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Xinjiang, officially the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, is a region in Central Asia and home to several ethnic groups, including the Uyghur, Kazakhs, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, in addition to a large Han Chinese population. In recent years, the conflict between Uyghurs and the Beijing government has intensified due to the government’s policies of mass surveillance, increased arrests, and a system of “re-education camps,” which reportedly held more than a million Muslim ethnic groups. The 2017 Regulation was introduced as providing legal justifications for the government’s mass detention policies on anti-terrorism grounds. It was enacted on March 29, 2017 by the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, the region’s legislature. Article 14 of the 2017 Regulation authorized the government to effectuate “education and transformation” through “individual and collective” education programs. Article 48 further authorized criminal penalties for violation.

In divorce proceedings, a wife appealed the decision of the Oakland Circuit Court Family Division, granting her husband’s motion to dismiss her claims and recognize their previous divorce, which occurred when the couple was in India. Specifically, she contested the validity of the “triple ṭalāq” divorce (a version of final, irrevocable divorce under Indian and Islamic law, performed unilaterally by the husband) that her husband performed in India, and filed for divorce in Michigan. The trial court concluded that the certificate of divorce that the defendant husband produced from their earlier divorce was sufficient evidence to dismiss the case under Michigan Compiled Laws 2.116(C)(7) (which bars claims based on prior judgment). The Court of Appeals reversed and found in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that the Indian divorce violated due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution art. 1, § 2, as it gave the wife no chance to plead her case concerning the divorce before a court. The Court also concluded that allowing the divorce to stand would be contrary to state public policy, as it privileged the Muslim personal law of India (which placed women in a weaker position regarding property division in the event of a divorce than would Michigan state law) over Michigan state law and the rights and protections extended to persons living in the state.

The plaintiff, Remon Shields, a prisoner serving a life sentence without parole, brought this action against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, alleging that his religion requires those who want to marry to get married and consummate their relationship, but his request for non-overnight "family visiting" with his wife were denied. The prison contended that there is a policy stating that those who are serving a life without parole sentence are ineligible for the family visiting program. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court granted the respondent's motion to dismiss, determining that there was no fundamental right to conjugal visits, and that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that the prison regulation prohibiting conjugal visits for life-without-parole prisoners was not rationally related to a valid penological interest.

During trial court proceedings in which a Muslim couple was dividing their marital property, the husband, Mr. Irfan Aleem, attempted to perform a “triple ṭalāq” divorce—a form of final, irrevocable dissolution of marriage under Pakistani law, initiated unilaterally by the husband. The Court refused to honor this type of divorce, concluding that it violated due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment by not giving Mrs. Farah Aleem any role or voice in the divorce proceedings. The Court also concluded that allowing the ṭalāq divorce to replace court proceedings was contrary to the public policy interest of the people of Maryland, as it would allow Pakistani version of Islamic law, which grants all property to the husband as the default in divorce cases, to regulate distribution of property in the state of Maryland. The Court thus upheld the ruling of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, granting the wife’s petition for divorce, and applied the Maryland default rule that, in the absence of prior written agreement, marital property is to be divided fairly and equitably.

This enactment of August 3, 1948, "provide[s] for the solemnization and registration of church and civil marriages." It deals with all marriages except those "contracted according to the usages of the Mohammedans, Hindus, Buddhists, Dayaks and other persons governed by their own laws or customs." It names neither the Sultan nor the British Resident, and does not specify an author or enacting authority.

This document was enacted on August 1, 1913. It prescribes certain measures for the registration of marriages and divorces between Muslims in Brunei, and shows the basic format of marriage and divorce certificates. It names neither the Sultan nor the British Resident, and does not specify an author or enacting authority.

The plaintiff petitioned the Court to bury his wife according to Islamic legal requirements over the objections of her family. The plaintiff claimed that he and his wife had shared the Islamic faith and had married by way of an Islamic marriage ceremony the previous year. However, they never obtained a marriage license, and there was no proof of her faith or burial wishes. The Court found in favor of the deceased’s parents, concluding that, without a marriage license, the plaintiff was not her surviving spouse before the law. Therefore, the deceased was to be buried according to her parents' wishes. The Court did not view this as a potential First Amendment Free Exercise issue.

The South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) on Islamic Marriages and Related Matters drafted this bill in 2011 to "redress inequities and hardships arising from the non-recognition of these marriages." The bill proposes legislative measures to statutorily recognize Muslim marriages, arguing that the lack of such recognition unjustifiably discriminates against Muslim women on the basis of religion, marital status, gender, and sex.

The applicants were married on 18 October 2013 by Tgk. H. Hanafiah, the then village imam. The second applicant's younger brother had acted as her marriage guardian (wali nikah), and the dowry (mahar) was five grams of pure gold. Due to a family dispute at the time, the marriage could not be convened at the local Office of Religious Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama). Accordingly, the applicants requested that the court ratify their marriage retrospectively. Both applicants were eligible for marriage, the second applicant having divorced her previous husband in Lhokseumawe Shari'a Court Decision No. 232 of 2012. The applicants submitted that, while they had already attended the Banda Sakti Office of Religious Affairs to request the issuance of a marriage certificate, the office was precluded from doing so as it could not locate any information relating to their marriage.

The court acceded to the applicants' request, acknowledging that while the parties did not have proof of their marriage in the form of a marriage certificate, they had already married. Moreover, the evidence provided by the witnesses in court did not conflict with the applicants' submissions. Therefore, the applicants' submissions, pursuant to art 7(3)(e) of Indonesian Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 1991 on the Compilation of Islamic Laws, had been established and were grounded in legal reasoning.

The court ratified the applicants' Islamic marriage of 25 November 2006, and ordered the applicants to register their marriage with the Office of Religious Affairs. Specifically, it noted that as the marriage was not hindered by anything, such as being related by blood or wet-nurse, it could be ratified.

The court ratified the applicants' Islamic marriage of 11 July 1997, and ordered the couple to register their marriage with the Office of Religious Affairs.

The court ratified the applicants' Islamic marriage of 15 September 1993, and ordered them to register their marriage with the office of Religious Affairs.

The court ratified the applicants' Islamic marriage of 9 October 2013, and ordered them to register their marriage with the Office of Religious Affairs.

The court ratified the applicants' Islamic marriage of 15 December 1975, and ordered them to register their marriage with the Office of Religious Affairs. Specifically, it noted that as the marriage was not hindered by anything, it could be ratified.

The court ratified the applicants' Islamic marriage of 28 August 2003, and ordered them to register their marriage with the Office of Religious Affairs. Specifically, it noted that as the marriage was not hindered by anything, it could, pursuant to art 7(3)(e) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, be ratified.

The court ratified the applicants' Islamic marriage of 6 August 2001, and ordered them to register their marriage with the Office of Religious Affairs. Specifically, it noted that as the marriage was not hindered by anything, it could, pursuant to art 7(3)(e) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, be ratified.

The court ratified the applicants' Islamic marriage of 22 December 2006, and ordered them to register their marriage with the Office of Religious Affairs. Specifically, it noted that as the marriage was not hindered by anything, it could, pursuant to art 7(3)(e) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, be ratified.

The court ratified the applicants' Islamic marriage of 20 July 1990, and ordered them to register their marriage with the Office of Religious Affairs. Specifically, it noted that as the marriage was not hindered by anything, it could, pursuant to art 7(3)(e) of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, be ratified.

The court ratified the applicants' Islamic marriage of 25 June 1992, and ordered them, pursuant to art 2(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 5 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, to register their marriage with the Office of Religious Affairs.

The court ratified the applicants' Islamic marriage of 8 May 1985, and ordered them, pursuant to art 2(2) of Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, and art 5 of the Compilation of Islamic Laws, to register their marriage with the Office of Religious Affairs.