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At issue in this case is the validity of a marriage performed in the Islamic tradition, where the husband sought an annulment of an initial “traditional” marriage and recognition of a subsequent civil marriage. The law of the Philippines does not require a couple to obtain a marriage certificate if their marriage is performed according to the Islamic tradition; accordingly the couple married under traditional Islamic law and obtained no certificate. In seeking annulment of that marriage and recognition of a subsequent marriage, appellant Rafiqul Islam argued that the first marriage was not official; he further argued that the union was not truly Islamic because his so-called wife was not Muslim, because the wedding ceremony was performed by a clerk rather than a religious official, and because neither party intended to enter into a marital relationship. On appeal, the Court upheld the trial court’s decision that the first marriage was a legitimate, state-recognized union, and thus that any subsequent marriage would be considered void.

In divorce proceedings, a wife appealed the decision of the Oakland Circuit Court Family Division, granting her husband’s motion to dismiss her claims and recognize their previous divorce, which occurred when the couple was in India. Specifically, she contested the validity of the “triple ṭalāq” divorce (a version of final, irrevocable divorce under Indian and Islamic law, performed unilaterally by the husband) that her husband performed in India, and filed for divorce in Michigan. The trial court concluded that the certificate of divorce that the defendant husband produced from their earlier divorce was sufficient evidence to dismiss the case under Michigan Compiled Laws 2.116(C)(7) (which bars claims based on prior judgment). The Court of Appeals reversed and found in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that the Indian divorce violated due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution art. 1, § 2, as it gave the wife no chance to plead her case concerning the divorce before a court. The Court also concluded that allowing the divorce to stand would be contrary to state public policy, as it privileged the Muslim personal law of India (which placed women in a weaker position regarding property division in the event of a divorce than would Michigan state law) over Michigan state law and the rights and protections extended to persons living in the state.

The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s refusal to enforce an Islamic marriage contract, which called for a postponed dowry (mahr) owed by the husband to the wife upon death or divorce of $25,000. The Court found that the groom was coerced into signing the agreement, and thus it was not valid. The Court did not delve into the potential First Amendment Establishment Clause issues considered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

The Texas Court of Appeals reversed a state district court’s decision to uphold an Islamic marriage contract that awarded the wife a deferred dowry (mahr), an amount agreed upon at the time of marriage and due to the wife from the husband or his estate upon death or divorce, of $50,000. The district court had concluded that the amount was due pursuant to a marital contract made by the parties “in contemplation of a forthcoming marriage,” constituting “a valid, binding, and enforceable contract under Sections 4.001-003 of the Texas Family Code.” The appellate court reversed and remanded to the lower court, concluding that the agreement was not a valid premarital contract under the state law, defined as “an agreement between prospective spouses made in contemplation of marriage,” because the religious wedding ceremony occurred before the contract was signed. As the contract fell outside of the definition of premarital contract, the Court concluded that it could not be enforced like one. 

The plaintiff petitioned the Court to bury his wife according to Islamic legal requirements over the objections of her family. The plaintiff claimed that he and his wife had shared the Islamic faith and had married by way of an Islamic marriage ceremony the previous year. However, they never obtained a marriage license, and there was no proof of her faith or burial wishes. The Court found in favor of the deceased’s parents, concluding that, without a marriage license, the plaintiff was not her surviving spouse before the law. Therefore, the deceased was to be buried according to her parents' wishes. The Court did not view this as a potential First Amendment Free Exercise issue.

The appellate court upheld the Superior Court of Orange County’s refusal to divide marital property in the context of a divorce according to Islamic law. The plaintiff introduced a marriage certificate as a “premarital contract,” which, among other things, lays out a set amount to be paid to the wife in the event of a divorce. The lower court refused to consider the certificate a “contract,” as it was not clear that both parties were expressly agreeing to the same terms, consistent with their understanding of Islamic law and custom.

This Court reversed the decision of the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County that prevented a wife from collecting her deferred dowry (sadaq), the dowry due from the husband to the wife upon marriage, a portion of which is deferred by agreement to be paid upon death or divorce. The husband argued that, under Islamic law, the wife forfeits her contractual right to the deferred dowry if, as here, she is the one to seek the divorce. This Court upheld the contract, holding that it was binding because there was a meeting of the minds, and the parties agreed that the deferred dowry would be due upon divorce.

In a divorce proceeding involving a prenuptial agreement (Islamic marriage contract) between a Muslim husband and wife, the California Court of Appeals considered the validity of a provision requiring the husband to pay 3,000 Jordanian dinars as well as 2,000 dinars of either cash or household furniture as a “deferred dowry” (known as mahr or ṣadāq) due to the wife upon death or divorce. The husband claimed that the deferred dowry is not due where, as here, the wife initiates the divorce proceeding. The court concluded that, regardless of the individual claims, requiring payment of one party to the other upon divorce was an example of prohibited “divorce profiteering” and that, “if the court had accepted the position of wife’s expert, the contract would not have been enforceable under the public policy of the state.” Accordingly, the Court upheld the lower court's decision not to enforce that provision of the agreement.

A Muslim-naturalized American citizen of Egyptian national origin sued Homeland Secretary Michael Chertoff, along with officials at the Transportation Security Administration, under Title VII, as well as under the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), the Fifth Amendment, the Freedom of Information Act, and the Privacy Act, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin. The plaintiff was suspended from work with the Federal Aviation Administration after he failed to obtain a security clearance renewal following 9/11, and the plaintiff alleged that his security clearance was not renewed because he was Egyptian and Muslim. The defendant claimed that the Administration did not control who receives a security clearance, and that their action suspending him was merely a result of his failure to maintain his previous level of clearance. The Court held that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of religious or national-origin discrimination [with no allegation of barring practices of Islamic ritual law, for example] as articulated by McDonnell Douglas, and that without the security clearance, he was no longer qualified for his job. Accordingly, the Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Representing an Arab-American Muslim former employee of the Omni Hotels, the EEOC sued the hotel chain under Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination. The plaintiff claimed that the company fired the employee from his position because he was vocal in his community regarding American-Islamic relations following the events of 9/11. The company argued that his termination resulted from the employee’s lackluster sales at the hotel he was managing, and that the plaintiff resigned for his own personal reasons. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that, while the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of discrimination, it failed to provide evidence showing that the defendant’s defense was a pretext for discriminatory intent.

A Lebanese Muslim physician sued his former employer, represented by Secretary of Veteran Affairs Jim Nicholson, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination under Title VII. The plaintiff claimed that the VA Medical Center, his place of employment, subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his identity as both Lebanese and Muslim [presumably related to his observance of Islamic ritual law] and that his supervisors retaliated against him for filing a claim with the EEOC. He further argued that the employer's discrimination ultimately led to his termination. The Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative options before initiating a lawsuit in court, and that he had not demonstrated that his termination was retaliatory.  

The plaintiff, who won a judgment in the lower court, challenged the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine’s refusal to retry an employment discrimination case in which the jury refused to award damages despite finding the defendants guilty. In the underlying case, the plaintiff had sued his employer under §1981 and Title VII, alleging religious and national-origin discrimination as well as harassment based on his race and religion in the form of a wide range of offensive actions and statements aimed at the plaintiff, including likening the plaintiff to Osama bin Laden, telling him to go back to his own country, and attempts to shove pork in his mouth (Islamic law prohibits the consumption of pork). The plaintiff argued that on a guilty finding, the jury was obliged to award damages as a matter of law. The appellate court, however, pointed to precedent rejecting this argument, and thus affirmed the lower court’s decision not to retry the case.

An African-American Muslim bus driver sued her former employer, the City of New York, under federal and state law (including Title VII; Article 1, section 3 of the New York State Constitution, and New York City Administrative Law §8-107(1)), alleging gender, religious, and racial discrimination and for allowing a hostile work environment. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that she was subjected to a hostile work environment after securing accommodations for her to wear a headscarf (khimar) while on the job. She claimed that she was required to wear a baseball cap over the headscarf or to accept shifts that did not entail interaction with the public. The Court concluded that the complaints were not severe or pervasive enough to warrant a hostile work environment claim before a jury; accordingly, it dismissed the Title VII and New York State Constitution claims. The Court permitted the employment discrimination claim under the NY City Administrative Law to proceed.

Plaintiff, a Muslim prisoner, challenged prison policies that (1) failed to provide a Muslim chaplain and an adequate number of Islamic services; (2) prohibited religious meetings without a volunteer present; (3) failed to provide ḥalāl meals and a location where he may perform five daily ṣalāt (prayers); and (4) prohibited him from wearing a kufi (prayer cap) or an Islamic medallion outside of his clothing. The Court found that plaintiff had not demonstrated that the prison's policies substantially burdened his ability to practice his religion, as required for a finding of a violation of the First Amendment or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and that where plaintiff had demonstrated a substantial burden, the prison had demonstrated that its policies were the least restrictive means of achieving the compelling government interest in safety and security.

Plaintiff Jerry Lemons, a Muslim prisoner confined in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, brought this complaint against the Respondents, prison officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, for a violation of his freedom to exercise his religion when the Respondents did not provide a special menu for an Islamic holy day in December 2008. The judge determined that the fact that a single meal service was disrupted or missed did not create a substantial burden on the Plaintiff’s ability to practice religion, and recommended that the Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim be dismissed.

Plaintiff Hilton Karriem Mincy, a Muslim prisoner at the Lycoming County Prison, brought this suit against the Respondents – the county prison, the prison warden and other prison officials – alleging that the prison’s inadequate food service during Ramadan, which included no hot meals at the end of the day and evening meals of insufficient caloric content to compensate for the absence of a daytime meal, constituted a failure to accommodate his religious beliefs and a violation of the RLUIPA. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania entered summary judgment in favor of the Respondents, and the Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The Court of Appeals determined that the Plaintiff identified no official policy promulgated by the prison administration which violated his constitutional rights, and there was no evidence to suggest that any named Respondent played a direct role or had any personal involvement in the preparation or storage of food.

Plaintiff Lavotte Saunders, a Muslim African-American male, brought this claim of discrimination based on race and religion against the Respondent, the Plaintiff’s former employer Apothaker & Associates. Two days after the Plaintiff was hired, he was fired on the basis of having a criminal record, but later discovered that several other employees of the Respondent had criminal records (including felony convictions) and were not fired. Therefore, the Plaintiff brought suit on the basis that he was fired as a result of disparate treatment due to religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. The Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. The Court found that claims of discrimination are subject to the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green burden shifting analysis: First, the Plaintiff had to state a prima facie case, and then the burden shifted to the Respondent to “articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employee’s termination.” The Court found that the Plaintiff failed to state a prima facie case, because he could not prove that he was qualified for the position in the first place. Therefore, the Court granted the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff Joe Burgos Vega, a practicing Muslim prisoner at the Connecticut Department of Corrections (“DOC”), brought this action against the Respondents, officials at the DOC, claiming that Respondents’ 1) denial of the Plaintiff’s request to be circumcised; 2) denial of access to suitable Islamic prayer oils; and 3) frequently canceled Friday congregational prayer constituted a violation of his right to exercise his religion. The Respondents argued that they are entitled to qualified immunity from suit in their individual capacities. The Court sided with the Respondents, finding that 1) prisoners have no constitutional or statutory right to a surgery that is not medically necessary; 2) DOC officers did not violate the Plaintiff’s right with regard to prayer oils, because they provided him with access to the imam-approved commissary oil; and 3) that although prisoners have the right to participate in group religious services, the frequent Friday prayer cancellations were reasonable because they occurred due to a shortage of volunteer imams and that other opportunities for religious practice were available to Muslim inmates.

Appellant Amina Aden appealed her contempt citations and sentences, contending that they violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).  During the Appellant’s criminal trial for providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota cited the Appellant for criminal contempt for repeatedly failing to stand when the court convened and recessed as required by pretrial order. This Court found that the lower court erred in evaluating the Appellant’s former contentions that standing at these times would violate her religious belief. The Court found that in the RFRA context, the district court erred by evaluating the orthodoxy and sophistication of the Appellant’s belief, instead of simply evaluating whether her practice was rooted in sincerely held religious belief.  Because the district court only applied a First Amendment analysis, it did not apply an RFRA analysis that evaluated whether the pretrial order was the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling government interest.  Therefore, the Court vacated the contempt citations and remanded to the district court to evaluate whether the pretrial order was the least restrictive means to further that or other compelling interests.

Plaintiff Sturgeon Stewart, an inmate at the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) brought suit against Respondents Vernestene Dulin, head of prison food services, and various other prison officials for alleged violations of his rights to religious free exercise on the claim that the prison served Muslim inmates the same ḥalāl food menu for all meals of the day, and that these meals excluded meat. Ḥalāl food is meat prepared in accordance with Islamic ritual law, and free of pork and alcohol. The Plaintiff contended that this repetition was not a nutritional religious-accommodating alternative to regular prison meals. The Court found for the Respondents, determining that Muslim prisoners do not have a right under the First Amendment or the RLUIPA to be provided ḥalāl meat entrees. Rather, a correctional facility need only provide Muslim prisoners with food that is not ḥarām (prohibited under Islamic law). The Court found that, as long as the Plaintiff was given an alternative to eating non-ḥalāl meat, he did not suffer a substantial burden to his religious beliefs. The Court determined that the Plaintiff had been provided with alternatives to non-ḥalāl meat, but that the Plaintiff was “simply not happy with the substitutions offered.” Therefore, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff’s factual allegations, construed as true, failed to establish a violation of the Plaintiff’s federal rights.