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This brief, submitted by fifteen religious and civil rights organizations, addresses the notion that numerous conflicts often arise between job duties and religious convictions in areas of ritual law, including Sabbaths and other holy days, dietary restrictions, and dress for many Jews, Muslims, Christians and members of other faiths. These organizations point out that the headscarf (ḥijāb) is a particularly visible manifestation of a religious practice (more so than taking off holy days), and under the laws of the United States, it is entitled to no less a standard of reasonable accommodations, particularly in an era where online applications set the qualifications and in-person interviews may offer cause for discrimination if not for application of Title VII broadly. They further argue that “the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning gives the employer a perverse incentive to deny to religiously observant applicants any opportunity to discuss religion-based limitations on their appearance or scheduling. Under that reasoning, the employer’s ignorance automatically defeats a prima facie case, and thus effectively eliminates Title VII’s accommodation protections for those applicants. Under the Tenth Circuit’s position, then, observers of Sabbaths and other holy days will find themselves effectively excluded from a large and growing sector of the workforce that is hired through online applications (p. 10).” For reviews and commentary on the U.S. law implications of this case, see the SCOTUSblog Case Page.

On December 26, 2008, Mariam Ayad ("Wife") and Ayad Hashim Latif ("Husband") got married.  They executed a prenuptial agreement ("Islamic Prenuptial Agreement") on the same day, which the wife alleges she considered to be a customary marriage certificate, not a contract conferring substantive rights and limitations on the Husband and the Wife, respectively.  The couple have a son.  Their marriage started deteriorating in 2020, at which point the Wife alleges she learned for the first time about the existence of the Islamic Prenuptial Agreement and the fact that she had executed it on the day of her marriage with her Husband.  On January 25, 2021, the Wife filed for divorce.  The Husband countersued for divorce and filed a motion to have the Islamic Prenuptial Agreement enforced, which provides that all divorce-related matters, including spousal support, child support, alimony, and marital property division, shall be resolved through the ruling of a fiqh panel to be convened.  The trial court, in rejecting the Wife's arguments regarding the invalidity and unenforceability of the Islamic Prenuptial Agreement, which the Wife had argued based on her assertion that she had thought she was signing a cultural document at the time of signing and that she was not given an opportunity to read and understand the terms, ruled in favor of the Husband and held that the prenuptial arrangement be enforced. 

The Wife appealed to the appellate court seeking relief from the order of referral to arbitration of the trial court.  In her submission to the appellate court, the Wife made four separate arguments:

1. The Islamic Prenuptial Agreement is void on grounds of contravening public policy, as the agreement clearly disavows Texas law and the laws of the United States, and replaces those with Islamic Law, which, according to the Wife's submission, "limits the rights of a woman to obtain a divorce," in violation of Equal Protection, the Establishment Clause, and Due Process, given the different weights assigned by Islamic law to official testimony from women compared to men.

2. The Islamic Prenuptial Agreement is void as a matter of Texas contract law because the agreement was involuntarily executed.

3. The trial court abused its discretion in finding that the Islamic Prenuptial Agreement stipulated to arbitration, as the agreement does not contain evidence of a meeting of the minds as regards an intent to arbitrate.  The agreement's mention of a "fiqh panel" or a "Muslim court" cannot unequivocally be read as an agreement to arbitrate.

4. Relatedly, the trial court also abused its discretion in referring the dispute to arbitration without allowing the Wife to present meaningful evidence refuting the existence of an alleged agreement to arbitrate.

The case is pending before the Texas appellate court.

A Maryland court ruled that Sharīʿa Court lacked jurisdiction in a custody case since the couple never resided in the jurisdiction of the Sharīʿa Court. 

This is the summary of Abouzahr v. Abouzahr 361 N.J.Super. 135.

This amicus brief was filed before the Supreme Court concerning the case of Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. It was submitted by over 50 faith based organizations, including Muslim Advocates, a Muslim American organization. It argues that abortion is permitted under certain circumstances until approximately 19-20 weeks gestation by many schools of Islamic thought. It cites various scholars of Islamic law to say that, among Muslims, "there is no universally agreed-upon moment when a fetus becomes a person,” however "the predominant view is that a fetus acquires personhood 120 days from conception.”