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An Iranian Muslim teacher sued his former employer, the Memphis Board of Education, under Title VII, alleging retaliation and discrimination on the basis of national origin and religion. The plaintiff argued that he was denied a permanent, full-time position because of his race and religion. The defendant argued that the denial was because the plaintiff received several unsatisfactory reports while serving in substitute positions. At trial, the U.S. District Court for the District of Tennessee granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination and that the defendant had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for refusing to offer the plaintiff a permanent position.

An Iranian Muslim professor sued his former employer, Case Western Reserve University, under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of religion and nation origin. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that he was denied scheduled performance reviews and ultimately tenure because of his race and religion. The University argued that the professor was not qualified for tenure. The Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff’s qualification for tenure is a matter of fact, and as such, must be decided by a jury. The case was ultimately settled on June 26, 1998.

A Pakistani Muslim professor sued her former employer under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin. The plaintiff argued that she was denied tenure because of her religion and race, pointing to instances in which several members of the deciding committee had allegedly articulated biases against Muslims and Pakistanis. The defendant argued that it offered the position to the most qualified applicant, who was not the plaintiff. The Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff did not offer any direct evidence of discrimination nor did she prove that she was more qualified than the other successful candidate (which is necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the absence of direct evidence).

Representing himself and a class of unspecified American Muslims, a Muslim-American plaintiff petitioned the court to compel a radio station to include a Muslim panelist on its program regarding religion, under Title VII and other anti-discrimination laws. The Court denied the plaintiff’s request, concluding that he had failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the plaintiff did not file an employment discrimination claim first with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which is a requirement before a Title VII lawsuit can begin.

A Muslim man from Algeria sued his former employer, SUNY College at Brockport, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin. The plaintiff argued that he was not selected for a job at the university because of the Department of Foreign Languages’ head’s prejudice against him. The hiring committee voted in favor of the plaintiff for a permanent position, but the decision ultimately went to the department head, who the plaintiff claimed did not select him out of discriminatory animus toward his race and religion. The department head responded that the plaintiff was not hired because of his lack of research experience. The Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that a jury may find that the defendant’s reasons for not hiring the plaintiff were pretexts for discriminatory motives.

An Iranian Muslim worker sued his former employer, the University of Rochester, under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on race and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that his termination in the months following 9/11 resulted from religious discrimination. The defendant produced documentation of the plaintiff’s poor work performance, citing that as the reason for termination, and the plaintiff did not rebut that evidence. The Court found that the timing of his firing was not enough to establish a discriminatory nexus, that the plaintiff failed to otherwise produce instances of explicit discrimination, and that the University had provided evidence of a legitimate reason for the termination, which the plaintiff did not rebut. The Court thus entered a decision of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

The plaintiff, a Lebanese Muslim teacher in Alaska who alleged a workplace discrimination claim, challenged the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska’s grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff sued under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of national origin and religion. Specifically, she alleged that she was not hired for a permanent position because of her religion and country of origin. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the lower court had not considered all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party (the plaintiff) in its consideration of the defendant’s summary judgment motion, and that a jury could reasonably find that the plaintiff successfully articulated a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court thus reversed and remanded the case to the District Court for further consideration. Even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the District Court again granted summary judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff attempted to appeal several times, but was not successful.

A Muslim man who sued his employer under Title VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of religion, challenged the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York's decision granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff argued that his employer did not accommodate his religion when it refused to allow him to move his breaks to attend religiously-mandated Friday prayer (jumu'a) services. He further argued that he was treated differently (i.e., punished more severely for infractions such as failing to report an accident immediately) than non-Muslim employees. The Court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the instances of alleged discrimination, though not time-barred, were insufficient to create a prima facie case of discrimination.