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Representing a group of Muslim truck drivers, the EEOC brought suit under Title VII against the group’s employer, Pace Services (a trucking company), alleging that the company subjected them to a hostile work environment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the company did nothing to stop their supervisor from calling them a variety of derogatory names, such as al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Osama. The company argued a recognized affirmative defense against the discrimination claim by attempting to show that it took reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any racially-discriminatory behavior and that the employee(s) failed to take advantage of said corrections. The plaintiffs argued that the defendant could not prove the essential elements of that defense, and thus, that summary judgment should be granted in their favor. The Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ motion, concluding that the defendant had provided evidence sufficient to allow a jury to conclude that they had adequately proved the elements of the affirmative defense.

A Jordanian Muslim sued his former employer, a life insurance firm, under the California Fair Housing and Employment Act, alleging discrimination based on religion and national origin. The plaintiff argued that he was terminated from his job because he was a Muslim and of Middle Eastern origin. The defendant claimed that he was fired for failing to meet job performance standards; the plaintiff responded that the company’s explanation was a pretext, arguing that the company applied different job performance evaluation standards to him as compared to his non-Muslim co-workers. Employing the burden-shifting test established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (where the plaintiff alleges a prima facie claim, the company responds with a reason, and the plaintiff will prevail if he can show that the reason is a pretext for actual discrimination), the Court found that the plaintiff had presented enough evidence of a discriminatory motive to establish a prima facie case and allow the suit to proceed before a jury. Accordingly, the Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

During trial court proceedings in which a Muslim couple was dividing their marital property, the husband, Mr. Irfan Aleem, attempted to perform a “triple ṭalāq” divorce—a form of final, irrevocable dissolution of marriage under Pakistani law, initiated unilaterally by the husband. The Court refused to honor this type of divorce, concluding that it violated due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment by not giving Mrs. Farah Aleem any role or voice in the divorce proceedings. The Court also concluded that allowing the ṭalāq divorce to replace court proceedings was contrary to the public policy interest of the people of Maryland, as it would allow Pakistani version of Islamic law, which grants all property to the husband as the default in divorce cases, to regulate distribution of property in the state of Maryland. The Court thus upheld the ruling of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, granting the wife’s petition for divorce, and applied the Maryland default rule that, in the absence of prior written agreement, marital property is to be divided fairly and equitably.