SHARIAsource

At issue is this case is an Islamic financial instrument called a mudaraba agreement, by which a bank enters into a profit-sharing arrangement with a borrower. The Agreement at issue includes a clause stating that any disagreements are to be settled through arbitration in the Bahamas. The Court refused to uphold the Agreement because Vinewood Capital was not a signatory to the agreement, and thus denied the motion to compel arbitration of Vinewood’s claims. In May of 2011, the Court dismissed the appeal and closed the case.

Plaintiff Kevin Murray, an American taxpayer, sued Treasury Secretary Geithner and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, challenging use of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds created by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) to bailout AIG, a “market leader in Sharia-compliant financing.” The Court denied summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the bailout of AIG by the government may raise First Amendment Establishment Clause issues. This decision was overturned in a 2011 appeal, in which this same Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, holding that the plaintiff had not made out a sufficient case that would allow a jury to conclude, under the Lemon Test (which assesses whether there is excessive entanglement of the Government with religion) that the Treasury Secretary violated the Establishment Clause by allowing AIG investment in sharīʿa-compliant financial instruments.

The U.S. accused a group of defendants of financial dealings with terrorists, on the basis that they had entered into Islamic financial agreements—specifically a profit-sharing arrangement known as a mudaraba contract—with a known leader of Hamas, a relative of one of the members of the defendant group. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas found them guilty. On appeal, this Court held that there was enough evidence to suggest that the defendants knew that their relative was a designated terrorist but continued to do business with him. The Court thus upheld the District Court’s guilty verdict.

The Court granted the defendant Marriott International’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. Plaintiff Nagy Edrisse sued Marriott and several of its employees under Title VII, § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The plaintiff alleged that the hotel created or tolerated a hostile work environment in that his direct manager made frequent derogatory racial, religious, and ethnic statements, including asking the plaintiff whether he was going to blow up the building and whether he was a terrorist. Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed that the hotel fired him out of discriminatory animus based on his religion, race, and ethnicity. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was fired due to inappropriate behavior at the workplace (including using racial slurs directed at fellow employees), rather than his race, religion, or ethnicity. The Court dismissed the claim against the employees who were not directly involved, but denied summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the facts were sufficient to make out a prima facie case to move forward. In other words, the Court concluded that a jury could consider the evidence presented to be severe and pervasive enough to allow for a finding of a hostile work environment.

The Court denied defendant Merrill Lynch’s motion for summary judgment, adopting the opinion of the magistrate judge, which held that the employee established a prima facie case of discrimination. Plaintiff Abdul-Giyath Mayale-Eke sued his former employer and direct supervisor under Title VII, §1981, the Rhode Island Fair Employment Act, and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff alleged that, as a Muslim who had immigrated from Nigeria, he was treated differently and ultimately fired from his position as an investment specialist because of his race, national origin, and religion; specifically, he claimed that he was frequently asked questions about his heritage and was subject to derogatory comments. Defendant Merrill Lynch claimed that it fired plaintiff after giving him numerous warnings of his failure to meet set performance standards. The Court ultimately denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had alleged enough specific facts to make the claim not just conceivable but plausible before a jury.

Masroor Siddiqui, a Muslim of Pakistani origin, sued his former employer, Autozone, under Title VII, alleging race-based harassment; discrimination based on race, ethnicity, national origin, and religion; and retaliation. The plaintiff claimed that he was subjected to a hostile work environment when, after 9/11, he was barraged with racial epithets. He further alleged that he was passed by for promotions because of his race, religion, and national origin (citing comments from his supervisor that they would never promote “people like him”), and that he was ultimately terminated as a result of these factors. The defendant argued that, even if the court found that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of discrimination, the company legitimately denied the promotion of, and ultimately fired, the employee because of poor work performance. The Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the hostile work environment claim, concluding that no jury would consider the evidence produced by the plaintiff severe or pervasive enough for a hostile work environment claim; however, the Court denied the motion for summary judgment in respect to the promotion claim, allowing the case to go forward.

A group of Muslim employees sued their employer, Celestica Corporation, a manufacturing company, and Adecco USA, Inc., a temporary employment agency, under Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. The plaintiffs alleged discrimination on the basis of religion, and also claimed that the defendants refused to reasonably accommodate their religiously-mandated prayer schedule despite repeated requests. The defendants argued that they offered the plaintiffs options to accommodate their prayer schedule, including changing shifts. The Court, however, found that there was enough evidence to allow a jury to conclude the defendants did not reasonably accommodate the religion of the plaintiffs; it thus denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

On appeal from the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, the Court upheld the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The EEOC brought a case under Title VII on behalf of Asthma Suliman, a Muslim employee of Kelly Services (a temporary employment agency), alleging religious discrimination. Suliman claimed that the company required her to remove her headscarf (khimār) to work at Nahan (one of Kelly’s work placement facilities) because of the risk that loose clothing posed to the wearer due to the heavy machinery. The defendant company argued that, even if the Court determined that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of discrimination, the company had “a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” An earlier precedent, Ollis v. Hearthstone Homes, Inc., recognized the operation of heavy machinery as a legitimate basis for requiring headscarf-removal and as a proper defense to a claim of discrimination in such instances. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that the EEOC could not prove that the employee was discriminated against as a direct result of her religious beliefs, and that the defendant had demonstrated a safety-related reason for the lack of accommodation.

Plaintiff Tarick Ali sued his former employer under Title VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act, claiming he was discriminated against on the basis of his religion. As an EMT and firefighter for the District of Columbia, Ali alleged that the District subjected him to disparate treatment and a hostile work environment after he filed a complaint about his supervisor’s lack of accommodation of his prayer schedule. He alleged that, on several occasions, his direct supervisor told him that he must choose between his religion and job, publicly mocked him when he returned from prayer, and ridiculed him for filing an internal complaint regarding the alleged discrimination. The Court denied the defendant government’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the evidence presented could allow a jury to find that the plaintiff was treated adversely because of his religion and was subjected to a hostile work environment on that basis.

Plaintiff Sultan Chowdhury sued his employer under Title VII for discrimination, retaliation, and creating a hostile work environment. In this action, the Court reviewed the defendant’s supplemental motion for summary judgment based on plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. (The defendant had previously filed a motion for summary judgment that was dismissed on the discrimination and retaliation claims, and the Court ordered further briefing for the hostile work environment claim.) The plaintiff also amended his previous claim, detailing the hostile work environment claims, alleging discrimination on the basis of his religion (Islam), including belittling and humiliation in front of his co-workers, exclusion from important meetings, and interference with his attempts to seek transfer. The Court held that the named instances provided sufficient evidence for jurors to find that the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to allow a hostile work environment claim. It therefore denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, allowing the case to move forward to trial. On March 7, 2011, a jury trial delivered a partial verdict in the case, as the jury did not answer all of the questions raised but awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $1,125,000. The Court directed the parties to file a joint status report in August 2011 if they were seeking mediation on the outstanding issues.

The plaintiff sued her former employer, Neiman Marcus, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion, race, color, and national origin; failure to accommodate her religion; failure to stop harassment; and retaliation for her filing of a religious and national origin discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which allowed her suit to proceed in court. The defendant company argued that, because of the statue of limitations, the plaintiff failed to make a claim. Many of the plaintiff’s claims, including allegations of her co-worker directing racial epithets at her, and being compelled to work on religious holidays, were time-barred and thus could not be introduced to the court. The court found that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination as required by McDonnell Douglas, concluding that she did not prove that she was treated differently because of her religion, race, or national origin. Accordingly, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant company on these claims; however, the Court denied the company’s motion for summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim, concluding that a jury could consider allegations that the company permitted so-called sale-stealing, when an employee rings up the sale of a client that a co-worker was working with thereby receiving their commission, to be an adverse employment action in the claim that was not time-barred, and thus the suit on this issue could move forward.

A Pakistani Muslim plaintiff sued her former employer, JP Morgan Chase, under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and disparate treatment. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that she received a lower salary than her co-workers in the same position and that her reasonable requests to work a different shift so she could care for her daughter were denied. The Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Court concluded that the incidents that the plaintiff cited to support her claim of a hostile work environment were not severe or pervasive enough to allow a jury to find for the plaintiff. Furthermore, the court did not see any adverse employment action as a result of alleged disparate treatment (which is an element that the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green test for discrimination requires in cases lacking direct evidence). Finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, the Court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

A Muslim woman, Zahra Mowafy, sued her former employer and her supervisors under Title VII and under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging discrimination and job termination based on religion, race, national origin, and age. The plaintiff alleged that, during her time working for the company, it had created a hostile work environment by failing to stop her student interns from mocking her religious prayer rituals or asking insensitive questions about her religion. The Court found that, although the plaintiff narrowly made a prima facie case demonstrating religious discrimination (as no other non-Muslims were similarly fired), the defendant company had non-discriminatory reasons for firing the plaintiff, specifically poor work performance (which was not disputed by the plaintiff). Furthermore, on the hostile work environment claim, the Court concluded that the incidents detailed by the plaintiff were not severe or pervasive enough to allow a successful claim. Accordingly, the Court granted the motion for summary judgment is favor of the defendant. 

A female Muslim police officer, Kimberlie Webb, sued the City of Philadelphia under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act, alleging religion- and gender-based discrimination. Specifically, the plaintiff objected to the City barring her from wearing a headscarf (ḥijāb) with her police uniform, and argued that the prohibition amounted to a failure to accommodate her right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment. The City argued that the bar was consistent with Philadelphia Police Directive 78 and that allowing her to wear religious garb would cause an undue burden on the City and the Police Department, in that it would compromise a look of cohesiveness and uniformity among officers. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to exhaust internal remedies regarding her claim of gender discrimination and found the bar on the headscarf to be a compelling state interest. Accordingly, the Court upheld the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, granting the City’s motion for summary judgment.

Muslim plaintiff Iqbal Sulehria sued his employer, the New York City Department of Correction, and related officials under Title VII, §1983, and New York State and City anti-discrimination laws, alleging religious and national origin discrimination as well as retaliation for filing a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and through the prison administration. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that his co-workers and managers harassed him for being Muslim after the events of 9/11. The harassment consisted of verbal taunts, intrusive searches, withholding promotions, denying him use of the bathroom, forcing him to work in substandard conditions, and having his face imposed on the body of Osama bin Laden in photos left on the plaintiff’s desk. The Court upheld a magistrate judge’s report granting the City partial summary judgment, dismissing the retaliation and failure-to-promote claims, because the Court found that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case; however, the Court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment as to the hostile work environment claim, concluding that a jury could see the events as alleged to be severe and pervasive enough to allow the claim to go forward.

The Court considered questions of venue for a case related to Islamic financial instruments. The defendant, Dar al-Maal al-Islami Trust, petitioned the Court to compel the plaintiff, Vinewood Capital, to follow the arbitration clause of a profit-sharing (mudaraba) agreement. The Court determined that there was no single agreement listing both parties as signatories, and it thus refused to uphold the arbitration clause.

The defendant, Dar al-Maal al-Islami Trust, sought to enforce the terms of an arbitration clause, which required arbitration in the Bahamas upon disputes surrounding an Islamic financial profit-sharing arrangement known as a mudaraba agreement. The Court found that the clause was not enforceable, as Vinewood Capital was not a signatory party to the agreement. This decision was affirmed in 2008 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The Court denied defendant Deloitte Consulting’s summary judgment motion, contesting plaintiff Zakaria Memon’s Title VII discrimination claim against the company. The plaintiff alleged that he was given fewer assignments and ultimately fired because his religiously-mandated prayer schedule interfered with his workday and allegedly made clients uncomfortable. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was fired due to poor work performance. The Court found that the prima facie case of discrimination was strong enough to survive the motion for summary judgment, and a status and scheduling conference was set for April 2011.

Plaintiff Skwikar Abdelkader alleged a Title VII violation against her former employer, Sears, for failing to accommodate her religion (Islam). The plaintiff alleged that Sears failed to accommodate her religious beliefs by asking her for work on Fridays (the day of communal Muslim prayer services) and on Muslim holidays; she also alleged that the company retaliated against her after she reported the alleged discrimination internally to the Human Resources department. The defendant responded that they neither forced her to work those days nor punished her for refusing to do so; it further noted that she was fired because she violated company policy by allowing a cashier to use her management discount card without the direct supervision required. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, finding that the company equally punished non-Muslims for misuse of the discount card. On that basis, the Court held that no disparate treatment occurred and therefore granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

The Court granted defendant Freedom Financial Network’s motion for summary judgment in a case where the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging discrimination. Following the EEOC dismissal of his claim, the Court found that the plaintiff, in his second amended complaint, still failed to state a claim warranting relief despite being given several chances to amend his complaint. Plaintiff Reginald Ringgold was an employee of defendant and claimed that he was fired because he was a Muslim and a Free Moorish American National. The defendant responded that it let the employee go because he claimed to be a tax-exempt non-citizen of the United States on several occasions, but his documentation showed that he was born in Connecticut. The Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove that his employer knew he was a Muslim or Free Moorish American National, and thus there was no actionable claim of discrimination.