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On December 26, 2008, Mariam Ayad ("Wife") and Ayad Hashim Latif ("Husband") got married.  They executed a prenuptial agreement ("Islamic Prenuptial Agreement") on the same day, which the wife alleges she considered to be a customary marriage certificate, not a contract conferring substantive rights and limitations on the Husband and the Wife, respectively.  The couple have a son.  Their marriage started deteriorating in 2020, at which point the Wife alleges she learned for the first time about the existence of the Islamic Prenuptial Agreement and the fact that she had executed it on the day of her marriage with her Husband.  On January 25, 2021, the Wife filed for divorce.  The Husband countersued for divorce and filed a motion to have the Islamic Prenuptial Agreement enforced, which provides that all divorce-related matters, including spousal support, child support, alimony, and marital property division, shall be resolved through the ruling of a fiqh panel to be convened.  The trial court, in rejecting the Wife's arguments regarding the invalidity and unenforceability of the Islamic Prenuptial Agreement, which the Wife had argued based on her assertion that she had thought she was signing a cultural document at the time of signing and that she was not given an opportunity to read and understand the terms, ruled in favor of the Husband and held that the prenuptial arrangement be enforced. 

The Wife appealed to the appellate court seeking relief from the order of referral to arbitration of the trial court.  In her submission to the appellate court, the Wife made four separate arguments:

1. The Islamic Prenuptial Agreement is void on grounds of contravening public policy, as the agreement clearly disavows Texas law and the laws of the United States, and replaces those with Islamic Law, which, according to the Wife's submission, "limits the rights of a woman to obtain a divorce," in violation of Equal Protection, the Establishment Clause, and Due Process, given the different weights assigned by Islamic law to official testimony from women compared to men.

2. The Islamic Prenuptial Agreement is void as a matter of Texas contract law because the agreement was involuntarily executed.

3. The trial court abused its discretion in finding that the Islamic Prenuptial Agreement stipulated to arbitration, as the agreement does not contain evidence of a meeting of the minds as regards an intent to arbitrate.  The agreement's mention of a "fiqh panel" or a "Muslim court" cannot unequivocally be read as an agreement to arbitrate.

4. Relatedly, the trial court also abused its discretion in referring the dispute to arbitration without allowing the Wife to present meaningful evidence refuting the existence of an alleged agreement to arbitrate.

The case is pending before the Texas appellate court.

This amicus brief was filed before the Supreme Court concerning the case of Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. It was submitted by over 50 faith based organizations, including Muslim Advocates, a Muslim American organization. It argues that abortion is permitted under certain circumstances until approximately 19-20 weeks gestation by many schools of Islamic thought. It cites various scholars of Islamic law to say that, among Muslims, "there is no universally agreed-upon moment when a fetus becomes a person,” however "the predominant view is that a fetus acquires personhood 120 days from conception.”

This is a discussion paper prepared by the Horizon Institute on Islamic criminal law reform in Somaliland.  The discussion paper outlines the reasons for criminal law reform in the country; describes the relationship between Somaliland’s penal code and other laws; makes stylistic and structural recommendations on Islamic criminal law reform; considers the proposed crimes and sentences; and makes recommendations for the future.

By Waheeda Amien (University of Cape Town), originally published on The Conversation

South Africa’s Constitutional Court has fundamentally changed the country’s marriage law, making it fairer to people who are married “out of community of property” when their marriages end. In these marriages, the estates of spouses are kept separate. They do not combine what they own into a joint estate.

The change applies to people who got married after 1 November 1984 when their marriages end in divorce; or who got married before or after 1 November 1984 and whose marriages end in death.

The apex court’s judgment of 10 October 2023, in the case of EB v ER, will benefit spouses, mainly wives, who find themselves in financially vulnerable positions when their marriages out of community of property without accrual end in divorce or death. This includes stay-at-home mothers, who take care of the family home or raise the children full time. Their non-financial contributions to the marriage, including unpaid labour in the home, are now valued as much as any financial contributions to the marriage.

Before 1 November 1984, there were only two legally recognised matrimonial property regimes applicable to marriages in South Africa. They were marriages in community of property and out of community of property.

Marriages in community of property are those in which the estates of both spouses are combined. When the marriage ends through divorce or death, the parties each have a 50% claim against the joint estate.

In the case of the out of community of property regime, the estates of the spouses are at all times kept separate. Neither spouse has a claim against the other spouse’s estate even if they contribute to the maintenance or growth of the other’s estate.

The change

On 1 November 1984, the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 entered into force. It introduced a third matrimonial property regime: the accrual system.

The accrual system allows spouses who are married out of community of property to share in the growth of each other’s estates while still maintaining their separate estates.

Both spouses retain separate estates when they enter the marriage and during the marriage. At the end of the marriage through divorce or death, the spouse with the smaller accrual or no accrual has a claim against the spouse with the bigger accrual. The claim is for an amount equal to half of the difference between the accrual of the respective estates of the spouses.

For example, a wife and husband each enter the marriage with R1,000. At the time that they are married, both spouses are working. During the marriage, they decide that the wife should stay at home and take care of the house and children while the husband will continue working and be the breadwinner of the family.

Suppose that at the end of the marriage, the wife’s estate is valued as R3,000 and the husband’s estate is valued as R10,000. The accrual in the wife’s estate is R2,000. The accrual in the husband’s estate is R9,000. Half the difference between the accrual of the spouses’ estates is R3,500 (R9,000 minus R2,000 equals R7,000, divided by two equals R3,500.) Since the wife’s accrual is smaller than her husband’s accrual, she has a claim of R3,500 against her husband’s estate.

The above crude example illustrates that even though it may not have been intended, the out of community of property with accrual regime recognises that even though parties retain separate estates during the marriage, they may contribute indirectly to the maintenance or growth of each other’s estates, like the wife did through her unpaid labour in the home.

The judgment

When the accrual regime was created, section 7(3) of the 1979 Divorce Act was amended to allow spouses who were married out of community of property before 1 November 1984 (who therefore did not have the option of accrual), and who were undergoing a divorce, to apply to a divorce court for a redistribution order.

Through a redistribution order, a court can transfer the assets of one spouse to the other spouse if it is just and equitable to do so. This applies in instances where one spouse contributes directly or indirectly to the maintenance or growth of the other spouse’s estate including through the rendering of services.

In its judgment of 10 October 2023, the Constitutional Court found section 7(3) of the Divorce Act, among others, to be unconstitutional and invalid to the extent that it did not include a) spouses who were married out of community of property without accrual after 1 November 1984 if the marriages were dissolved through divorce, and b) spouses who were married out of community of property without accrual before or after 1 November 1984 whose marriages ended through death.

These parties could not claim a redistribution order if they contributed to the maintenance or growth of their spouse’s estate.

Significance of the judgment

The court’s judgment will provide much needed financial relief to spouses whose marriages out of community of property without accrual end regardless of when the parties were married or how the marriage ended.

The judgment will also benefit spouses in Muslim marriages. These were legally recognised when the Constitutional Court, in a 2022 case, Women’s Legal Centre Trust v President of the Republic of South Africa, declared that the common law definition of marriage and section 7(3) of the Divorce Act, among others, were unconstitutional to the extent that they did not include Muslim marriages. Now, spouses in Muslim marriages that are out of community of property without accrual, which dissolve through divorce or death, may apply to court for a redistribution order to transfer the assets from one spouse’s estate to the other.

Next steps

The advisory committee of the South African Law Reform Commission Project 100E on the Review of Aspects of Matrimonial Property Law is reviewing existing laws that deal with matrimonial property regimes.

In light of the Constitutional Court judgments in the Muslim marriages’ and accrual cases, the advisory committee could most likely recommend amendments to, among others, section 7(3) of the Divorce Act to enable all spouses married out of community of property without accrual to apply to court for a redistribution order when their marriages end in divorce or death.

In its discussion paper 160, the commission recommends that a court should retain discretion to ensure a just and equitable result when granting a redistribution order.