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On September 23, 2022, the Texas Supreme Court remanded a divorce case to the trial court in which it had originally been heard, deciding that the lower court had erred in its initial judgment. The case involved two agreements that had been signed in 2008 when the couple was first married; one was an Islamic “Marriage Contract,” and the other was an “Islamic Prenuptial Agreement.” The wife sued for divorce, claiming that she had not known at the time exactly what she was signing and had assumed that the prenuptial agreement was just a copy of the marriage contract. The prenuptial agreement stated that any conflicts arising from the marriage were to be “resolved according to the Qur’an, Sunnah, and Islamic Law in a Muslim court, or in [its] absence by a Fiqh Panel,” whose decision was to be “binding and final.” The Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred in determining the enforceability and validity of the prenuptial agreement, and that the conflicts arising from the marriage should be determined by a court according to U.S. law, rather  than by a so-called fiqh panel of Islamic law experts. The Court’s per curiam opinion came in response to an appeal from the Texas Fifth Court of Appeals, whose ruling can be viewed here. 

In Farooq Siddiqui v. Mst. Farzana Naheed,[1] the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan (“the Court”)[2] considers whether surrogacy can be reconciled with Pakistani law and sharī‘a, and whether the law needs to be updated. The underlying case involved a Pakistani doctor living abroad who orally contracted with a Pakistani woman to serve as a surrogate, as his wife was unable to conceive, creating a “false drama of marriage” as a cover.[3] When the child came due, the surrogate refused to give the child to the doctor, and litigation commenced. The lower courts held the contract invalid and ordered the doctor to pay maintenance.[4] The Federal Shariat Court does not address the instant case specifically, but holds that surrogacy contracts, with the exception of “test tube babies,” are un-Islamic and void.[5]

[1] Farooq Siddiqui v. Mst. Farzana Naheed (2017), 2017 PLD (FSC 78) (Pakistan).

[2] As part of his project of Islamification of Pakistan, then-Prime Minister Zia created the Shariat Court with authority to decide whether Pakistani law is consonant with Sharia. Several justices are required to be Islamic law scholars. See Niaz A. Shah, Women the Koran and International Human Rights Law 101 (2006).  

[3] Supra note 1.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

The parties were married on 15 July 1999 and had their first and only child on 30 August 2000. At the beginning of February 2000, however, before the birth of the child, the defendant sought the plaintiff's approval to go to his parents' home. He would never return to the matrimonial home and the parties would remain separated for the next 14 years and two months. During that extended time the defendant never provided the plaintiff with any financial support, nor did the plaintiff leave behind anything of value that could be sold to provide for the plaintiff and their child. Moreover, the plaintiff's attempts to locate the defendant were unsuccessful. She sought to pay a fee in order that she could divorce (talak satu khul'i) the defendant for breach of their marriage vows (taklik talak) as she found the situation no longer tenable.

The court acknowledged that the defendant's absence had rendered mediation futile. It also noted that the defendant's conduct specifically repudiated their marriage as he had failed to provide the plaintiff with financial support and failed to care for the plaintiff for more than six months (conduct envisaged by figures 2 and 4 of the parties' marriage contract). Accordingly, by virtue of art 116(g) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the plaintiff was permitted to divorce the plaintiff for breach of their marriage vows by paying a fee ('iwadh) of IDR 10,000.

The respondent had worked in Taiwan from 2007-2013, returning every three years at the completion of a work contract. The parties had quarrelled over how the appellant used money the respondent would send to the appellant from Taiwan, and, since 2013, the parties had not lived together or communicated whatsoever.

The court upheld the decision of the lower court to grant the respondent an irrevocable divorce (talak satu ba'in shughra), finding on the facts that the parties' marriage was indeed irreparable for the purposes of art 19(f) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws. Accordingly, it directed the appellant to pay costs.

The parties were married on 14 August 2013 before a marriage registry official from the local Office of Religious Affairs. The plaintiff submitted that, from the beginning of their marriage, she and the defendant had quarrelled often. The plaintiff claimed this was due to the defendant's temperamental and unstable nature, his gambling addiction, and his use of profane language, which he would direct at the plaintiff.

Problems escalated on 5 October 2013 when, three days into living together in their rental property, the parties had a major altercation. The defendant telephoned the plaintiff's brother-in-law, but, as he was unable to attend the property, the plaintiff's older sister arrived and suggested that the parties calm down and that the plaintiff return to the plaintiff's parents' home. That evening the defendant texted the plaintiff's brother-in-law saying that he was leaving the rental property, that he had sold the parties' household items, and that he was taking the parties' vehicle. The plaintiff had since attempted to contact the defendant but his mobile phone had been inactive. The plaintiff also did not know the defendant's whereabouts, and, since his departure, the defendant had not provided the plaintiff with any financial support. Accordingly, pursuant to the parties' marriage vows, the plaintiff was prepared to pay the agreed sum of money ('iwadh) to divorce the defendant.

The court, pursuant to art 19(b) of Government Regulation No. 9 of 1975, and art 116(b) and (g) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, found that because the defendant had contravened figures 1, 2 and 4 of the parties' marriage contract, the evidentiary burden for divorce contained in art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage had been met. Accordingly, the court granted the plaintiff a divorce based on the plaintiff paying to the defendant IDR 10,000 (talak satu khul'i).

The plaintiff and defendant were married on 3 September 2007 and had their first and only child on 7 August 2008. Around the same time, however, the parties had begun to quarrel because the plaintiff's parents did not approve of the plaintiff's relationship with the defendant. Their disapproval was based on the defendant misleading them all by saying he had not been married before, when, in actual fact, he had been married and already had a child from his previous marriage. The plaintiff and her parents knew this because the defendant's child from his previous marriage would often come to the parties' home asking for money.

The defendant had left the matrimonial home and the parties had been separated for approximately five years. The defendant would also visit the child he had with the plaintiff at the plaintiff's parents' home for the first four months of the child's life, after which he stopped visiting. The plaintiff did not know of the defendant's whereabouts, and the defendant had failed to provide financially for the plaintiff since their separation. Pursuant to the parties' marriage agreement, the plaintiff was prepared to pay the agreed sum of money ('iwadh) to divorce the defendant.

The court, pursuant to art 116(g) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, found that because the defendant had contravened figures 1, 2 and 4 of the parties' marriage contract by leaving for three consecutive years, not providing the plaintiff with any financial support for three months (the defendant had failed to do so for two years), and not caring for the plaintiff for more than six months, the evidentiary burden for divorce contained in art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage had been met. Accordingly, the court granted the plaintiff a divorce based on the plaintiff paying to the defendant IDR 10,000 (talak satu khul'i).

The parties were married on 4 May 2009. The plaintiff submitted that since the parties married, she had been invited to live at the defendant's parents' home in Jakarta. While pregnant she was verbally abused and threatened with divorce by the defendant, and, then in December 2009, while heavily pregnant, returned to her parents' home to give birth. After the birth of the child, the defendant ordered the plaintiff to return to the defendant's parents' home with their child and the plaintiff's parents. In August 2012, due to economic concerns, the parties returned to Padang to live with the plaintiff's parents, while the defendant searched for employment (albeit unsuccessfully). In October 2012, following a minor problem, the defendant left the plaintiff and their child and, since then, had not returned to see the plaintiff and their child or to provide financial support for the child.

The court, pursuant to art 116(g) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, found that because the defendant had contravened figures 2 and 4 of the parties' marriage contract by not providing the plaintiff with any financial support for three months, and not caring for the plaintiff for more than six months (it had already been nine months), the evidentiary burden for divorce contained in art 39(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage had been met. The court granted the plaintiff a divorce and custody of the parties' child based on the plaintiff paying to the defendant IDR 10,000 (talak satu khul'i).

The parties were married on 27 December 2012 and had their first and only child on 31 January 2013. Six months into their marriage, however, the parties had begun to quarrel regularly. The plaintiff submitted that the cause of the conflict was the defendant's lack of responsibility as a husband in terms of providing enough financially to meet the parties' daily needs. The plaintiff also submitted that the defendant was unmotivated in his employment and that she had to assist to make ends meet. Furthermore, the defendant did not assist the plaintiff in looking after their child while the plaintiff was busy or cooking, and when the parties would argue, the defendant would often leave the matrimonial home, sometimes for up to two weeks at a time.

Problems escalated on 20 December 2013 when the defendant failed to provide enough to meet the parties' domestic needs, and the plaintiff was hesitant to seek assistance from her parents. When the plaintiff sought to discuss this with the defendant, the parties argued and the defendant then left the matrimonial home, unbeknownst to the plaintiff. The defendant never returned, nor did he contact the plaintiff or provide her with financial assistance to help rear their child.

The plaintiff sought to pay the necessary fee ('iwadh) for the court to grant her a divorce from the defendant (talak satu khul'i). The court noted that the defendant's failure to attend court had rendered mediation futile. It also noted that the defendant's conduct specifically repudiated their marriage as he had failed to provide the plaintiff with financial support, and failed to care for the plaintiff for more than six months (conduct envisaged by figures 2 and 4 of the parties' marriage contract). Accordingly, by virtue of art 116(g) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, the plaintiff was permitted to divorce the plaintiff for breach of their marriage vows by paying a fee ('iwadh) of IDR 10,000.

This Country Profile provides a basic overview of the legal history and institutional structures of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (Shri Lanka Prajatantrika Samajavadi Janarajaya/Ilankai Jananayaka Choshalichak Kutiyarachu), based on research produced by GlobaLex at NYU Law School and the Library of Congress. Under Sri Lanka's Constitution, Islamic law (sharīʿa or fiqh) has some legal status. 

The fatwa is a unanimous decision by forty Muslim muftis, affiliated with the Sunni Ittehad Council in Pakistan, declaring honor killing of women as “un-Islamic” or heresy (kuffur) and an “unpardonable sin” (gunah-e-qabir). The decree explicitly states that burning a woman alive, in the name of honor, for marrying a person of their choosing, is heresy and against the commands of Islam. The fatwa quotes a Quranic verse, verse number 232 of Surat al-Baqarah: [translated from the Urdu translation of the verse – as used in the fatwa – into English] “Oh woman’s family, do not say no to women for wanting to marry the husband [of their choice] if the two of them have consented to the marriage.” The fatwa states that Islam is the true guardian of rights of women and that it is imperative upon the leaders of an Islamic nation/government (hukumat) to ensure protection of women’s rights. For that purpose, the government should pass and implement laws that make burning and killing of women an unpardonable crime. The oppression and torture unleashed upon women has no relation to Islam. The fatwa then refers to an example (sunna) of the Prophet Muhammad, as narrated in Sahih-Bukhari: The Prophet (s.a.w.) terminated the marriage contract (nikkah) of a woman who complained to him (s.a.w.) that she did not like the man her father had married her off to. The fatwa condemns the act of burning alive or killing one’s child for marrying someone of their choice and then “appeals” to the parents to focus on the ethical education and upbringing of their children in line with the teachings of Islam; and that the upcoming month of Ramadan will be devoted to raise awareness about women’s rights. Finally, the fatwa states that those who burn women and girls alive should be hanged to death.

The particular newspaper reporting (in Roznama Dunya) on this fatwa includes the names of twenty four clerics who signed the fatwa (the total number of clerics who joined in issuing the fatwa were forty but the newspaper article explicitly mentions just twenty four names).