS-owned beef plant in Grand Island, Nebraska. The Plaintiff filed a Title VII discrimination claim against the Respondent-employer, alleging that the Respondent failed to provide Muslim employees with time to pray during sunset and also denied them prayer breaks during Ramadan. The District Court ultimately agreed with the Respondent-employer, deciding that the Muslim workers did not face undue discrimination because the accommodation of their prayer breaks would cause "undue hardship" to the employer because it would lead to unsafe meat curating practices and other dangers to the non-Muslim employees at the plant.

The Plaintiffs, three Muslim individuals (Hamid Raza, Mohammad Elshinawy, Asad Dandia), two mosques (Masjid Al-Ansar, Masjid at-Taqwa), and a non-profit Muslim organization (Muslims Giving Back), alleged that the NYPD violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights through unlawful, "suspicionless" surveillance and sought an injunction to prevent further surveillance. The Plaintiffs sought to prove discriminatory intent in one or two of the ways identified in Brown: (1) an express classification theory—by showing that "the NYPD expressly classified Muslims by adopting a policy of singling them out for heightened policy scrutiny"; or (2) a discriminatory application theory—"to the extent that Respondents claim they had a legitimate law enforcement interest in  Plaintiffs, . . . by showing that [Plaintiffs] were subject to NYPD investigations of unequal and unwarranted scope, duration, and invasiveness as a result of their religious beliefs and activities." Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 1999). The Respondent, the City of New York, filed for bifurcated discovery, and the Plaintiffs responded with a move for a preliminary injunction and for expedited discovery. The Respondent argued that the Plaintiffs failed to meet the necessary standard for justifying expedited discovery. The District Court granted the expedited motion in part, but set up a two-stage schedule for discovery.

The Plaintiffs, two Muslim prisoners, challenged prison policies that 1) failed to provide adequately nutritional ḥalāl meals, and 2) denied them the ritual end-of-Ramadan feast. The District Court found that the ḥalāl meals provided did not substantially burden the Plaintiffs' religious practice. The District Court also decided that although the denial of the ritual feast marking the end of Ramadan substantially burdened the Plaintiffs' beliefs, the prison demonstrated that this policy was the least restrictive means of achieving the government's interest in security.