SHARIAsource

On March 6, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued a revised Executive Order which barred, with certain exceptions, entry to the United States of nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries, suspended the entry of refugees for 120 days, and reduced the number of refugees who can be admitted to the United States by more than half. The Plaintiffs (political activist Linda Sarsour, as well as 26 additional Muslim individuals) filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. While other litigation opposing the revised Executive Order were filed to enjoin only Sections 2 and 6 of the revised Executive Order, in this case the Plaintiffs asked the Court to enjoin the enforcement of the revised Executive Order in its entirety. In order for the Plaintiffs to succeed, they had to prove that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits of their case; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) the balance of the equities tips in their favor; and (4) an injunction would be in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S. Ct. 365, 172 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2008).

This document is a beyānnāme, or declaration, sent by the Ottoman reʾīsül-kuttāb (chief scribe) to Britain's ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, justifying the Ottoman declaration of war on Russia by explaining Russia's violation of treaty obligations. The document gives insight into eighteenth-century Ottoman attitudes to international law and its relationship with Islamic law. Its use of the phrase naḳż-ı ʿahd (breaking the treaty), which has its origins in a specifically Qurʾānic context illustrates one way in which war was legitimized within the Ottoman Empire. Other phrases used in the beyānnāme demonstrate how Ottoman legal plurality functioned within a martial context. 

In this source, al-Khallāl (d. 311/923) echoes the criteria adopted by al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) for determining the credibility of witness. His approach is largely in line with that of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) and the Companion Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī (d. between 42 and 53/662–73). However, Khallāl slightly diverges in permitting non-Muslims to testify in the specific case regarding the last wishes of a Muslim who dies while traveling, a scenario explicitly condoned in Qurʾan 5:106. Aḥmad rejects the notion of non-Muslim uprightness forwarded by Ḥammād b. Sulaymān (d. 120/737) and Khayr b. Nuʿaym (in office 120-27/738-45), maintaining that individuals outside the Muslim community could not possibly be considered righteous in an objective sense given that they transgress fundamental commandments, for example they partake in wine and pork.

This source is part of the Online Companion to the book Justice and Leadership in Early Islamic Courts (ILSP/HUP 2017)—a collection of sources and other material used in and related to the book.   

A child born out of wedlock is typically not entitled to paternity recognition in Morocco. In an unprecedented move, the First Instance Family Court in Tangiers recognized the familial relationship connecting a father to his biological daughter. The Court also required the man to pay 100,000 MAD (10,500 USD) to the child through her mother for the material and moral harms caused to the child from denial of paternity or familial relations. The defendant appealed the judgment. On October 9, 2017, the Tangiers Court of Appeals overturned the First Instance Court decision, rejecting the DNA tests and any recognition of familial relation. The Court also invalidated the lower court’s use of international conventions, explaining that the child is so foreign to her father that the possibility of their future marriage would not be overruled.

This document is a beyānnāme, or declaration, sent by Recāī Efendi, the Ottoman reʾīsül-kuttāb (chief scribe), to Britain's ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. It justifies the Ottoman declaration of war on Russia by explaining Russia's violation of treaty obligations, and gives insight into eighteenth-century Ottoman attitudes to international law and its relationship with Islamic law.

This agreement between Great Britain and Brunei announces that Brunei "shall remain an independent state, under the protection of Great Britain." It confers certain powers over Brunei's internal administration on the British government, and entitles British citizens in Brunei to certain rights. It is signed by Hugh Low, British Resident at Perak, and bears the seal of the Sultan of Brunei.

This case was brought by the parents of Maria Huberdina Hertogh for the following reliefs: that Hertogh's marriage to Inche Mansoor Adabi be declared void and of no effect; that Inche Mansoor Adabi be ordered to deliver Hertogh to the custody of the Consul-General for the Netherlands; that the Consul-General for the Netherlands be free to restore Hertogh to her parents; and that Inche Mansoor Adabi and Amina Binte Mohamed be prohibited from removing Hertogh from the jurisdiction of the court pending the hearing of the application. The Court ruled that it did have jurisdiction to declare the marriage void, that the marriage was invalid, and that Hertogh should be returned to the custody of her mother.

This appeal against the ruling reported in Malaya Law Journal XVII 12 was made on the grounds that the Court had no jurisdiction to declare void the marriage between Maria Huberdina Hertogh and Inche Mansor Adabi, that Hertogh was a Muslim "in fact and in law," and that her marriage to Inche Mansor Adabi was valid. The Court ruled that the declaration of the illegality of the marriage was beyond the Court's jurisdiction, but that Hertogh was domiciled in Holland. As Inche Mansor Adabi had not proven that the marriage was valid by the laws of Holland, the Court had rightly ordered custody of Hertogh to be returned to her parents.

This case was an appeal against the order of the Chief Justice of Singapore that Che Amina Binte Mohamed should deliver Maria Huberdina Hertogh to the custody of the Consul-General for the Netherlands. The Court ruled that the non-service of the necessary parties rendered the order a nullity. This version reproduces the opinions of the presiding judges, Evans, Storr and Thorogood.

A.V.M. Horton edited this 1987 edition of the 1904 report written by M.S.H. McArthur on conditions in the Sultanate (and then-British protectorate) of Brunei. It is a detailed survey of government, administration, and social and economic conditions in the Sultanate, written to the end of informing British administration in Brunei. It predates the establishment of the Residency by two years. This edition includes Horton's preface and annotations, along with supplementary materials.

Brunei’s Second Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed this letter to the Special Procedures Branch of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on April 8, 2019, responding to an April 1, 2019 letter asking that the Syariah Penal Code Order of 2013 be repealed. The letter starts by affirming Brunei’s commitment to international human rights law. It then argues that the Code is acceptable given the local context: Brunei is a small country, Islam has been the official religion for centuries, and religious values underly the Brunein identity, and Brunei has the sovereignty to enforce laws reflecting its cultural and religious values. It also states that the Syariah criminal law system is focused more on prevention than punishment, that the Code does not criminalize any sexual orientations or same-sex relations, and that the most severe punishments require a standard that is so high that it would be extremely difficult to satisfy.

Note: Authors' name is written differently on the cover letter and on the country's official site. In the long form field, his name is written as on the official site.

A group of UN officials, principally Special Rapporteurs, wrote this letter to Brunei lawmakers on April 1, 2019 expressing concerns about the Syariah Penal Code Order of 2013 and asking that it be repealed. The letter starts by listing prior communications between the UN and Brunei regarding the Code, summarizing the aspects of the Code it considers objectionable, and discussing the international human rights standards that it holds that the Code violates. It then urges that Brunei’s government revoke and repeal the Code, contending that it would not be in conformity with international human rights law. It concludes with inquiries for further information. 

In November 2009, Switzerland passed a popular referendum prohibiting the construction of minarets. In response, Mr. Ouardiri, a Muslim living in Switzerland, challenged the legality of the ban in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Mr. Ouardiri alleged that the ban violated his rights under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees religious freedom, as well as Article 14, providing that no one can be discriminated on the grounds of religion. The Court declined to rule on the merits of the case, holding that Mr. Ouardiri neither qualified as a direct, indirect nor potential victim of the minaret ban.

In December 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) considered the question whether Muslim citizens who lived in the Greek province of Thrace could be required to submit to the jurisdiction of Islamic law, as detailed by local experts called muftīs. In Greek law, Islamic law usually governed matters of family law—such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance—in cases involving the Muslims in Thrace. This arrangement was a legacy of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres and the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. When the ECHR considered whether this arrangement should persist, it considered a case in which a Muslim man had died, leaving everything to his wife in his will. His sisters contested the will, arguing that it improperly circumvented the authority of the muftīs. Greece’s highest court agreed with the sisters. With the will invalidated, the muftī distributed one-fourth of the estate to the widow, and the rest to the sisters, in accord with Islamic inheritance law. The widow appealed to the ECHR. This Court determined that the Greek government had misinterpreted the treaties, which did not require a separate legal framework for Muslims. It further noted that Greek case law was inconsistent about “whether the application of Sharia law [sic] is compatible with the principle of equal treatment and with international human rights standards.” In addition, the Court emphasized a right to "free self-identification”: people should be free to opt out of differential treatment from the government on the basis of belonging to a minority group, and the government should not force minorities into a special legal category in the name of protecting them. The Court held that Greece, by compelling the Muslim minority of Thrace to follow Islamic law, had violated Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.

Volume 2

Volume 1