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Chapters on nominate contracts (endowment, sales, options, barter/ mu‘āwaḍa, hire and lease, partnerships -shirka, muzāra‘a, musāqāt, muḍāraba-, reward/ju‘āla, deposit, fungible and non-fungible loan, agency, financial and personal guaranty, assignment, settlement, pledge, gift), shuf‘a, wills, inheritance, marriage and divorce, mahr, and alimony took almost all of its substance from prominent Shi’i fiqh treatises. Other chapters (classification of properties, easement, usufruct, general rules of obligations and contracts, nationality, registration of civil status, domicile, engagement, guardianship, and evidence) are mainly influenced by Swiss and French Civil Codes and Swiss Code of Obligations.

Chapters on nominate contracts (endowment, sales, options, barter/ mu‘āwaḍa, hire and lease, partnerships -shirka, muzāra‘a, musāqāt, muḍāraba-, reward/ju‘āla, deposit, fungible and non-fungible loan, agency, financial and personal guaranty, assignment, settlement, pledge, gift), shuf‘a, wills, inheritance, marriage and divorce, mahr, and alimony took almost all of its substance from prominent Shi’i fiqh treatises. Other chapters (classification of properties, easement, usufruct, general rules of obligations and contracts, nationality, registration of civil status, domicile, engagement, guardianship, and evidence) are mainly influenced by Swiss and French Civil Codes and Swiss Code of Obligations.

The court accepted the plaintiff's claim in part, distributed the estate (four properties, five vehicles) of the deceased as it saw fit, and ordered the parties to share costs.

The Court altered the decision of the lower court insofar as it noted that the vehicle of the two deceased, while only a shell, still constituted part of the estate. It also noted that debts acquired while the deceased couple were married needed to be paid out.

The Court upheld the appeal on the grounds that the plaintiff/respondent had failed to include the children of S bin J (deceased) in the claim.

The court ordered the parties to abide by the contents of the deed of reconciliation, which delineated the borders and limitations of the house in question, as agreed to by both parties.

The applicant sought to impugn a gift executed by the deceased in 2002, one year prior to the deceased's passing in 2003. The court acceded to the application, rendering the bequest process null and void for the following reasons:

1. the deceased's health was in a critical condition at the time of making the bequest;
2. the consent of the plaintiff (as a benefactor) was lacking;
3. the deceased made no oral declaration (Ijab Kabul) at the time; and
4. the witnesses involved in the notary deed process were not family members, as required.

The cassation applicant had married the deceased in 1997. She had one daughter from her previous marriage (her first husband had passed away), and the deceased had four children (first-fourth cassation respondents) from his first wife (fifth cassation respondent). The cassation applicant and the deceased never had any children. After the deceased passed away on 27 December 2011, ownership of their property came into question. The cassation applicant and the deceased obtained the property in 2003, five years into their marriage, and the cassation applicant sought: 50 per cent in her favour, the other 50 per cent split between the five cassation respondents. At the time of trial, the first cassation respondent was in possession of the property, valued to be worth IDR 500 million. The cassation applicant claimed the cassation respondents had not transferred to her half of the property, and based her cassation appeal on the following:

1. As the wife of the deceased, she should enjoy certain inheritance rights;

2 and 3. That while she incorrectly brought a joint asset action, rather than an inheritance claim, prior to the deceased's death, her inheritance claim should still stand;

4. That such an inheritance claim still details the division of joint assets;

5. That the appellate court had shown no interest in examining the case file and her reasons for appeal;

6.1 That the appellate court had applied the law incorrectly insofar as it had failed to properly assess the cassation applicant's additional documentary evidence, most notably that the property had been purchased prior to the cassation respondents selling the joint land of the deceased and the fifth cassation respondent (first wife of the deceased); and

6.2 That the cassation applicant would lodge an inheritance claim if her appeal in this instance were dismissed.

The Supreme Court acceded to the cassation appeal concurring that, while the cassation applicant had incorrectly filed a claim based on joint assets, rather than inheritance, the cassation respondents had also made formulaic errors in their submissions, including incorrectly making the fifth cassation respondent a party to the proceeding. Also, the court agreed that the lower court had failed to consider crucial evidence produced by the cassation applicant regarding ownership of the property.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Takengon Shari'a Court insofar as it distributed the assets of the deceased.

The Court overturned the decision of the lower court and readjudicated the distribution of the assets subject of the will. Particularly, the Court found that the distribution of a coffee plantation (one of the assets) was not based on a mutual agreement or applicable law, meaning parties entitled to it were deprived of their inheritance.

The appellants sought to challenge the ruling of the Blangkejeren Shari'a Court in terms of how the lower court had distributed land under a will to the relevant beneficiaries.

The Court dismissed the appeal, reaffirming the decision of the lower court.

The deceased was survived by two wives, five sons and three daughters. In his will he left behind land and a house, proceeds from the sale of which were to be distributed to all 10 beneficiaries. The appellants sought to challenge the Bireuen Shari'a Court's interpretation and subsequent distribution of the will.

The Court found that the decision of the lower court was correct, however, it chose to restate the distribution per beneficiary in a clearer fashion.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Langsa Shari'a Court in regards to its distribution of the estate of the deceased. The Court dismissed the appeal, however, finding no fault with the judgment and reasoning of the lower court.

The appellants sought to challenge the manner in which the Lhokseumawe Shari'a Court distributed the estate of the deceased between the appellants and respondents (one-third to the respondents, two-thirds to the appellants).

The Court allowed the appeal, but only restated the distribution of the estate more specifically vis-a-vis each beneficiary.

The Court overturned the decision of the Banda Aceh Shari'a Court, finding that what the appellant was seeking did not solely belong to NT (deceased mother), but was the joint property of NT and AH (deceased father).

The Court also held that the respondent's claim before the lower court was unclear and, given his low educational background and knowledge of the law, could not be inferred. Rather, he would need to make a clear and explicit claim.

The appellants sought to challenge the decision of the Banda Aceh Shari'a Court (lower court), which had stipulated the beneficiaries of the deceased, as well as the manner in which the estate of the deceased was to be distributed.

The Court concurred with the decision of the lower court, but added that the appellants' claim in regards to the daughter procuring the estate in its entirety, based on Indonesian Supreme Court Jurisdiction No. 184K/AG/1995, was inpplicable in this case because the child of a beneficiary had passed away, rather than the child surviving the beneficiary.

Moreover, the Court held that the respondents' objection in regards to the standing of the replacement beneficiary, unknown in Sunni fiqh, was not a valid reason, because Presidential Decision No. 1 of 1991 (Compilation of Islamic Laws) had already provided positive jurisprudential guidelines in this regard. The Court cited the qaedah that permits a government to remove any inconsistency or difference.

B bin B's two beneficiaries, his sons Z bin B and A bin B, passed away in 1964 and 2007 respectively. Z bin B's beneficiaries were his daughters N binti Z (the appellant) and H binti Z (first respondent). A bin B's beneficiaries were his children Y bin A (second respondent), M bin A (third respondent), MZ bin A (fourth respondent), N Binti A (fifth respondent) and NU Binti A (sixth respondent).

As the beneficiaries under B bin B's will had passed away (A bin A and Y bin A), the Bireuen Shari'a Court (lower court) divided shares in the 1600m-squared parcel of land bequeathed to them to their beneficiaries (the parties). N binti Z and H binti Z were granted a 25 per cent share each, Y bin A, M bin A and MZ bin A 12.5 per cent each, and N binti A and NU binti A 6.25 per cent each.

The appellant successfully challenged the lower court's ruling, the Court rendering the decision null and void because the lower court had determined more than requested by the appellant. While the appellant had only requested that the lower court stipulate she and the first respondent to be beneficiaries under Z bin B's will, that Z bin B's estate be distributed, and that the lower court define their individual claims to the estate, the lower court had also stipulated the beneficiaries to B bin B's will, and divided B bin B's estate.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Banda Aceh Shari'a Court (lower court), which had dismissed his claim in its entirety in regards to a bequest made by the deceased. The appellant claimed the deceased had intended to make a bequest of a parcel of land to his daughter Zainab.

The Court found that the lower court was correct in its determination, noting that, based on the appellant's claim, the legal relationship between the appellant and respondents was unclear, and that the appellant had failed to involve the relevant beneficiaries and locate their whereabouts. Moreover, while the appellant had told the Court that the bequest was intended for Zainab, points two and three of his claim stated that the bequest was for Zainab, Fatimah and Ummi Kalsum. Accordingly, the appellant's claim failed due to lack of clarity (Obscur Libel).

The court found that the respondents had principally sought from the lower court a distribution of the estate of D.G, who had passed away in 1945. Citing Supreme Court Jurisdiction No. 181.K/AG/1994, the court noted that the rights of a deceased's children, parents and spouse take precedence over those of any other concerned parties. This decision, the court found, was all the more authoritative as it was based on the opinion of Ibnu Abbas, an interpreter and commentator from Muhammad's inner-circle, who interpreted the word 'walad' in verse 176 of Surah An-Nisa' to include both boys and girls.

Accordingly, the court found that A binti D.G (sibling of the deceased H.G) could not be stipulated as a beneficiary of H.G because H.G had a daughter, Z binti H.G. That said, Z binti H.G could similarly not be stipulated as a beneficiary of A binti D.G's estate, despite having been stipulated as a replacement beneficiary, because A binti D.G was survived by her daughter M binti D.

The lower court's distribution of D.G's estate did not reflect this, causing the court to pass its own, far more detailed judgment. The distinguishing inclusion was a lineage of beneficiaries relevant to the distribution of the estate.

The appellants sought to challenge the decision of the Sigli Shari'a Court, which had dismissed the appellants' claim in regards to the estate of the deceased. The Court, however, dismissed the appeal, finding the lower court's decision to be correct and lawful.

The appellant sought to challenge the decision of the Jantho Shari'a Court (lower court), which had dismissed his claim in full.

The Court did not concur with the judgment of the lower court, but still found that the appellant's claim lacked clarity in terms of, among other things, its inclusion of beneficiaries who had already passed away, and persons who had replaced those beneficiaries that had passed away. Accordingly, it dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay costs.