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On January 17, 2023, the National Assembly of Pakistan passed a bill expanding the country’s laws on blasphemy. Previously, Pakistan’s blasphemy laws subjected those who insulted the Prophet Muhammad to the death penalty. The amended blasphemy laws carry a minimum ten-year prison sentence for those deemed to have insulted any of the Prophet’s Companions or Family members, and it renders blasphemy a non-bailable offense.

This section of al-Jarīda al-Rasmiyya officially promulgates the first two books of the Moroccan Personal Status Code, the Mudawwana. The first book presents the stipulations concerning marriage, including issues such as the contract, dowry, and inhibitors (like number of wives). The second book deals with the dissolution of marriage, thus addressing conditions of repudiation, women’s repudiation, and the ʿidda (the woman’s waiting period until she may remarry).

This statute makes amendments to Law No. 7 of 1989 on the Religious Judiciary.

On August 3, 2022, the Sharia Court of Appeal of Kwara State in Nigeria at Ilorin decided in Mohammed v. Mohammed that a deceased man’s second and third wives were not entitled to inheritance under Islamic estate laws because he married his first wife under the secular Marriage Act. The man’s second and third wives were suing upon his death for inheritance claims under sharīʿa, but the Court held that, for those marriages to have been valid under sharīʿa, the man would have had to divorce his first wife, whom he had married under the Marriage Act and not according to norms of Islamic law. By contrast, because the deceased had married his first wife under the Marriage Act, the Court held that the law governing the distribution of his estate was the law of Kwara State, not Islamic law, or sharīʿa.

This statute defines and regulates the institution of marriage in Indonesia.

The elucidation (Penjelasan) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage.

This statute defines a 'child' as a person under the age of 18 years, and 'child protection' as all activities that guarantee and protect children and their right to live, grow, develop and participate to their optimum, having regard to their dignity as human beings, affording them protection from violence and discrimination.

The statute regulates the responsibilities and obligations of the state, government, and parents vis-a-vis children, as well as other child-related issues such as guardianship, foster-care, society's role, as well as that of the Indonesian Child Protection Commission (Komisi Perlindungan Anak Indonesia).

This statute makes amendments to the pre-existing Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration.

This statute makes amendments to Law No. 23 of 2002 on Child Protection, and is designed to further improve protections afforded to children.

This statute regulates social security, providing that every member of the Indonesian workforce is entitled to social security. Workers or their families are entitled to access their social security in the event of a workplace accident, fatality, retirement/pension, and for other medical/health reasons.

This statute regulates, among other health-related topics, family health, nutritional improvement, food and beverage safety, environmental health, workplace health, mental health, disease eradication, recovery from illness, and traditional medicine. It was subsequently replaced by Law No. 36 of 2009.

In divorce proceedings, a wife appealed the decision of the Oakland Circuit Court Family Division, granting her husband’s motion to dismiss her claims and recognize their previous divorce, which occurred when the couple was in India. Specifically, she contested the validity of the “triple ṭalāq” divorce (a version of final, irrevocable divorce under Indian and Islamic law, performed unilaterally by the husband) that her husband performed in India, and filed for divorce in Michigan. The trial court concluded that the certificate of divorce that the defendant husband produced from their earlier divorce was sufficient evidence to dismiss the case under Michigan Compiled Laws 2.116(C)(7) (which bars claims based on prior judgment). The Court of Appeals reversed and found in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that the Indian divorce violated due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution art. 1, § 2, as it gave the wife no chance to plead her case concerning the divorce before a court. The Court also concluded that allowing the divorce to stand would be contrary to state public policy, as it privileged the Muslim personal law of India (which placed women in a weaker position regarding property division in the event of a divorce than would Michigan state law) over Michigan state law and the rights and protections extended to persons living in the state.

This paper addresses and critiques the case for state-level legislative bans on courts citing “Islamic law” or the law of Muslim-majority countries. In particular, the paper reviews the most substantive evidence adduced by the bans’ supporters, in the form of a set of state court cases published by the Center for Security Policy (CSP). Very few of these cases, in fact, show courts actually applying Islamic or foreign law, and in none of these cases would the various forms of proposed legislation have been likely to alter the result. Thus even this report does not suggest a need for the state laws purporting to ban sharīʿa. The paper thus argues that even if these bans are not unconstitutionally discriminatory in their effect, they are ineffective at achieving their claimed purpose.

This is the elucidation to Law No. 23 of 2002 on Child Protection. It provides clarity on certain sections contained in the statute.

This statute defines domestic violence as physicial, psychological or sexual violence, or domestic neglect. It outlines the rights of victims, including rights to protective and rehabilitative services, and sets out the possible punitive measures perpetrators may face.

This government regulation is concerned with the implementation of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage. In terms of divorce, art 19 of this Regulation provides the courts with six different reasons to grant an application for divorce, as required by art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974.

The cassation applicant and cassation respondent had been married for 14 years and had four children. The parties, however, had begun to quarrel because, as the cassation respondent had submitted, the cassation applicant was disrespectful to the cassation respondent as the husband and head of the household. The cassation applicant was stubborn and difficult to deal with, and not afraid of rebutting or opposing the cassation respondent's words and wishes.

The cassation applicant submitted that the cassation respondent had failed to meet certain legislative requirements associated with filing for divorce, namely, that as a public servant, the cassation respondent had not yet first obtained the permission of his work superior before filing for divorce.

The Supreme Court held that the Samarinda High Religious Court's decision could not be overturned because it had not applied the law incorrectly, nor had there been a contravention of applicable law, or a failure to meet any other legislative requirements that would render a decision null and void.

The parties were married on 8 October 2000 and had two children. Before the Pontianak Religious Court (lower court), the cassation respondent had submitted that, since 2008, her marriage to the cassation applicant had become strained because the cassation applicant would often belittle the cassation respondent's parents, leaving the cassation respondent feeling offended. There were also issues pertaining to the ways in which the parties' families managed a relevant business, as well as allegations from the cassation respondent that the cassation applicant had been physically violent towards her, which necessitated a police report. The lower court had, accordingly, granted the cassation respondent an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in shughra), pursuant to art 39 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, on the grounds of ongoing conflict.

The cassation applicant appealed to the Supreme Court at cassation level on the grounds that the Pontianak High Religious Court, which had affirmed the decision of the lower court, had failed to summons him in an appropriate manner. The Supreme Court found that the cassation applicant had failed to establish this and, therefore, pursuant to art 30 of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court, as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004 and Law No. 3 of 2009, dismissed the appeal.