SHARIAsource

This regional regulation makes provision for Qur'anic education in South Sulawesi (Sulawesi Selatan), in terms of its administration (art 5), staffing (art 8), infrastructure and facilities (art 10), evaluation and certification (arts 11 and 12), funding (art 13), and monitoring (art 14). It states that the aim of Qur'anic education is to develop students into God-mindful, pious Muslims, who understand, comprehend, and put the contents of the Qur'an into practice (art 3).

This gubernatorial regulation prohibits adherents, members and/or coordinating members of the Ahmadiyya community (Jemaat Ahmadiyah) from conducting activities in any form that relate to the dissemination of their own interpretation of Islam, as well as activities that deviate from the tenets of Islam (art 3(1)). The regulation also prohibits members of society from carrying out anarchic or illegal conduct in connection with the activities of adherents, members and/or coordinating members of the Ahmadiyya community that deviate from the tenets of Islam (art 4(1)).

The plaintiff (KH. Moch. Yusman Roy) was the caretaker of Jamaah Pengajian Lelaku at Pondok Iktikaf, an i'tikaf (seclusion in a mosque) study group venue in Malang, East Java, where Qur'anic study and recitation activities were held, and the production of prayer carpets (sajadah), pillows, and bolsters was conducted. The defendant, the Regent (Bupati) of Malang, had issued a decree declaring the cessation of the activities of Jamaah Pengajian Lelaku at Pondok Iktikaf. The plaintiff submitted that he had received the decree, dated 7 May 2005, through a family member. On 6 May 2005 at 8.00pm, however, the plaintiff submitted that he had been arrested and interrogated by the Malang Regional Police. Therefore, the legal process had been implemented prematurely and without authority. Moreover, that in issuing the decree, the defendant had acted unilaterally, without considering all the relevant concerns. Therefore, pursuant to art 53(1) and (2)(a) and (b) of Law No. 9 of 2004 on Amendments to Law No. 5 of 1989 on the State Administration of the Judiciary, as the plaintiff had suffered loss as the result of a state administrative decree, he was entitled to submit a written application to the authorised court seeking that the decree be declared null and void, and seeking damages as an additional remedy. The plaintiff also requested that the court suspend the implementation of the defendant's decree, pursuant to art 67(2) of Law No. 5 of 1986, and that the investigation of the case be conducted as quickly as possible, pursuant to art 98 of Law No. 5 of 1986.

In its exceptions, the defendant submitted that the plaintiff's submissions were incorrect and inaccurate because the plaintiff had already submitted a request for protection, dated 6 May 2005, to the Malang Regional Police, expressing concern and fear for the consequences of his having taught sholat and do'a (prayers) in both Arabic and Indonesian. The plaintiff's conduct had allegedly generated a negative reaction from the community towards the plaintiff. It was in accordance with the plaintiff's request that the Malang Police conducted its investigation and arrest on 7 May 2005. The legal consequences that followed had, therefore, resulted from the plaintiff's request, rather than the issuance of the regental decree. The regental decree had been issued in consideration of Presidential Determination No. 1 of 1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and/or Defamation of Religion, meaning that both an administrative action and criminal conduct had occurred, for the purposes of art 10 of Law No. 32 of 2004 on Regional Administration. Moreover, purusant to art 27(1)(c) of Law No. 32 of 2014, the regental decree had been issued in accordance with the obligations of a regional head to maintain peace and order. More specifically, it was issued in anticipation of anarchic reactions from other parties who did not share the religious opinions of the plaintiff that it was acceptable to conduct sholat in Indonesian, as well as the original Arabic.

The defendant also submitted that the state administrative court was precluded from adjudicating the case pursuant to art 49 of Law No. 5 of 1986, because it had issued the regental decree during a time when the public interest dictated it do so. In addition to adhering to Presidential Determination No. 1 of 1965, the regental decree also accorded with art 156(a) of the Criminal Code because it acknowledged that the plaintiff's conduct was defamatory towards a religion.

The court dismissed the defendant's exceptions in their entirety. It reiterated the constitutioanlly-guaranteed freedom to practise one's religion and beliefs in accordance with their own conscience, as found in art 28E(1) and (2) of the 1945 Constitution, as well as Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights. The court noted that these guarantees derive from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, which identifies basic human rights and freedoms which are naturally connected to, and inseparable from, humans from the moment they are born. The court also noted, however, that as the defendant had deemed the activities of Pondok Iktikaf Jamaah Njagi Lelaku to have the potential to disturb the peace and order of the community, it was of the opinion that the cessation of these activities constituted a preventative measure to protect the human rights of others, and that maintaining the peace was in the public interest, per art 73 of Law No. 39 of 1999, which states that rights and freedoms can only be limited by, and pursuant to, statute. Accordingly, the court dismissed the plaintiff's request that the regental decree issued by the defendant be revoked on the grounds that it was not contrary to any statute. Moreover, it dismissed the plaintiff's request that the defendant reinstate the good name of the plaintiff on the same grounds.

This fatwa declares that homosexual intercourse is forbidden (haram) and constitutes a crime (jarimah). It recalls that Allah SWT created human beings and living creatures to procreate and to regulate their sexual inclination based thereon. The fatwa defines 'homosex' (homoseks) as sexual activity between persons of the same sex, 'lesbianism' (lesbi) as sexual activity between two women, and 'gay' as sexual activity between two men. It declares that homosexuality is an abnormality that must be cured and a deviation that must be corrected. The fatwa recommends that the Indonesian People's Representative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) and government together enact legislation to proscribe the existence of a homosexual community and prescribe heavy penalties for homosexual intercourse.

This ministerial regulation is intended to assist in the implementation of Government Regulation No. 55 of 2007 on Religious Education. It regulates certain facets of religious education in Indonesia, including the requirement on all schools to provide religious education for their students, the mandated curriculum, the study process, required levels of competency, teaching staff, and supervision.

Decided by the Supreme Court of India, Vishwa Lochan Madan v. Union of India decreed that fatwās issued by sharīʿa courts hold no legal leverage. 

Muslim inmate John McGlothlin brought a case under §1983, alleging that the prison chaplain and other prison officials violated his right to free exercise under the First Amendment. The plaintiff claimed that Muslim inmates were treated differently from fellow inmates of other religious beliefs, exemplified by comparing the announcements on the bulletin board for Muslims with one run by the Christian Fellowship. A report by the U.S. Magistrate recommended that this case should be dismissed, and the District Court agreed. Specifically, the Court found that the plaintiff’s claims against the prison’s non-denominational chaplain should be dismissed as the chaplain was not a state actor; it further dismissed the claims against the other officials because the plaintiff’s claims failed to demonstrate a disparity of treatment based on religion.

Faris Matiyn, an inmate at the Attica prison, mounted a § 1983 claim against the commissioner of the New York State Department of Corrections and prison superintendent Walter Kelly. The plaintiff alleged that the prison violated his First Amendment free exercise right by not allowing Sunnī and Shīʿī Muslims—the two major Muslim denominations—to have separate worship services. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the plaintiff did not speak for the majority of the Sunnī Muslim community and that keeping the two groups together satisfied legitimate penological objectives, such as maintaining a safe prison environment. 

A Somali Muslim bus driver for American University sued his former employer and supervisor under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin as well as retaliation for asking for reasonable religious accommodation. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was frequently denied the chance to attend Muslim Friday prayer services and that his supervisors made several derogatory comments regarding Muslims. He further argued that he was ultimately terminated because of his religion and in retaliation for filing a complaint regarding a lack of reasonable religious accommodation (in the form of a schedule that accommodated his weekly prayer services). The Court found that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case and that there was enough evidence for a jury to conclude that the University’s reason for firing the plaintiff was a pretext for actual discrimination. However, the Court dismissed the retaliation claim, as the plaintiff did not present any evidence to support it.

University of Utah, College of Law

The evolution of legal traditions in the Middle East will be examined, analyzed and discussed through the lens of multi-disciplinary readings reflecting the law, history, culture, human rights, and contemporary political dilemmas.

UCLA, School of Law

This course introduces the field of Islamic law. Islamic law is one of the oldest and most significant legal systems in the contemporary age, and this course is designed to give students a firm grounding in its principles, concepts, and doctrines. We will study the history, theory, and the role of Islamic law in the contemporary age. No previous familiarity with the field is necessary, and there are no course prerequisites. All readings are in English. The course will be divided into two main parts: the first will deal with Islamic law in the classical context, while the second will examine the role of Islamic law in the contemporary age. The first half of the course is oriented towards the historical legacy and theoretical framework of the Islamic legal tradition with a special emphasis on the development of the various schools of law. In the second half, we will study the challenges of modernity and Islamic law in the contemporary age, and will examine issues related to Islamic public international law, human rights, women and gender, and violence.

University of Toronto

Mr. Zafar Hasan, a Muslim of Indian heritage, sued his former employer, Foley & Lardner LLP, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion, race, national origin and color. The plaintiff claimed that his work assignments were cut and he was ultimately terminated because he was Muslim. For support, he points to the cut in his assignments that occurred immediately after 9/11, a comment made by one partner that “those people [Muslims] don’t belong here…they should kick them all out,” a warning by another partner to be careful about displaying articles the plaintiff had written on his view that Islam is a peaceful religion, and the fact that the other two Muslims in his department were either transferred or terminated in the same time period. The defendant company responds that it cut Mr. Hasan’s work and then terminated him due to poor work performance. The Circuit Court reversed and remanded the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois’s grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had presented enough direct evidence of religious discrimination to allow the case to move forward.

The EEOC represented a group of Muslims suing their former employer, Norwegian Cruise Lines, under Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination. The plaintiffs claimed that these discriminatory motives caused the company to target them for increased scrutiny, to create a hostile work environment by allowing their co-workers to verbally harass them (in part, by referring to them as terrorists), and finally, to terminate them. The plaintiffs further entered a complaint for negligent infliction of emotional distress on these bases. The defendants argued that they terminated the plaintiffs for inconsistent answers given to background questions and because they were “positive matches in the FBI database.” The Court dismissed the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, but concluded that the discrimination case could go forward as plaintiffs had established a prima facie discrimination case such that a jury could find that the company’s reasons given for terminating the plaintiffs were pretexts for a discriminatory reason.

A Pakistani Muslim bank employee suffering from irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) sued his former employer, Bank of America, under Title VII alleging discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin; under the American Disabilities Act (ADA) for discrimination on the basis of disability; and under Title VII and the ADA for retaliatory firing following his filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  Specifically, the plaintiff argued that his religious beliefs required him to take several prayer breaks throughout the workday, and that this practice ultimately led to his firing. The defendant responded that the employee was fired because of poor work performance. The Court found that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, and that, even if he did, the defendant had provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating his employment that the plaintiff did not dispute. The Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant company and dismissed the retaliation claim, concluding that the plaintiff had established no connection between the EEOC filing and his termination. 

A Pakistani Muslim hospital employee sued his employer under Title VII, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law (after receiving a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC)), alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin and a hostile work environment. The plaintiff argued that he received negative performance evaluations because he was absent from work on several Fridays and other days in observance of Islamic religious prayer services and holidays, in compliance with Islamic ritual law. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie discrimination claim, as he never articulated any adverse employment action suffered. The Court, however, allowed Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim to move forward as it raised a material question of fact that should be decided by a jury. 

The EEOC represented an African-American Muslim suing his former employer under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination and a hostile work environment. The plaintiff claimed he had been the recipient of many offensive comments (such as being called a “towel head” and “Taliban”) and degrading actions (such as his co-workers hiding his time card while he was at prayer services). The Court reversed and remanded a decision by the District Court for the District of Maryland to grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. This Court held that a jury could find that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment and that his employer had notice of the ongoing conduct; it thus denied the defendant company’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the case to proceed.

The plaintiff, a Muslim occupational health physician, sued his former employer, the Department of Veteran Affairs and its Secretary, Jim Nicholson, under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination and retaliation for filing a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). He filed the claim after he heard his supervisor refer to Muslims as a threat and after his supervisor’s wife made comments about how she and her husband do not like Muslims and the way they live—presumably referring to his observance of prayers, fasting, and other aspects of Islamic ritual law. The plaintiff discovered that his position was being eliminated sometime after these comments were made, but continued to consult with his former employer about infectious diseases. Three months following his position’s elimination, the plaintiff saw a job advertisement for the same position at his former place of employment and filed a claim with the EEOC for discrimination. Immediately after his supervisor found out about his claim, the plaintiff contends that he was no longer allowed on the property and that other employees were barred from contacting him for consultations. The Court concluded that the timing was questionable enough that a jury could find that the events described were examples of retaliation. The Court reversed and remanded the decision of the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi to grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, allowing the case to go forward. The parties ultimately settled the case, and the case was closed in December of 2008.

An Arab-American police officer in New York City sued his employer under §1981 (providing “a cause of action for race-based employment discrimination based on a hostile work environment”), New York Executive Law Section 290, and New York Administrative Code Section 9-101 (both state laws imposing “liability on aiders and abettors of unlawful discriminatory practices”), as well as laws prohibiting the creation of a hostile work environment. The plaintiff worked for the NYPD’s Intelligence Division and claimed that the Department made him read anti-Muslim and anti-Arab rhetoric in the form of briefings from an anti-terrorism consultant. According to the plaintiff, these briefings entailed the consultant instructing the reader to not trust Muslims in law enforcement and making comments like “a good Muslim…can’t be a good American.” The Court held that a jury could find that the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to allow a hostile work environment claim to proceed. It thus denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the case to go forward. The case was ultimately closed in 2010 after an order of dismissal without ever going to trial. The plaintiff did not lodge an explicit claim on the basis of Islamic law, but his allegations about religion may have included ritual practice or dress related to Islamic law.

The Muslim plaintiff sued her former employer, Supervalu Holdings, under Title VII, alleging religious discrimination. Specifically, she argued that the company overlooked her for a position with more responsibility because of her religion. The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, as she neither proved that non-Muslims were treated better, nor did she allege that she suffered an adverse employment action (as the higher-level position did not offer additional compensation or benefits). Thus, this Court affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.