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The applicants were married in accordance with shari'a on 15 August 1973 by the village imam. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian, and the dowry (mahar) was a two-gram gold ring paid for with cash. Nothing about the applicants' pre-marriage relationship precluded them from marrying, and they had subsequently had five children, then two which had passed away. The applicants had never divorced, nor had they ever received any formal objection to their union. The applicants required their marriage to be ratified (itsbat nikah) in order that they have proof of their marriage, and in order that they could obtain a birth certificate for their children.

Acknowledging that the first applicant was not married to four other women, that the second applicant was not married to another man, nor in the process of carrying out the period of iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted), and that the marriage did not contravene the prohibitions on marriage articulated in arts 8-11 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or arts 39-42 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the application. Pursuant to arts 8(2), 35(a) and 36 of Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration, and art 7(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court ordered the applicants to register their marriage with a marriage registrar in their local jurisdiction.

The applicants were married in accordance with shari'a on 10 May 1984 by the village imam. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian, and the dowry (mahar) was a one-gram gold ring paid for with cash. Nothing about the applicants' pre-marriage relationship precluded them from marrying, and they had subsequently had five children, the first of whom had passed away. The applicants had never divorced, nor had they ever received any formal objection to their union. The applicants required their marriage to be ratified (itsbat nikah) in order that they have proof of their marriage, and in order that they could obtain a birth certificate for their children.

Acknowledging that the first applicant was not married to four other women, that the second applicant was not married to another man, nor in the process of carrying out the period of iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted), and that the marriage did not contravene the prohibitions on marriage articulated in arts 8-11 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or arts 39-42 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the application. Pursuant to arts 8(2), 35(a) and 36 of Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration, and art 7(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court ordered the applicants to register their marriage with a marriage registrar in their local jurisdiction.

The applicants were married in accordance with shari'a on 9 May 2002 by the village imam. The second applicant's uncle had acted as her marriage guardian, and the dowry (mahar) was a one-gram gold ring paid for with cash. Nothing about the applicants' pre-marriage relationship precluded them from marrying, and they had subsequently had two children. The applicants had never divorced, nor had they ever received any formal objection to their union. The applicants required their marriage to be ratified (itsbat nikah) in order that they have proof of their marriage, and in order that they could obtain a birth certificate for their children.

Acknowledging that the first applicant was not married to four other women, that the second applicant was not married to another man, nor in the process of carrying out the period of iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted), and that the marriage did not contravene the prohibitions on marriage articulated in arts 8-11 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or arts 39-42 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the application. Pursuant to arts 8(2), 35(a) and 36 of Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration, and art 7(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court ordered the applicants to register their marriage with a marriage registrar in their local jurisdiction.

The applicants were married in accordance with shari'a on 8 September 1983 by the village imam. The second applicant's older sibling had acted as her marriage guardian, and the dowry (mahar) was a two-gram gold ring paid for with cash. Nothing about the applicants' pre-marriage relationship precluded them from marrying, and they had subsequently had three children. The applicants had never divorced, nor had they ever received any formal objection to their union. The applicants required their marriage to be ratified (itsbat nikah) in order that they have proof of their marriage, and in order that they could obtain a birth certificate for their children.

Acknowledging that the first applicant was not married to four other women, that the second applicant was not married to another man, nor in the process of carrying out the period of iddah (three-month period after divorce has been granted), and that the marriage did not contravene the prohibitions on marriage articulated in arts 8-11 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, or arts 39-42 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court acceded to the application. Pursuant to arts 8(2), 35(a) and 36 of Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration, and art 7(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the court ordered the applicants to register their marriage with a marriage registrar in their local jurisdiction.

The applicant had submitted a marriage ratification request to the court, dated 8 January 2010. The request stated that she and M. Yusuf bin Jafar (deceased, 29 December 2009) were married in accordance with Islamic shari'a on 10 June 1949, with her older brother Muhammad Yunas acting as her marriage guardian. The marriage was witnessed by two other persons, the names of whom the applicant could not recall. The applicant's dowry was IDR 40.

The applicant required a marriage ratification certificate in order to access her deceased husband's pension, life insurance, and widow's pension. The marriage had never been registered pursuant to current legal provisions. The applicant and her husband, however, had seven children, all of whom were now adults. Moreover, they had never divorced and no one had ever had any objections to their marriage.

In acceding to the applicant's request, the court cited arts 7(2) and (3)(d) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, which granted it powers to solemnise a marriage, as well as one that preceded the enactment of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage. The Court also cited the rule of fiqh contained in Kitab Tuhfah Jilid IV, which mandates the recognition of the marriage of a woman who is of age and sound mind ('aqil baligh).

The applicants submitted that they were married in accordance with Islamic law on 7 March 1992 before two witnesses. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian (wali nikah) and the dowry (mahar) had been seven mayam worth of gold in cash. At the time of the parties' marriage, the first applicant was a bachelor and the second applicant a virgin. The parties had never divorced nor had they left Islam (murtad). There were no other prohibitions to their marriage under Islam or current laws. The parties had two children. They had never, however, received a marriage certificate issued by the Office of Religious Affairs. The parties, therefore, requested that the court ratify their marriage for civil administration purposes.

The court cited Kitab l'anatu al-Thalibin, juz IV, page 254, and Kitab Ushu al-Fiqh by Abdul Wahhab Khallaf, as examples of Islamic norms that allow the ratification of a marriage based on facts such as those established by the parties. The court then, pursuant to art 2(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 4 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, ratified the parties marriage based on the evidence produced by the applicants.

The applicants submitted that they were married in accordance with Islamic law on 14 August 1995 before two witnesses. The second applicant's father had acted as the second applicant's marriage guardian (wali nikah) and the dowry (mahar) had been 10 mayam worth of gold. At the time of the parties' marriage, the first applicant was a bachelor and the second applicant a virgin. The parties had never divorced nor had they left Islam (murtad). There were no other prohibitions to their marriage under Islam or current laws. The parties had two children. They had already registered their marriage with the Office of Religious Affairs and received a marriage certificate. The parties, however, also requested that the court ratify their marriage for residency purposes.

The court cited Kitab l'anatu al-Thalibin, juz IV, page 254, and Kitab Ushu al-Fiqh by Abdul Wahhab Khallaf, as examples of Islamic norms that allow the ratification of a marriage based on facts such as those established by the parties. The court then, pursuant to art 2(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 4 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, ratified the parties marriage based on the evidence produced by the applicants.

The applicants submitted that they were married on 9 September 2009 in accordance with Islamic shari'a before two witnesses. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian (wali nikah) and the dowry (mahar) had been 10 grams of gold. At the time of the parties' marriage, the first applicant was a bachelor and the second applicant a virgin. They had never divorced, no one had objected to their marriage, and there were no other prohibitions to their marriage under Islam or current laws. The parties had one child. The parties had never registered their marriage with the Office of Religious Affairs, as evidenced by a notice of rejection they had received, dated 22 January 2016, issued by the same office. The parties submitted that they required a court determination ratifying their marriage before they could obtain a birth certificate for their child.

The court, pursuant to provision (a) of the elucidation to art 49 of Law No. 3 of 2006, and art 7(4) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, noted that a marriage ratification request can be submitted by the husband or wife. The court then, pursuant to art 2(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, ratified the parties marriage based on the evidence produced by the applicants.

The applicants submitted that they were married on 15 October 1999 in accordance with Islamic shari'a before two witnesses. The second applicant's father had acted as her marriage guardian (wali nikah) and the dowry (mahar) had been 10 grams of gold. At the time of the parties' marriage, the first applicant was a bachelor and the second applicant a virgin. They had never divorced, no one had objected to their marriage, and there were no other prohibitions to their marriage under Islam or current laws. The parties had three children. The parties had submitted the necessary documentation for the registration of their marriage to local village authorities but the documentation was never forwarded on to the Office of Religious Affairs. The parties submitted that they required a court determination ratifying their marriage in order to obtain birth certificates for their children.

The court, pursuant to art 14 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, ratified the parties marriage based on the evidence produced by the applicants. The court also cited Kitab l'anatu al-Thalibin, juz IV, page 254, as an example of Islamic norms that allow the ratification of a marriage based on facts such as those established by the parties.

The plaintiff submitted a claim for child maintenance from the defendant (her biological father), who was previously married to her biological mother from 1995-2001. Since September 2000, four months before her parents divorced, until the time of the proceeding, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had not provided her with any financial support, either via her biological mother or directly. The plaintiff submitted that, from the age of 4-19 years, the defendant had neglected his financial obligations to the plaintiff, which the plaintiff quantified at IDR 1.5 million per month, or IDR 264 million in total for the past 14 years and eight months. The plaintiff also submitted that the defendant was obligated to provide her with IDR 2 million per month in financial support until she reached 21 years of age, and that as a university lecturer with a PhD, he earned sufficient income to afford these payments.

The defendant submitted an objection to the plaintiff's case on the grounds that the plaintiff's biological mother had unilaterally changed the plaintiff's name and altered her birth certificate, the new certificate having been issued on 11 January 2007. Meanwhile, the birth certificate the defendant had in his possession was a copy of the original (dated 8 February 1996). The defendant submitted that the effect of this alteration was that it was no longer clear who the plaintiff's actual biological father was.

As part of the defendant's primary defence, he submitted that, following his divorce from the plaintiff's mother, he had finalised all financial issues through deliberatons with the plaintiff's great-aunt (now deceased), as well as the matter of the custody of the plaintiff. At the time, the defendant had abided by the plaintiff's mother's wishes and allowed the plaintiff to remain in her mother's care until she was of an age where she could knowingly choose which parent she wished to follow.

The defendant also suggested to the court that it was more likely that the plaintiff's mother had instigated the claim, given that there had been no tension in the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, as well as the fact that the parties had only recently reunited in September 2014 after more than 13 years apart. Moreover, the defendant's relationship with the plaintiff's mother had been fractured at best, meaning that the defendant had not known of the plaintiff's specific whereabouts, other than that she had been living with her mother and grandmother in Makassar. In short, the lack of communication between the defendant and the plaintiff's mother made providing the plaintiff with financial assistance logistically unfeasible. Indeed, when the plaintiff visited the defendant with her aunt at his residence for the first time in 13 years, the defendant happily provided the plaintiff with IDR 1 million, while the defendant's father (the plaintiff's grandfather) gave her IDR 500,000. The defendant informed the court that the plaintiff later requested IDR 8 million from the defendant to cover certain educational costs. As the defendant had only recently returned from completing postgraduate study in Yogyakarta at the time of the request, however, the defendant and his wife could only afford to provide the plaintiff with IDR 4 million, which the plaintiff had refused.

The court dismissed the defendant's objection on the grounds that the plaintiff's original birth certificate had never been declared null and void by the authorised agency, and, therefore, its legal authority remained intact.

In regards to the plaintiff's claim, the court noted the conflicting laws as to the legal age of an adult: while art 47(1) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, as well as art 47(1) of Law No. 7 of 1989 on the Religious Judiciary, define an adult as someone who is 18 years of age, art 98 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws defines an adult as a person of 21 years of age. Meanwhile, customary law (hukum adat) stipulates 15 as the relevant age. In choosing to follow that legislation that defined the legal age as 18, the court thereby found that the plaintiff was already an adult as she was 19 years of age. In reaching its decision, the court considered that the plaintiff and defendant had been separated for 13 years, that the defendant and defendant's father had offered the plaintiff IDR 1.5 million collectively on their first meeting in 13 years, and that the plaintiff had refused to accept IDR 4 million from the defendant to cover educational costs. The court also cited Indonesian Supreme Court Decision No. 608 K/AG/203 (23 March 2005), where the Supreme Court declared that the obligations of a father to provide financially for his child were Lil Intifa rather than Lil Tamlik, that is, the obligation to meet a child's needs is shared by the child's parents, and therefore, does not rest solely on the father (art 77(3) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws; art 45(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage). Accordingly, back payments were not necessary as the child's past needs were assumed to have already been met. Pursuant to the defendant's concession that he was happy to provide the plaintiff with financial assistance, provided it was within his own means, as well as surat Al Baqarah verse 233, the court ordered the defendant to pay to the defendant IDR 2 million per month until she reaches 21 years of age.

The two co-accused sought to appeal the decision of the Banda Aceh Shari'a Court, which had found them guilty of being together in close proximity out of wedlock (khalwat). In their submissions they stated that they had already informed the village head (kepala dusun) that they would be living together as husband and wife, and that they would be joined by the three-year old son of the second co-accused. When both co-accused told the village head that they were unable to provide photocopies of their family card, both their identity cards, their wedding certificate (buku nikah), and relocation notice, because they were still being processed, however, the village head requested that the village official attend the home of the co-accused. It then came to light that the second co-accused was actually in the process of divorcing her ex-husband, which made the fact that the two co-accused were in close proximity with one another illegal, as contained in art 23(1) of Aceh Qanun No. 6 of 2014 on Criminal Law.

The court overturned the decision of the lower court on several grounds:

1. The lower court had not granted what was sought by the prosecution;
2. According to art 23(1) of Aceh Qanun No. 6 of 2014 on Criminal Law, the appropriate punishment for repudiation of the prohibition contained therein is either ten strokes of the cane, a fine of 100 grams of pure gold, or a maximum ten month prison sentence;
3. The punishment contained in art 23(1) provides alternative punishments, one of which may be requested by the prosecution, to be determined by the court;
4. The lower court was not authorised to sentence the co-accused to be caned when the prosecution had requested that they be imprisoned; and
5. The lower court was only authorised to either accede to, or deny, the prosecution's demands.

Accordingly, the court sentenced both co-accused to five months and 20 days in prison, taking into account time already served on remand.

The deceased, who passed away on 18 January 2007, was survived by his second wife (respondent), as well as his first wife and children (first-eighth appellants). One of the primary issues of the dispute concerned the marriage status of the respondent to the deceased.

In overturning the decision of the Banda Aceh Shari'a Court (lower court), the Court found that, pursuant to art 38 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, if the deceased had wanted to repudiate his marriage to the respondent, he needed to have filed for divorce prior to his passing. Moreover, a marriage is formally repudiated by filing for repudiation with the Religious Court/Shari'a Court, pursuant to art 25 of Law No. 1 of 1974, arts 37 and 38 of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 74(1) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. The deceased had never followed such procedure to repudiate his marriage to the respondent.

Even if he had successfully repudiated his marriage to the respondent, the Court noted that the deceased's legal relationship to the respondent and their children (all three of whom were underage) would not cease, as per arts 75 and 76 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, and art 28 of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage.

The Court also dismissed the appellants' argument that the decision of the Banda Aceh State Court regarding the falsification of the respondent's marriage certificate was grounds for repudiation of her marriage to the deceased.

The Court found that for the first appellant, with whom the deceased had acquired property before he married the respondent, one-half of that property became the first appellant's, as well as one-third of the property the deceased had acquired while married to both the first appellant and respondent. The same could be said of what constituted the property of the deceased, viz. one-half of what the deceased had acquired while married to the first appellant, and one-third of what the deceased had acquired while married to both the first appellant and respondent.